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The effects of climate change are being felt globally, but especially by Pacific Island Countries 
(PICs) that face challenges of rising sea levels, salt-water inundation, and more extreme 
weather events. Conversation about climate change in this region has turned to adaptation 
methods, including the idea of climate change-induced migration. The discourse of ‘climate 
refugees’ has emerged, suggesting potential for large numbers of international migrants as PICs 
become uninhabitable due to climate change. As a low-lying atoll nation, the Republic of 
Kiribati has been placed at the forefront of this issue as an example of a state that may become 
uninhabitable in the future. However, notions of climate migration are complex and contested, 
raising a number of questions around the dominance of Western knowledge, power and 
discourses in climate change issues, as well as issues justice and responsibility that arise from 
entire nations becoming uninhabitable. This thesis aims to explore the ongoing debate over 
climate change migration in the Pacific region, focusing on representations of Kiribati, the 
implications of these representations for the responses of Kiribati and New Zealand 
organisations to climate change, and what role New Zealand Government and Non-
governmental Organisation (NGOs) have in these issues.  
This thesis uses a post-structural approach to complete a media discourse analysis of New 
Zealand and international news articles to uncover the dominant representations of Kiribati in 
relation to climate change migration and adaptation. Semi-structured interviews were also 
conducted with New Zealand Government, involved NGOs and New Zealand I-Kiribati to 
provide a range of in-depth perspectives on issues and approaches to climate change migration 
and adaptation. The findings show that climate migration from Kiribati remains a complex and 
contested idea that is developing and surrounded by uncertainty. I argue there is a disconnect 
between representations of Kiribati in the media analysis in relation to climate migration and 
adaptation, compared the actual approaches by New Zealand Government and NGOs that are 
focused on adaptation and development through principles of partnership, with climate 
migration remaining a background issue that will be addressed in future if necessary. I contend 
that climate migration represents a more recent iteration of geographic imaginaries, framing 
Kiribati as ‘other’ and in need of Western assistance for its population to migrate. Contrasting 
these imaginaries, the approaches being taken by New Zealand in Kiribati show the nuance of 
these issues and suggest the role of New Zealand (and other industrialised nations) is to support 
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Introduction: Climate Change Migration, Kiribati 
and New Zealand 
 
1.1 Introduction: Climate Change and Pacific Island Countries  
Climate change is an increasing challenge that is exacerbating existing inequalities globally 
through its uneven impacts. Though Pacific Island Countries (PICs) make minimal 
contributions to global emissions that cause anthropogenic climate change, these nations are 
among some of the worst and most immediately affected by climate change (Iati, 2008; Mearns 
and Norton, 2010; Betzold, 2015). PICs face a range of impacts such as sea level rise, coral 
bleaching, degradation of groundwater, increased temperatures and droughts (Nurse et al., 
2014). While mitigation of climate change has been a focus internationally, there is now 
agreement that some climate change effects are no longer preventable, making adaptation a 
necessity (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010; Betzold, 2015). This is particularly the case for PICs 
such as the Republic of Kiribati, where it has been predicted that in the future these impacts 
will make the nation uninhabitable (Betzold, 2015). With its continuing impacts, conversation 
about climate change and the Pacific region has turned to adaptation methods, including the 
idea of climate change induced migration.  
 
Ideas of climate change migration are embedded in the wider context of how climate change 
adaptation and development in the Pacific region have been understood and approached. These 
approaches are informed by the broader governance of climate change. Critics argue that 
orthodox understandings have ‘universalised’ the climate and separated it from cultural settings 
(Hulme, 2008), with dominant understandings of the climate separating the ‘physical’ and the 
‘cultural’ (Hulme, 2009). Climate change science represents a ‘powerful orthodoxy’ for NGOs 
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and governments, particularly in the Global North1 (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2010). Western 
worldviews such as these have dominated understandings of both climate change and 
development approaches. Development aid has been governed by Western-based institutions, 
practices and policies, technical expertise and science, privileging the power of the Global 
North to define and control development (Escobar, 1999; Hammett, 2019). Similarly in the 
case of climate change, top-down, technical approaches to adaptation have dominated in the 
Pacific region (Nunn, 2009; Sovacool, 2011; McNamara and Buggy, 2017). Often these 
approaches have failed due to a general lack of understanding of the local context and 
appropriate approaches to these issues (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Nunn et al., 2020). In response 
to these issues, there have been moves to approach climate change (and also development) in 
ways that include traditional and local knowledge, context and understandings of the 
environment (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009; McNamara and Buggy, 2017; Bryant-Tokalau, 2018).  
 
Within this context, the discourse of climate change migration or ‘climate refugees’ has 
developed. The idea of climate refugees and climate migrants has emerged to describe those 
who are displaced or at risk of being displaced due to changes to the environment (Farbotko 
and Lazrus, 2012). Though there is no one agreed upon definition, climate change migration 
generally refers to:  
“The movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of 
sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are obliged 
to leave their habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or 
permanently, within a State or across an international border.” (IOM, 2019, p.35) 
In this thesis, I will use the terms ‘climate migrant’ and ‘climate migration’ to refer to climate 
change-related mobilities, though as Chapter Two will discuss further, there are many different 
ways and difficulties to defining and understanding these mobilities.  
  
Kiribati is a key example of these ideas of climate migration, commonly presented as a nation 
that may become uninhabitable due to climate change (McNamara, 2015; Betzold, 2015; 
Allgood and McNamara, 2017). Kiribati has attracted international attention through former 
 
1 I have chosen to use the terms ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ in this thesis due to the issues associated with 
the terminologies such as ‘First World’ and ‘Third World’ and ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries that imply 
whole regions of the world are impoverished or underdeveloped compared to others. While ‘Global North’ and 
‘Global South’ reduces some of these issues, I do acknowledge these terms contribute to binary divisions that fail 
to recognise the diversity of regions and countries (For a discussion of these issues with terminology see Chapter 
One of Hayne, 2008). To limit this, I have endeavoured to use the specific name of the country or region in 
question where possible, rather than these broad statements.  
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President Anote Tong’s policy of “Migration with Dignity” and his awareness raising efforts, 
as a nation that may have to migrate due to climate change (Korauaba, 2014; McNamara, 
2015). Discourses of climate migration from Kiribati have become popular in the mainstream 
media of Western nations and New Zealand has become part of these discussions. For example, 
the case of I-Kiribati man Ioane Teitiota captured international attention over his (unsuccessful) 
refugee claim to New Zealand based on the impacts of climate change (Baker-Jones and Baker-
Jones, 2015). However, there has been little research asking what role New Zealand has in 
Kiribati in relation to climate migration or comparing these approaches to the mainstream 
representations of the issue of climate migration in relation to Kiribati. This gap is something 
I hope to contribute to through this research.   
 
In this thesis I will take a post-structuralist approach to explore these ideas of climate change, 
knowledge, and power through the case of climate migration in relation to Kiribati, and what 
role New Zealand has in these issues. Specifically, I investigate how Kiribati is represented in 
the mainstream media through a Foucauldian discourse analysis of news articles to understand 
what the dominant discourses are and the potential counternarratives that may be forming. 
Through semi-structured interviews, I explore the perspectives of New Zealand Government, 
NGOs and New Zealand-based I-Kiribati. These interviews focus on New Zealand’s role in 
climate migration from Kiribati and how this compares popular representations from the media 
analysis. As this thesis will show, interrogating the way popular representations present PICs 
such as Kiribati in relation to climate migration is important for considering the power of 
discourses and what knowledge informs these constructions. By exploring the approaches 
being taken by New Zealand in relation to climate migration in Kiribati I have illustrated the 
disconnect between the mainstream representations of climate migration from Kiribati and 
what is actually occurring. I demonstrate the role New Zealand might play in international 
discourses of climate change (through events such as the Teitiota refugee claim) and in 
development cooperation in the Pacific region (through the New Zealand Aid Programme).  
 
Although recent examples such as Kiribati have captured global attention of the general public, 
academics and organisations, discussions of climate change migration come from a longer 
history of debate about the connections between the environment and human mobility. The 
term ‘environmental refugee’ first appeared in the 1970s before gaining popularity in the 
following decades (See for example: Brown, 1976). From this point more recent ideas linking 
climate change and migration developed, with predicted numbers of climate refuges ranging 
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from 200 million to 1 billion by 2050 (Myers, 1997; Christian Aid, 2007). However, this 
discourse has been debated and is contentious with a number of issues being raised by climate 
migration critics. These criticisms focus on climate migration as a simplistic understanding of 
complex migration processes (Black et al., 2011b; Brown, 2008; Morrissey, 2012); the lack of 
evidence for claims of climate migration (Oliver‐Smith, 2012; Morrissey, 2012); issues with 
legal definitions and numbers of migrants that have been predicted (Gemenne, 2011; Kelman, 
2019); and the securitised and depoliticised nature of climate migration (Felli, 2013; Baldwin 
et al., 2014; Bettini et al., 2017). Despite these critiques, discussion and debate around climate 
migration continues.  
 
The discursive construction of climate migration has centred around countries in the Global 
South. In particular, the low-lying PICs of Tuvalu and the Republic of Kiribati have been 
placed at the forefront of climate migration discussions (Klepp and Herbeck, 2016; Farbotko 
et al., 2016). Represented as the ‘canary in the coalmine’ (Farbotko, 2010, p.53) these PICs are 
presented as the human face of climate change, a warning of what is to come if high income 
nations do not take climate change action (Felli, 2013; Gemenne, 2017). These discursive 
constructions of climate migration have presented PICs as vulnerable and passive victims of 
an environmental injustice, in need of legal protection and options for migration (Farbotko, 
2005; McNamara and Gibson, 2009; Bettini, 2013). Though the prospect of entire nations 
becoming uninhabitable raises issues of justice, industrialised countries leaders have been 
hesitant to recognise and take responsibility for climate migrants (McNamara and Gibson, 
2009; Dreher and Voyer, 2015; Dwyer, 2020). Additionally, representing entire nations as 
‘climate refugees’ is considered to be disempowering, and based on Western understandings 
of PICs as isolated, vulnerable and lacking agency to adapt to climate change (Farbotko and 
Lazrus, 2012; Gillis, 2014; Hingley, 2017). These ideas of climate migration also tend to be 
informed by Western sedentarist understandings of human mobility as a one-way process that 
occurs due to a failure of PICs communities to adapt (Tacoli, 2009; Hastrup and Fog Olwig, 
2012; Klepp, 2017).  
 
However, discourses of climate migration ignore the long traditions of mobility and adaptation 
to environmental changes by PICs populations (Hau’Ofa, 1993; Teaiwa, 2018; Bryant-
Tokalau, 2018). Reflecting this, many PICs Governments and residents have opposed the idea 
of being ‘climate refugees’, being vocal about their intention to remain in-country or migrating 
on their own terms if migration must occur (McNamara and Gibson, 2009; Bettini, 2013; Noy, 
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2017; Lynch, 2019). This signals that discursive constructions of PICs populations as future 
climate refugees do not always align with the policies and approaches being taken.  
 
As this thesis will contend, to fully understand the discursive construction of climate change 
migration, these issues must be examined in relation to the knowledge systems in which they 
are embedded. Ideas of climate migration are Western-based and part of geographic 
imaginaries that present countries of the Global South as ‘other’ and in need of Western 
assistance. These geographic imaginaries refer the way certain groups or places are 
represented, usually by outside observers, and are based on power, knowledge and discourses 
that establish these perceptions (Desbiens, 2017). This concept originates from the work of 
Edward Said whose book ‘Orientalism’ (1978) discussed how the orient was constructed by 
discourses and knowledge of the West, presenting the East as ‘others’. Said’s geographic 
imaginary is based on the idea that spaces are imagined and meanings are designated to these 
places, contributing to the constructions of ideas such as ‘us’ and ‘them’ that legitimise 
colonisation (Kothari and Wilkinson, 2010). Derek Gregory who further built on Said’s ideas, 
interrogated imaginative geographies in his works such as ‘Geographical Imaginations’ (1994) 
with a focus on the Middle East and the Western geographic imaginations that ‘other’ these 
people (Gregory, 1995b; Gregory, 1995a).  
 
Geographic imaginaries are a helpful analytical tool when understanding climate migration in 
the Pacific region. For instance, geographic imaginaries can be seen in the way islands have 
been represented as remote, idyllic, and sparsely populated which has in the past justified 
actions such as these nations being colonised (Kothari and Wilkinson, 2010). In the context of 
climate change, Piguet et al. argues that post-colonial imaginations of “the archetypal victim 
of climate change as a poor peasant from the south” (2018, p.359) are connected to the focus 
on issues of security for Global North countries. More specifically looking at climate 
migration, Chaturvedi and Doyle (2010; 2015) also discuss how geographic imaginaries of 
climate change and mass migration of Global South populations to the North create a physical 
and mental ‘otherness’ as these ‘millions’ of migrants are viewed as a threat to national security 
as they cross borders. Geographic imaginaries are therefore a key consideration for this thesis 
in exploring Kiribati and climate change migration. Through the interviews and Foucauldian 
discourse analysis of this thesis, I will show the relevance of climate migration as what I argue 
to be a current iteration of these geographic imaginaries in relation to Kiribati as the ‘other’ 
and in need of Western nations assistance for climate migration.  
 6 
 
1.2 The Republic of Kiribati: the case of climate migration  
The Republic of Kiribati is a PIC with a population of 117,606 (World Bank, 2019) that 
consists of 33 islands, 32 of which are low-lying atolls, and one raised coral island, Banaba 
(GoK, 2016). Kiribati is considered extremely at risk to the impacts of climate change as a 
nation that is only 2-3 metres above sea level at its highest point (Storey and Hunter, 2010). 
Not only this, Kiribati is considered a Least Developed Country (LDC), and faces a number of 
challenges including issues of education, employment, health, food security, water, sanitation 
and hygiene (WASH), rapid population growth, and high poverty rates (Loughry and McAdam, 
2008; Storey and Hunter, 2010; Wyett, 2014).  
 
Despite the multiple and overlapping development challenges the country faces, most 
international attention in relation to Kiribati has been on climate change (Carden, 2003; Storey 
and Hunter, 2010). Internationally Kiribati had been represented as a nation that is vulnerable 
to climate change, particularly in the mainstream media. For example, headlines that exemplify 
this view are common: “Pacific nations like 'canary in coal mine'” (Rose, 2015); “What 
happens when a country drowns?” (Munoz, 2019); “The angry sea will kill us all!” (Mitchell, 
2017); and “What happens when the sea swallows a country?” (Nuwer, 2015). All of these 
titles use the common idea of vulnerable nations that will become uninhabitable in the future 
to create sensational headlines. This reinforces the ideas of PICs that have been created through 
geographic imaginaries of nations that are vulnerable and victims of climate change (Farbotko, 
2005; McNamara and Gibson, 2009; Bettini, 2013). Among this media coverage, the former 
President of Kiribati, Anote Tong has also attracted attention to Kiribati using discourses of 
‘sinking islands’ to advocate for international climate change action, and climate change 
assistance for Kiribati (Korauaba, 2015; Klepp and Chavez-Rodriguez, 2018). In addition, 
Tong implemented the ‘migration with dignity’ approach to respond to the challenges of 
climate migration. This policy would see I-Kiribati upskilled and able to migrate on their own 
terms when this becomes necessary (McNamara, 2015). However, with the recent changes in 
political leadership, Kiribati’s approach to climate change no longer emphasises climate 
migration.  
 
Despite the challenges posed by climate change, and the international discourses that suggest 
climate migration is inevitable, the Government of Kiribati currently does not have plans for 
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its citizens to migrate, having dismissed predecessors policies of ‘migration with dignity’ 
(Hermann and Kempf, 2019; Remling, 2020). Instead the Government of Kiribati is focused 
on citizens remaining in-country through adaptation and a focus on development of living 
standards, infrastructure and tourism (Rytz, 2018; Hermann and Kempf, 2019). The contrast 
between the current approaches to climate change in Kiribati and the international discussion 
of this nation raises a number of questions about the relationship between NGOs, international 
organisations and Global North nations and how these actors interact with countries in the 
Global South. Kiribati is therefore an important case study of shifting approaches to climate 
change, and the disconnects between popular representations of climate migration and actual 
approaches being taken in-country.  
 
1.3 New Zealand, Kiribati and climate migration  
New Zealand has historic, current and cultural connections to the Pacific region as a larger 
neighbouring country that is actively involved in development in the region. New Zealand has 
been drawn into considerations of climate migration in a number of ways. Firstly, due to 
geographic proximity and existing Pacific communities, New Zealand is considered a suitable 
location for migrants, should climate migration be necessary (Cameron, 2013). Secondly, New 
Zealand has received 11 claims for refugee status on the basis of climate change related factors 
(Manch, 2018; Walters, 2019). However, due to legal issues and the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees not including environmental factors as a reason for refuge, none of 
these claims have been successful (Shen and Binns, 2012). Thirdly, in 2017 the Green Party of 
New Zealand proposed an Experimental Humanitarian visa that would allow for 100 Pacific 
people to migrate permanently to New Zealand due to the impacts of climate change (Green 
Party, 2017). This Humanitarian Visa gained international attention, as no other country has a 
policy specifically for those displaced by climate change (Fiennes, 2019). The subsequent 
dismissal of this Humanitarian Visa in 2018 therefore raises a number of questions about 
climate migration, and the role of high-income nations such as New Zealand in these issues, 
something this thesis will explore. 
 
The New Zealand Government engages in Kiribati through the New Zealand Aid Programme 
(NZAP). This programme is focused on supporting the development policies of the 
Government of Kiribati and projects that address a range of development challenges including 
climate change adaptation (MFAT, n.d.c). While climate change adaptation is included in New 
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Zealand’s work, the focus is not on climate change migration, signalling a disconnect between 
representations of climate change in Kiribati and the actual approaches being taken there. New 
Zealand has two available migration pathways that include Kiribati, the Recognised Seasonal 
Employer scheme (RSE) for short-term labour migration (Immigration New Zealand, 2020a), 
and permanent migration through the Pacific Access Category Resident Visa (Immigration 
New Zealand, 2020b). It has been suggested that these migration pathways could be extended 
to ease migration pressures from climate change and other factors (Bedford and Bedford, 
2010). However, despite New Zealand being drawn into conversations of climate migration 
from Kiribati and other PICs, currently the nation has no specific climate migration pathway 
for Kiribati or elsewhere.  
 
This thesis will assert that New Zealand and Kiribati are connected by climate change 
migration discourses and events. For example, the climate refugee claim by I-Kiribati man 
loane Teitiota drew international attention to climate migration issues. Teitiota applied for 
refugee status in New Zealand through the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 
2013 due to the impacts of climate change in Kiribati but, despite multiple  appeals, was denied 
(see Baker-Jones and Baker-Jones, 2015). This event, along with the suggested Humanitarian 
Visa raised questions about whether New Zealand should have migration pathways for I-
Kiribati displaced by climate change. However, I argue that there is more nuance to this 
connection between Kiribati and New Zealand than the mainstream discourses of climate 
migration suggest. Kiribati and New Zealand have both historic and current connections 
through development initiatives and labour migration, and now through discourses of climate 
migration. However, mainstream understandings of the issue of climate migration and how this 
will impact Kiribati are not necessarily reflective of the actual approaches being taken to 
climate change issues by the nation’s government and its development partners. These 
differences raise several questions and areas that can be explored further to understand 
representations of Kiribati and the role of New Zealand Government and NGOs in adaptation 
and climate migration approaches.  
 
It is not the goal of this thesis to establish if climate migration is an appropriate approach or 
solution to the challenges Kiribati (and other PICs) face due to climate change. Nor is it the 
purpose to speak on behalf of the people of Kiribati. Instead, in this thesis I aim to cover a 
range of perspectives on issues of climate change migration to consider how involved actors 
from New Zealand NGOs and Government, as well as New Zealand based I-Kiribati see this 
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issue. In doing so I hope to shed light on the differences or similarities between perspectives 
and how these align with the popular representations of Kiribati in the media and international 
discussions. As such, the next section outlines the aim and research questions of this study.  
 
1.4 Research aim and questions  
The aim of this project is to explore the ongoing debate over “climate refugees” and climate 
change induced migration in the Pacific region, climate change adaptation approaches, and 
New Zealand’s role in this issue. Specifically, it will examine representations of climate change 
regarding Kiribati, and the implications or consequences of these representations for the 
responses of both Kiribati and New Zealand to climate change.  This project has four key 
questions:   
1. How has climate change in the Pacific region been represented by mainstream media 
groups? The specific focus has been in terms of migration and adaptation, specifically 
in relation to Kiribati and in representations by New Zealand.  
2. How do popular representations of climate migration reflect how the issue is understood 
and approached by New Zealand government, NGOs and policy makers who are 
involved in the issue?  
3. What are the different perspectives of the New Zealand Government, NGOs and New 
Zealand based I-Kiribati on climate migration, adaptation and approaches taken to 
Kiribati? Have these shifted over time?  
4. How do notions of climate justice and responsibility affect issues of climate change 
migration and adaptation, particularly with regards to New Zealand’s approaches in 
the Pacific? 
 
Exploring climate migration in relation to Kiribati is useful for understanding broader issues 
of knowledge, power and discourse in approaches to climate change and development in the 
Pacific region. More broadly, as I will argue in this thesis, analysing discourses of climate 
migration helps to understand power relations between nations of the Global North and the 
Global South, as these discursive constructions of climate migrants symbolise an iteration of 
geographic imaginaries that represent PICs as vulnerable and ‘other’. However, I will also 
assert that though PICs such as Kiribati are dominantly represented in this manner, there is also 
nuance to the issue of climate migration. Approaches to climate change in Kiribati are focused 
on a variety of adaptation and development approaches with the goal to remain in-country. As 
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such, climate migration remains an issue being worked on in the background should this 
become necessary in future. Therefore, I contend that representations of climate migration from 
Kiribati as inevitable does not fully reflect the responses being taken by Kiribati and New 
Zealand organisations. These disconnects between popular representations of climate change 
and the actual approaches being taken also signal the uncertain and developing nature of 
climate change issues such as climate migration.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure and overview  
The following chapter (Chapter Two) analyses and outlines the relevant literature around 
climate change, development, and climate change migration, discussing how this concept has 
developed and shifted over time to the most recent iterations of this discourse around climate 
change migration as adaptation. Here I illustrate the dominance of Western understandings and 
approaches to both climate change adaptation and climate change migration and assert the 
importance of linking post-structural ideas of knowledge, power and discourse to understand 
how climate change migration connects to wider issues of development and climate change 
knowledge. The literature review also establishes the lack of studies surrounding Kiribati and 
New Zealand, particularly in regards to the role New Zealand actors play in approaches to 
climate change adaptation and migration.  
 
Chapter Three contextualises the topic of this thesis, introducing the Republic of Kiribati and 
New Zealand through discussion of the main events, actors, policies and approaches in the 
space of climate change adaptation, development aid, and governance. In this chapter I show 
how the existing geopolitical relations between New Zealand and Kiribati (and more generally 
the Pacific region) contribute to and informs current understandings and approaches to climate 
change migration. It is argued here that New Zealand and Kiribati have been connected through 
issues of climate change migration including the I-Kiribati man Teitiota’s claim to refuge in 
New Zealand due to climate change, and the 2017 suggestion of an Experimental Humanitarian 
Visa for climate change displaced Pacific peoples.  
 
In Chapter Four I outline the methodological approach and methods used in this study. I have 
followed a post-structural approach to knowledge that allows for the analysis of discourses and 
power relations involved in climate migration. This project uses qualitative methods of a 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis of news articles to show the mainstream representations of 
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Kiribati in terms of climate migration and climate change adaptation. Semi-structured 
interviews are used to uncover the perspectives of New Zealand Government and NGOs and 
New Zealand I-Kiribati on issues of climate migration in Kiribati, and the role of New Zealand 
in these issues. In addition, ethical considerations and my positionality as a researcher will be 
considered. Here I establish the reasoning for my chosen focus on the role of New Zealand in 
issues of climate change in Kiribati, and how I have endeavoured to remain reflexive and 
address the uneven power relations that are present in research projects.  
 
Following this, Chapters Five, Six and Seven will describe and analyse the main findings of 
this project. Firstly, in Chapter Five the results of the media discourse analysis will be 
discussed to address research question one. This provides an overview of the media coverage 
of Kiribati and New Zealand in terms of climate change adaptation and migration. The media 
analysis results support arguments of earlier chapters that climate migration discourses are 
Western based and centred on scientific and ‘expert’ knowledge. I argue this continues to 
uphold traditional power relations between Global North and Global South nations that frame 
Kiribati as a vulnerable island nation without agency, in need of assistance from Western 
donors and nations. It is clear that while there is some nuance present in the media discourses, 
there is a need for more incorporation of diverse knowledges and views of local populations as 
much fewer articles include the perspectives and worldviews of I-Kiribati.   
 
Chapter Six explores the role of New Zealand Government and NGOs in Kiribati in terms of 
climate change adaptation and migration to address the second research question. Through 
interviews with key informants, this chapter establishes that, contrary to the mainstream media 
representations of Kiribati canvassed in the previous chapter, New Zealand approaches do not 
currently focus on climate migration as a solution to the challenges of climate change. While 
respondents acknowledged that climate migration from Kiribati may be inevitable in the future, 
current approaches in Kiribati are focused on adaptation and cross-cutting development issues, 
with climate change migration policies being a background issue that may be investigated 
further in future. I argue this apparent disconnect between representations of Kiribati and the 
actual approaches of New Zealand to Kiribati demonstrates that climate migration is a 
developing issue surrounded by uncertainty. This can be seen in the range of approaches that 
Key Informants noted could be possible in future if migration from Kiribati becomes necessary.  
It appears that New Zealand’s approach to Kiribati is embedded in the broader geopolitics of 
the region, and policy shifts such as the Pacific Reset based on principles of working in 
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Partnership with Kiribati to focus on development and adaptation approaches the Government 
of Kiribati deems appropriate.  
 
The final results chapter, Chapter Seven, analyses the findings of the Key Informant 
interviews further to address research questions three and four. This chapter interrogates the 
perspectives of New Zealand I-Kiribati on climate change migration and New Zealand’s role 
in Kiribati, as well as asking larger questions about what leadership from PICs such as Kiribati 
might look like, and what justice and responsibility would mean. The findings show the 
perception from Key Informants that while local awareness and education about the science 
and impacts of climate change varies throughout Kiribati, there is existent local and traditional 
knowledge and abilities to adapt to environmental changes. Key Informants argued for the 
importance of including local knowledge and worldviews in achieving contextually 
appropriate approaches to climate change, rather than the tendency to privilege Western, 
outside knowledges. This chapter also demonstrates recognition of the responsibility of New 
Zealand as a neighbouring and industrialised country to assist PICs such as Kiribati in their 
transition towards a future in a changing climate.  Understandings of this responsibility varied 
between Key Informants from traditional notions of responsibility of high-emitting nations, to 
those of collective global responsibility. These differences in perspectives help to envisage 
what climate justice might look like for Kiribati and other PICs. 
 
The final chapter (Chapter Eight) concludes this research, synthesising the main findings from 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven to answer the overall research aim of this project. In addition, 
the limitations of the project will be outlined as well as suggesting future directions research 








Literature Review: Climate Change, Migration, 
Discourse, and Development  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Climate change related mobility has been the topic of numerous academic, policy and media 
publications. In this chapter I will explore some major areas of literature involved in this 
discussion to provide background for my approach in this thesis. This chapter will focus on the 
connections of climate change migration discourses to those of development and climate 
change that are embedded in Western knowledge. Western development practice and the 
governance of climate change have had a role in shaping understandings of PIC communities. 
It is therefore crucial to explore the role these have in shaping discourses of climate migration. 
The chapter will then outline the shifting discussions of climate migration over time that have 
resulted in current discourses of climate migration in relation to PICs such as Kiribati. In doing 
so, I will argue that it is crucial to explore the underlying power relations, knowledge and 
discourses that have resulted in discourses of climate migration from PICs. I also contend that 
while there have been many studies of climate migration, comparatively fewer have explored 
this issue from a post-structural perspective, and even fewer have considered the links between 
development, discourse and representations in relation to the role of industrialised nations such 
as New Zealand in Kiribati. By taking a post-structural approach and exploring these areas, I 
argue that differing perspectives and approaches to the issue of climate change can be 
uncovered and the connections to broader issues of development, power relations of the Global 
North and Global South, and geographic imaginaries can be interrogated.  
 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of climate change in the Pacific region and adaptation 
approaches that have been used in this region. Following this, literature on development and 
its connections to climate change will be discussed. Climate migration and its historical roots 
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in the literature will then be outlined, exploring the various debates and criticisms that have 
emerged from this contested concept. Here I argue that while there have been numerous studies 
that explore, problematise or investigate climate migration discourses, fewer studies have 
examined this issue from a post-structural perspective, and even fewer have examined the 
differences in perspectives and approaches between PICs and NGOs compared to mainstream 
portrayals of climate migration. The final section will consider how justice and responsibility 
has been, and might be, conceptualised in relation to climate migration, before concluding with 
a discussion of the research gaps.   
 
2.2 Climate change and Pacific Island Countries   
Climate change is now widely accepted as one of the greatest challenges faced globally. The 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that if current rates of warming 
continue, human activities will cause 1.5°C of warming beyond pre-industrial levels by 
between 2030-2052 (IPCC, 2018). This figure has major implications globally through 
physical implications such as the potential for increased extremes in temperature, precipitation, 
droughts, sea level rise, and species loss (IPCC, 2018). Climate change exacerbates existing 
inequalities globally, with countries of the Global South facing the most immediate effects of 
climate change despite contributing much less to global greenhouse gases than richer countries 
(Mearns and Norton, 2010; UNDP, 2019, 2007). The impacts of climate change vary globally, 
but the Pacific region is especially affected and an example of the disproportionate impacts of 
climate change.  
 
Pacific Island Countries (PICs) contribute minimally to global greenhouse emissions, but face 
some of the most severe and immediate consequences of climate change (Betzold, 2015; 
Kumar et al., 2020). The low-lying atoll Kiribati in particular is facing severe impacts of 
climate change while being among the lowest emitters of CO2 globally (Kumar et al., 2020). 
Some of the challenges faced by PICs include sea level rise, increased temperature, drought, 
coral bleaching, and degradation of groundwater (IPCC, 2018; Nurse et al., 2014). The 
environmental impacts of climate change are likely to have detrimental effects on the 
livelihoods of communities in small islands such as PICs, threatening human security (Adger 
et al., 2014; Nurse et al., 2014). These impacts  also pose risks to the culture of PICs (Chand, 
2020). For example, there are predictions that some PICs such as Kiribati may become 
uninhabitable in the future due to these impacts of climate change (Betzold, 2015). This 
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prediction has led to the mainstreaming of the idea that climate migration from Kiribati is 
inevitable in the future. It is therefore crucial that adaptation takes place for reduce these 
impacts on PICs.  
 
2.2.1 Mitigation and Adaptation approaches in the Pacific region  
Mitigation by nations emitting large amounts of GHGs is crucial to reduce the impacts of 
climate change (Betzold, 2015). In the past this mitigation has generally been the focus of 
climate change discussion, however it is arguable that adaptation is now the favoured and 
prominent approach to climate change in PICs (McNamara and Buggy, 2017). With the 
continued effects of climate change, there has been recognition that adaptation must now occur. 
This is because of agreement that some effects of climate change cannot be avoided making 
adaptation necessary, especially for effected PICs (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010; Betzold, 2015). 
Thus, while policy makers have traditionally focused on mitigation to a greater extent than 
adaptation, since the UNFCCC’s Marrakesh Accords that brought adaptation into global 
negotiations, there has been a growth in focus on this issue (Weber, 2016). Two main 
approaches to adaptation are top-down or ‘hard’ approaches, and bottom-up or ‘soft’ 
approaches. Understanding these two approaches to climate change in the Pacific region 
specifically is useful for understanding the context that climate migration from PICs is 
emerging from.  
 
2.2.2 Approaches to Adaptation in PICs 
Traditionally, climate change adaptation has been approached in a top-down and technocratic 
manner, focusing on ‘hard’ approaches. Hard approaches have dominated adaptation and 
include the use of human created infrastructure and are complicated, inflexible and expensive 
creating “large-scale disturbances to local communities and/or ecosystems” (Sovacool, 2011, 
p. 1178). Supporters of top-down approaches to climate change adaptation at a national and 
global scale argue that this approach offers uniformity and standardisation that results in 
consistency that local approaches do not offer (Sovacool and Brown, 2009). In the Pacific 
region, these top-down technocratic approaches to adaptation have been favoured. For example 
sea walls have been used on exposed coastlines along with other expensive, highly engineered 
infrastructure (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010; McNamara and Buggy, 2017; Nunn, 2009). This can 
be problematic as sea-walls and other technologies used in hard approaches are often expensive 
and beyond communities capacities to maintain (Nunn, 2009). These approaches are often 
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based on outside ‘expertise’ and do not take into account local knowledge (Barnett, 2010b; 
Hulme, 2008; Kothari, 2014). As a consequence, these approaches often do not consider the 
effects on the local community or environment and can lead to maladaptation (Barnett and 
O’Neill, 2010; McNamara and Buggy, 2017). In the context of Kiribati, there have been 
discussions, particularly in the media, of large scale engineering feats and approaches including 
building whole new islands to prevent migration from occurring due to climate change (See 
for example: Vidal, 2011).  
 
These top-down ‘hard’ approaches to adaptation have not gone without criticism. 
Technological solutions are not the only way for adaptation to be successful, with local 
knowledge and traditional technologies also being important (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018). 
However, often local knowledge and approaches are not included by donors (Bryant-Tokalau, 
2018). Adaptation to climate change in PICs has often failed due to approaches being 
inappropriate to the culture and environment, an issue stemming from a lack of understanding 
of the context of specific PIC countries (Nunn et al., 2020). For example, adaptation can fail 
because of local perceptions of projects that these communities are expected to then maintain 
once donors leave; the communication of information about these projects; and that these 
adaptation and mitigation projects often present concepts that have been practiced by PIC 
communities for centuries as something new created by Western science (Nunn, 2010). Much 
of the donor aid for climate change adaptation and awareness has not been effective in PICs as 
it has been put into policy or environmental legislation as well as short-term projects that do 
not get mainstreamed (Nunn, 2009, p. 2). Likewise, when these projects end the community 
must maintain structures like seawalls and are unlikely to receive additional funding from 
donors to repair it, or have the resources in the community to maintain these structures (Nunn, 
2010, p. 2).  
 
In response to these top-down and technocratic approaches, ‘soft’ bottom-up and Community 
Based Adaptation (CBA) approaches have been developed, along with recognition of local 
indigenous practices and knowledge (McNamara and Buggy, 2017). Soft approaches are those 
that focus on developing community capacity, assets, and empowerment, and using natural 
infrastructure, capital and technologies that are low impact. ‘Soft’ approaches tend to be more 
flexible to changes in climate change predictions and are driven from a local level (Sovacool, 
2011). CBA specifically encourages community ownership of the project that uses local 
resources and context specific knowledge and culturally appropriate approaches that can be 
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sustained (McNamara, 2013). These CBA approaches are ‘local and place-based’ and take a 
development-oriented approach (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Ayers and Forsyth, 2009). This 
means CBA aims to address development needs such as adaptive capacity, livelihoods and 
productive assets, while also tackling the physical risks that climate change presents (Ayers 
and Forsyth, 2009). Inclusion of local knowledge of the environment into projects, as well as 
raising awareness and education in the community, are also positive parts of CBA (McNamara, 
2013). This approach sees local and indigenous knowledge of solutions as expertise and creates 
adaptation approaches through participatory methods based on a range of local stakeholders, 
rather than just the science (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009).   
 
There has been recognition of the benefits that these CBA and ‘soft’ approaches to climate 
change adaptation have. Organisations such as the IPCC have acknowledged in a report on 
human security that “indigenous, local, and traditional forms of knowledge are a major 
resource for adapting to climate change” (Adger et al., 2014, p. 758). It has also been 
acknowledged that ‘soft’ approaches are less expensive than ‘hard’ approaches, they allow for 
a focus on local communities and can build capacity and empower these groups (Sovacool, 
2011). For example, as an alternative to seawalls in the Pacific region, the soft approach of 
planting of mangroves to prevent erosion is a cheap long-term solution that communities can 
maintain (Nunn, 2009). However, there are still uncertainties about the effectiveness of CBA 
and its sustainability (McNamara, 2013). It is important to also note that different approaches 
may be appropriate in different locations. For instance, Barnett and O’Neill (2010) discuss 
local level adaptation to climate change and whose responsibility it should be to address these 
issues, pointing out that there are not always appropriate resources to address issues at this 
level. 
 
It is also important not to ‘romanticise’ local and indigenous knowledges, something that has 
occurred in some post-development approaches among other studies (Goldman et al., 2018; 
Ziai, 2015). As later sections will discuss, indigenous knowledge and Western science are often 
combined, and indigenous knowledge changes over time (Briggs, 2005; Goldman et al., 2018). 
Additionally, romanticising indigenous knowledge also ignores the problems and the power 
relations that can exist within these communities and knowledge systems (Briggs, 2005; 
Forsyth, 2013). However, PICs should be addressing and leading climate change as they see 
appropriate with outside assistance based what these nations request (Kelman, 2017; Kelman 
et al., 2015).  
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It is also important for this thesis, to acknowledge that in many ways PICs are already leading 
climate change action. In the Pacific region, communities, leaders, and activists have 
proactively advocated for international action and rejected the claims of discourses portraying 
them as passive victims of a changing climate (Kirsch, 2020). Though presented as innocent 
victims of climate change many PIC communities have acknowledged that they contribute to 
anthropogenic climate change through being part of global systems, even if this is minimal in 
comparison to other nations (Campbell and Barnett, 2010; Kirsch, 2020; Rudiak-Gould, 2014). 
As such, “a discourse of innocence that renders the region as passive and lacking agency” is 
not useful for climate change actions (Campbell and Barnett, 2010, p. 72). For example Former 
president of Kiribati Anote Tong and the Prime Minister of Tuvalu Enele Sopoaga are among 
Pacific leaders who have been vocal about the need for international climate actions and in 
climate change negotiations. Groups such as the Pacific Climate Warriors have also formed to 
push for climate action (Kirsch, 2020; Ourbak and Magnan, 2018).  
 
In international negotiations for climate change agreements, PICs have also been active in and 
influential especially considering the small size of these nations (Campbell and Barnett, 2010). 
Organisations such as the Alliance for Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), have contributed to PICs being 
coordinated to collectively negotiate at COPs and in the UN (Campbell and Barnett, 2010; 
Ourbak and Magnan, 2018; Ryan, 2010). In addition, communities in the Pacific have been 
centres for the development and piloting of climate change strategies and adaptation (Lesa, 
2020; Mcleod et al., 2019). In PICs, those working on climate change have combined 
traditional and local knowledges, values and practices with sciences and technologies to 
address the effects of climate change (Hayward et al., 2020; Lesa, 2020; Mcleod et al., 2019). 
This already occurring  leadership in the Pacific region is an important point for this thesis, to 
consider what leadership by Kiribati might look like, and how this impacts New Zealand’s 
relationship to Kiribati in terms of climate migration and adaptation.  
 
2.3 Development, climate change and Pacific Island Countries  
When discussing climate change related mobilities, development is a key area of importance 
due to the role this concept has in shaping understandings of PICs and climate change 
adaptation. Development is difficult to define and has shifted over time and is based on the 
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idea that ‘underdeveloped’ countries will become developed similarly to already ’developed 
nations’ (Hayne, 2008; Ziai, 2017). However there have been limitations to the success of 
development interventions, with wide differences in development outcomes within and 
between communities and continuing inequalities (Hayne, 2008). Development has been 
criticised by the field of post-development in particular, where it has been argued that 
development is a discourse created around a construct of ‘underdevelopment’ and as a response 
to poverty that is embedded in uneven power relations from the post-World War Two era 
(Escobar, 1999; Ziai, 2015). Thus, development interventions continued uneven power 
relations between countries of the Global North and Global South. Here Western powers were 
able to establish in post-colonial countries and embed neoliberal and capitalist ideas through 
development approaches that focused on modernisation and Western practices (Kothari, 2005; 
Ziai, 2015).  
 
International development has been dominated by Western institutions, policies and practices, 
with power relations that privilege the power of the Global North to define and control 
development (Escobar, 1999; Hammett, 2019). Escobar (1999) argues that orthodox 
approaches to development are top-down, technocratic and Eurocentric and do not involve 
people and culture. There have been criticisms that development is based on Western-style 
knowledge, science and technical expertise, where certain knowledge is seen as the truth, 
compared to other knowledges that are discredited (Escobar, 1999; Power, 2003). These 
development ‘experts’ further existing unequal power relations between countries of the Global 
North and South, donors and ‘beneficiaries’, while legitimising development interventions 
(Kothari, 2005).  
 
Similarities can be seen here to climate change adaptation approaches that focus on, and are 
legitimised by, Western science and expertise (Barnett, 2010b; Hulme, 2008; Kothari, 2014). 
These understandings of development are important for analysing the power relations and 
discourses that are involved in climate migration and the way that PICs such as Kiribati have 
been represented discursively. Over time, due to these criticisms of development being based 
on technical expertise, outside knowledge and science, there have been shifts in development 
approaches to move from the traditional approaches from the post-war era. There have been 
moves from the 1990s onwards to view development from a post-structuralist perspective, that 
sees the power relations in the concept of development (Willis, 2014). Here the context and 
diversity of communities where development might take place is important with a variety in 
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development approaches that might be appropriate, along with the need to engage with local 
people in the community (Willis, 2014). These changes show similarities to the broader shift 
in social sciences to recognise the diversity of experiences and voices rather than a focus on 
Western knowledges.  
 
Another important aspect of development for this thesis is the inseparability of development 
from climate change adaptation (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009; Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010). 
There have been debates in how development policy and practice might approach adaptation 
as there are often similarities in approaches, with many development practices now 
mainstreaming adaptation into approaches (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Methmann, 2010; 
Webber, 2016). There is recognition that risks from physical events are not only determined 
by the size of an event, but also by political, economic and social factors specific to contexts 
(Ayers and Forsyth, 2009). Because of this, the development context must be considered as it 
is inseparable from social vulnerability to climate change (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009; Wisner et 
al., 2004).  
 
As was already mentioned, more recent approaches adaptation such as Community Based 
Adaptation (CBA)  have focused on development style approaches (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; 
Ayers and Forsyth, 2009). Development that reduces vulnerability has been argued the best 
method of adaptation to climate change (Mearns and Norton, 2010; UNDP, 2019). The focus 
on incorporating climate change adaptation into development policies and practices has been 
termed by Webber (2016) as adaptation being “folded into development”. Climate change and 
the science surrounding it is also influencing development practices and policies (Cannon and 
Müller-Mahn, 2010). For example, ‘mainstreaming’ adaptation into development is now 
common for donors working on development and with discourses of ‘sustainable development’ 
becoming common (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Methmann, 2010; Webber, 2016). When 
understanding climate migration, the connection between climate change adaptation and 
development is important due to the involvement of NGOs and development agencies in 
advocating for climate action and climate migration. This will be an important consideration 
later in this thesis when examining how New Zealand and Kiribati’s relationship is influenced 
by connections between development and adaptation.   
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2.4 Climate change politics, knowledge and discourse: a post-
structural approach   
As the previous sections discussed, issues of climate change migration are embedded in the 
larger politics and understandings of climate change and also in development. In this thesis, I 
will take a poststructuralist approach that is focused on exploring the power relations, 
knowledge and discourses that influence the way that climate migration is represented and 
approached in relation Kiribati and the role of New Zealand in this issue. In particular, post-
structuralism provides a useful lens due to its focus the productions of meaning, and the way 
power and knowledge interact and create accepted knowledge in society (Fawcett, 2008; 
Panelli, 2004). The work of philosopher Michel Foucault is crucial for understanding the 
connections between power and knowledge. Foucault saw knowledge and power as inseparable 
and knowledge as value-laden rather than objective truth (Foucault, 1984, 1980). Of particular 
relevance to this thesis, is Foucault’s understanding of a “regime of truth” which consists of 
the discourses and practices that are accepted, and count as truth in a society. In Western 
societies this truth usually centres around scientific discourses and establishments (Foucault, 
1984, 1980). This is a useful approach for considering climate change and the power relations 
between nations such as New Zealand and Kiribati in representations and approaches to these 
issues.  
 
A key part of post-structuralism is an analysis of discourse and the power relations involved in 
constructing dominant understandings of an issue. Discourses legitimise certain 
understandings of knowledge and are crucial to controlling, governing and producing 
knowledge in society (Berg, 2009; Panelli, 2004). Understanding discourse is important 
because, as later sections will show, discourses of climate migration are a key example of the 
dominance of Western knowledge shaping understandings of vulnerability, resilience, and 
mobility (Bettini, 2013; Farbotko, 2005; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). Climate change is 
political and uneven power relations exist in terms of what knowledge is considered valid and 
accessible, as well as who is responsible for adaptation and mitigation (Goldman et al., 2018). 
Throughout this thesis, ideas of knowledge, power and discourse are used to understand 
discussions of climate migration and the creation of these representations and much of the 
debate. To understand climate migration discourses it is important to first explore how western 
knowledge, discourses and power have been involved in the global governance of climate 
change and climate change in PICs.  
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In climate change discussions and governance, science and Western knowledge tends to be 
separated and valued above other knowledges such as indigenous, local or emotional 
knowledges (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015; Farbotko and McGregor, 2010; Goldman et al., 
2018). In the governance of climate change, critics argue that in orthodox understandings the 
climate has become ‘universalised’ and separate from cultural settings, with the meanings of 
knowledge about climate changing as it goes between difference scales (Hulme, 2008). These 
Western and scientific understandings of climate change have tended to separate nature from 
society. For example, Hulme (2009) argues that dominant understandings of the climate 
separates the ‘cultural’ and the ‘physical’. This binary separation of people and nature is part 
of a longer Western understanding derived from the Enlightenment period, that is rare in other 
cultures (Hulme, 2009). Chaturvedi and Doyle (2010) note that climate change science has 
become a ‘powerful orthodoxy’ for groups (particularly in the Global North) such as 
academics, NGOs, governments, corporations. Over time, Western climate science has been 
elevated over indigenous and local knowledge systems, particularly through western-style 
development that has promoted westernisation (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015). Thus, this 
dominance for Western knowledge has repercussions for the way climate change is understood, 
and for discourses of climate migration in relation to PICs.  
 
Western understandings of climate have also discursively constructed PICs as ‘vulnerable’ and 
as ‘resilient’ by international discourses of climate change. For example, Governments, NGOs, 
International organisations (such as the UN), and the media have portrayed Pacific Islanders in 
a way that represents them as passive victims of their environment (Hingley, 2017). As Barnett 
and Campbell (2010) state, SIDS including PICs are discursively constructed as being alike 
with a focus on their geographic characteristics such as coasts, being islands, and isolation. As 
a consequence, often PICs are represented as victims without resilience to cope with climate 
change (Nunn and Kumar, 2018). However, in contrast to these Western and scientific 
understandings of climate change, Farbotko and McGregor (2010) suggest that emotions are 
needed to be included in debates around climate change. As noted in the adaptation section 
above, there have also been moves to start incorporating local knowledge and the community 
through soft approaches and CBA. The more recent shift to viewing vulnerable communities 
as resilient through technological or ecosystem adaptation has also been viewed as problematic 
for depoliticising climate change issues through ignoring power relations that exist (Cannon 
and Müller-Mahn, 2010). These representations have been contested and as previously 
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discussed, the way PICs are represented has been rejected by Pacific communities and leaders 
(Campbell and Barnett, 2010; Kirsch, 2020). The dominance of Western discourses and 
knowledge in climate change is crucial for understanding representations of PICs in relation to 
climate migration and adaptation, and differing less dominant perspectives on these issues.   
 
Understanding the important role that local and traditional knowledges have for climate change 
adaptation is crucial for this thesis because discourses of climate migration often fail to 
recognise the value of these knowledges. As already discussed, the global governance of 
climate change has been dominantly informed by Western knowledge and science. This outside 
expertise, scientific modelling, and top-down approach to climate change can alienate 
communities in the Pacific, and disregard local knowledge and abilities (Barnett, 2010b; 
Campbell and Barnett, 2010). However, while Western knowledge and scientific models are 
often elevated in climate change conversations, communities in the Pacific have been adapting 
and mitigating the effects of various environmental changes for generations (Bryant-Tokalau, 
2018; Nunn, 2010). Though traditional or indigenous knowledges are often viewed as binary, 
separate to Western science and knowledge, it is increasingly recognised that these knowledges 
merge and change over time and are used together (Briggs, 2005; Campbell and Barnett, 2010; 
Goldman et al., 2018; Rudiak-Gould, 2014, 2013). Bottom up, community driven adaptation 
that incorporates traditional knowledges and approaches is therefore important, and often more 
effective than top-down approaches (Fletcher et al., 2013; Nunn, 2009). 
  
It is clear that local and traditional knowledges are important for approaching climate change 
effectively. Another crucial aspect of this is understanding local context. Context such as local 
culture and religion effects the way climate change is understood, and varies between and 
within PICs, for example between outer and central islands of nations (Fletcher et al., 2013; 
Nunn, 2010, 2009). Understanding context is crucial for conveying climate change information 
in appropriate ways. For instance the radio or in-person meetings using the local language and 
protocols is important, or the information coming from those who are local to the community 
in question (Nunn, 2010, 2009; Rudiak-Gould, 2014). The Church has been noted as a social 
agent of change that can be powerful in climate change adaptation (Fletcher et al., 2013). 
However, official approaches to climate change can inadequately account for the part that the 
church, spirituality, and traditional belief systems have in PIC communities (Bryant-Tokalau, 
2018). The role of faith and the church is something that will be touched on in later chapters 
(see Chapter Three and Chapter Seven in particular). Faith and religious beliefs have in some 
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circumstances been shown to be a barrier to climate change actions (Kuruppu and Liverman, 
2011; Loughry and McAdam, 2008). However, the church and religious affiliated NGOs, for 
example Caritas, can also be powerful actors for spreading awareness of climate change 
through taking part in awareness raising activities and dissemination of climate change 
knowledge to local communities as a trusted organisation (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Hermann, 
2017; Kempf, 2012; Nunn, 2010). This is important because awareness raising activities have 
been a focus of PIC governments and actors and while important, this education and awareness 
about climate change needs to include and be based on local systems, rather than outside values 
being pushed on PIC communities (Nunn et al., 2014).  
 
Overall, as this thesis will show, it is crucial to consider the knowledge and context that 
discursive constructions of climate migration in relation to Kiribati originate from, and what 
views may be silenced by these dominant knowledges. As mentioned above, I argue that the 
post-structuralist approach taken in this thesis will facilitate an understanding of these differing 
knowledges when interrogating the role of New Zealand in issues of climate migration and 
representations of Kiribati.  
 
2.5 Mobility, the Environment, and Climate Change  
A common discourse that has emerged in relation to climate change is the idea of climate 
change migration. The term “climate refugee” and “climate migrant” have emerged to describe 
those who have been displaced or are at risk of being displaced due to changes to the 
environment (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). This discussion has often focused on countries of 
the Global South and low-lying atoll nations of the Pacific region, particularly the PICs Kiribati 
and Tuvalu (Allgood and McNamara, 2017; Farbotko, 2010). As this discourse has gained 
popularity, many debates have emerged around this idea which this section will discuss. 
However, to fully understand the nature of this discourse of the connections between human 
mobility and environmental changes, the roots of this discourse must be understood. I will 
begin by outlining historic and early conceptualisations of climate migration, before discussing 
some of the major shifts, debates and critiques around this discourse.  
 
2.5.1 Environmental refugees   
While there have been discussions about the connection between the environment and 
migration, the first clear example linked directly to climate migration is discussions of 
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environmental refugees. The idea of an ‘environmental refugee’ has been used to refer to those 
who cannot remain in their country due to degradation or other environmental problems 
(Myers, 1993). This discourse has its roots in much earlier discourses surrounding the 
environment and mobility, particularly in Malthusian ideas of the relationship between people 
and the environment. Malthus (Malthus, 1982 first published 1798) argued that while 
population grew geometrically, production of food grew arithmetically. Because of this, there 
would be surplus population that needed to migrate due to lack of resources. This resulting out-
migration would be a temporary solution to resource scarcity (Malthus, 1982).  
 
Historically, connections between the environment and population movement began with early 
environmentally deterministic ideas and these Malthusian conceptualisation of populations and 
the environment (Piguet, 2013; Saunders, 2000). For example, writings of those such as Ratzel 
(1882, cited in Piguet, 2013) and later Ravenstein (1891, 1885) discussed connections between 
migration and the natural environment, though still acknowledging there were many other 
factors involved in migration. In the early 1900s, Semple (1911) and Huntington (1922) also 
argued that the environment influenced migration. However, Piguet (2013) argues that this 
focus on the environment in migration studies subsided as the 20th century progressed. This is 
due to Western separation of nature and society based on the understanding that modernisation 
decreases natures impact on humans; the end of determinism; a focus on economics in 
migration; and the emergence of refugee studies that focused on a political paradigm (Piguet, 
2013). According to Saunders the concept of environmental refugees stems from papers such 
as that by Dennery (1931), Vogt (1949) who used the term ‘ecological displaced persons’. 
These neo-Malthusian ideas linking environmental degradation and population migration have 
continued into more current discourses of environmental and climate refugees (Morrissey, 
2012; Saunders, 2000). 
 
Discussion of environmental refugees became more common in the 1970s after Lester Brown 
(1976) created a report for Worldwatch Institute that used the term ‘environmental refugees’. 
Brown is generally considered the first to use this term. However, the term was later 
popularised by others such as El-Hinnawi’s (1985) report for the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) that further promoted the idea of environmental refugees. Reasons for 
environmental refugees included climate change but focus on other environmental concerns 
such as desertification, droughts, flooding and soil erosion, large dams, natural disasters, and 
degraded environments due to war (El-Hinnawi, 1985; Jacobson, 1988; Myers, 1993). Many 
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of these publications also connected to ideas of security, conflict, and the impact of migration 
for receiving countries (Myers and Kent, 1995; O’Lear, 1997). This created ideas of large 
numbers of refugees from the Global South, due to degradation of the environment, ‘invading’ 
and threatening the Global North (Kibreab, 1997; O’Lear, 1997).  
 
Throughout the 1990s discussion of ‘environmental refugees’ by environmentalists continued 
neo-Malthusian ideas that environmental degradation and less access to resources resulted in 
migration (Morrissey, 2012). The Worldwatch Institute continued to use the term 
‘environmental refugee’, publishing a working paper on environmental refugees (Jacobson, 
1988). Looking at drought in the Sahel in Africa in the 1980’s, the author of this report 
Jacobson (1988) suggested that there could be over 10 million environmental refugees around 
the world due to environmental degradation and climate change. Myers also became a key 
author in this discussion, suggesting in his 1993 article that there could already be up to 25 
million environmental refugees and this was likely to increase with climate change (Myers, 
1993). Later, Myers increased this figure, suggesting that there may be 200 million or more 
environmental refugees by 2050 (Myers, 2002, 1997; Myers and Kent, 1995). However, these 
numbers are controversial, because as later sections will discuss, it is difficult to accurately 
predict numbers, there is a lack of empirical evidence for claims, and causes for migration 
involve many interrelated factors beyond a singular environmental cause.  
 
2.5.2 Climate Change Refugees and Migrants 
While climate change was among the reasons initially suggested to cause environmental 
refugees, the concept of environmental refugees began to encompass the idea of climate change 
more explicitly the late 1980s and the 1990s. Jacobson (1988) began to consider more how 
global warming would fit into these ideas of environmental refugees considering factors such 
as sea level rise as well as the more general environmental factors. Additionally, as part of 
Working Group II in the first IPCC assessment a report was released stating that large numbers 
of people may need to migrate due to impacts of global warming such as sea level rise and 
drought (IPCC, 1990). Myers (1997) began discussing the potential for increasing numbers of 
environmental refugees driven by climate change through impacts such as sea level rise and 
flooding of coastal communities.  
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This term continued to be popularised in the early writings about climate refugees from NGOs, 
international organisations, media, and academics. The 2000s, saw Christian Aid (2007), 
Friends of the Earth (2011) and the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) among other organisations 
bring attention to climate migration. Christian Aid (2007) predicted up to 1 billion refugees, 
while the Stern  Review (2007) suggested that large numbers of those in Global South countries 
are at risk of displacement. Thus, NGOs and other actors used climate refugees to advocate for 
action on climate change, to prevent large numbers of displaced (Morrissey, 2009). There has 
been a tendency for discussions of  climate refugees or migrants to take an ‘alarmist’ tone that 
is focused on creating awareness of the effects that climate change may have in the future for 
migration (Piguet et al., 2011). This warns of the impacts that failing to mitigate climate change 
would have, making migration a failure to adapt (Felli, 2013). PICs have become a central 
example of ‘climate refugees’ as nations that will become uninhabitable requiring climate 
migration to occur (Farbotko, 2010).   
 
Discussion of climate refugees and climate migration has remained popular with numerous 
discussions by academics, NGOs, international organisations and policy makers, as well as the 
media. Some areas that have been discussed include: the connections between climate change 
and migration and the (lack of) evidence for this (Black, 2001; Morrissey, 2012; Piguet, 2013); 
definitions, policy, and legal challenges of climate migration (Berchin et al., 2017; Biermann 
and Boas, 2010; Dun and Gemenne, 2008; Faist and Schade, 2013); considerations of security 
and impacts for receiving countries (Burrows and Kinney, 2016; Kibreab, 1997; Morrissey, 
2009); impacts for SIDS and PICs cultures, identities and decisions to remain or migrate 
(Allgood and McNamara, 2017; Campbell and Warrick, 2014; Donner and Webber, 2014; 
Farbotko et al., 2016; McNamara et al., 2018; Suliman et al., 2019); and issues of justice 
(Bettini et al., 2017; Dreher and Voyer, 2015; Dwyer, 2020; Klepp and Herbeck, 2016; 
Nawrotzki, 2014). There has also been a recent growth in publications considering climate 
migration as adaptation (Baldwin and Fornalé, 2017; Bettini, 2014; Farbotko et al., 2018; 
Tacoli, 2009).  
 
Finally, an important aspect for this thesis is the less numerous but increasing area of literature 
that examines climate migration from a post-structural perspective. These studies have focused 
on the discourse of climate migration at a theoretical level and in international policy, 
documents and the media (Bettini, 2019, 2013; Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2010; Farbotko, 2005; 
Methmann and Oels, 2015); discourses by NGOs/international organisations such as the UN 
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(McNamara, 2008, 2007; McNamara and Gibson, 2009); discourses of climate migration in 
PICs at a regional level (Remling, 2020); and perspectives from NGOs and residents of PICs 
(Dreher and Voyer, 2015; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). However, few studies have specifically 
looked at the representations of Kiribati from the perspective of New Zealand development 
agencies, NGOs and Government approaches, thus this research aims to address this gap.  
 
2.5.3 Defining and differentiating between climate ‘refugees’ and climate 
‘migrants’ 
One contentious point in the discussion of climate migration is how to define those displaced 
by climate or environmental factors. At the centre of this issue are the legal issues surrounding 
the use of the term ‘refugee’ for environmental or climate change related movement (Berchin 
et al., 2017; Farquhar, 2015). The issue with the term ‘climate refugee’ or ‘environmental 
refugee’ is that it is not recognised under international law. ‘Climate refugees’ do not fit the 
United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to gain protections and 
rights. According to the 1951 convention a refugee is: “Someone who is unable or unwilling 
to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or a political opinion” 
(UNHCR, 2010, p. 3). This definition includes social, political, religious and race reasons for 
being a refugee, however it does not include environmental factors. In addition, climate 
refugees do not always cross borders, something that is also required to be a convention refugee 
(Gill, 2010). Thus, there is a lack of legal support for those who are displaced due to the effects 
of climate change (Farquhar, 2015). However, suggestions to update the Refugee Convention 
have been rejected (Faist and Schade, 2013; Piguet, 2008). This creates issues for those who 
claim to be displaced by climate change as they have no legal protections (Berchin et al., 2017). 
The lack of a clear definition hinders the creation of policy and plans, and knowledge of what 
rights those displaced by environmental factors have (Dun and Gemenne, 2008). Despite the 
lack of legal backing for climate refugees this language has continued to be used (Methmann 
and Oels, 2015). Thus, a clear terminology is important internationally (Gill, 2010). 
 
Another issue with the use of the term ‘refugee’ in these discussions is that this can be viewed 
as disempowering for populations such as the PICs that are often at the centre of this 
conversation. By framing people from PICs and other SIDS as climate refugees, this creates 
the idea of ‘victims’ who are helpless and lack agency (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Hingley, 
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2017). This contributes these communities being exploited as ‘evidence’ of climate change by 
the West (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). As Hingley states:  
“… Not only is the term ‘climate refugees’ disempowering, unsubstantiated, and 
insensitive, it is also exploitative. If it continues to remain unproblematised at a 
definitional level, then its language and ‘knowledge base’ will continue to adversely 
influence our practices.” (2017, p. 162). 
However, NGOs and international organisations use ‘climate refugees’ as an example of the 
“social and human consequences of anthropogenic climate change from a rather catastrophist 
perspective” (Felli, 2013, p. 340). Certainly, the idea of climate or environmental refugees 
‘conveys urgency’ that proponents of the term argue other terminology does not (Gill, 2010, p. 
862). In addition, because the term climate migrant does not have a universal definition and is 
‘indeterminate’ climate migrants “can only exist virtually, no less real, but never actually 
materialising, never fully emerging. In its indeterminacy, the figure is monstrous and 
incommensurable.” (Baldwin, 2016, p. 81). Thus, the lack of a definition also has implications 
for the way discourses form. Returning to earlier parts of this chapter, it should also be noted 
that many PICs communities and scholars have asserted agency and resisted narratives of 
victimhood and passiveness in relation to climate change (Hayward et al., 2020; Kirsch, 2020).  
 
Due to the problematic nature of  the discursive construction of ‘climate refugees’ and 
‘environmental refugees’, there has been a shift to use different terminology (Gill, 2010). For 
example, organisations such as the IOM and other academics have pushed for a shift in the 
language to use the term ‘climate migrant’ or ‘environmental migrant’ as a term that is less 
legally problematic and shifts the framing to one of more agency (IOM, 2019; Piguet, 2008). 
However, as will be outlined later, even the idea of climate migration has been problematised.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will refer to human mobility in response to climate change-
related factors as ‘climate migrants’ or ‘climate migration’. However, I acknowledge that the 
terminology and classification of climate/environment related mobility remains contested 
without a clear consensus on the issue so far. 
 
2.6 Climate Change Migration: The Proponents and Critics 
The previous sections have begun to explain some of the issues and debates surrounding the 
framing and causality of climate migration over time. Since the 1970s differences in views on 
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environmental and climate induced migration have existed (Dun and Gemenne, 2008). In trying 
to account for how we might categorise these approaches Suhrke (1994) first argued for two 
differing schools of thought: ‘Maximalists’ (those who connect environmental factors with out-
migration) and ‘Minimalists’ (those who see migration as complicated and not dependent on 
one factor like the environment). Others have termed those with these views of 
environmental/climate migration ‘alarmists’ and ‘sceptics’ (Piguet, 2013) or, the terminology 
I will use in this chapter, ‘proponents’ and ‘critics’ (See: Morrissey, 2012). While it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to determine if migration is a suitable solution to climate change issues 
in Kiribati, the debates around the legitimacy and use of this term are important context for 
how these representations of Kiribati have developed.  In this section I will outline some of the 
major debates that have occurred over time in relation to this discourse, and the way these have 
shaped narratives of climate change migration today (For more detailed discussion of these 
different schools of thought, see: Morrissey, 2012; Piguet, 2013; Suhrke, 1994).  
 
2.6.1 Climate change migration: a simple or complex issue?  
The first key area of disagreement between proponents and critics is their conceptualisation of 
the relationship between the environment and migration. For the proponents, migration, 
including as refugees, is seen as a certainty that will occur due to climate change or 
environmental factors (El-Hinnawi, 1985; Myers, 1997, 1993). These views have remained 
over time but were particularly common during the first conceptualisations of climate and 
environmental refugees. Proponents of climate migration tend to create or support 
‘apocalyptic’ visions of climate change migration, often also linked to ideas of conflict and 
security (McNamara and Gibson, 2009; Myers and Kent, 1995; O’Lear, 1997). These 
‘proponents’ tend to be from conflict, disaster and environmental fields (Dun and Gemenne, 
2008). Climate/environmental migration is conceptualised as a simple nexus where climate 
change (or environmental degradation) causes impacts such as droughts, floods, sea level rise, 
leading to the displacement of communities and migration or refugees (see figure 2.1) 
(Morrissey, 2012).  
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From this perspective, climate change or environmental degradation will lead to a humanitarian 
crisis and cause permanent migration to occur. Proponents for climate/environmental migration 
include academics such as Myers (Myers, 1997, 1993) who has been vocal about large numbers 
of displaced, arguing there will be up to 200 million environmental refugees by 2050. These 
academics and researchers have added legitimacy and authority to these discourses (Ransan-
Cooper et al., 2015).  NGOs and international organisations such as Friends of the Earth (2011), 
The Environmental Justice Foundation (2009), and Christian Aid (2007) have also contributed 
to these alarmist views. For example, Christian Aid (2007) reporting ‘human tides’ of migrants 
in future has contributed to these understandings. Bettini notes the use of language such as 
‘floods’ of refugees is commonly used by proponents, creating narratives of “doom and gloom” 
around this issue (2013, p. 63). In addition to the coverage by NGOs and academics, climate 
migration is also used in many news articles worldwide, which often use sensationalist 
dramatic language to report the issue, especially in relation to PICs (McNamara and Gibson, 
2009). For example, Farbotko finds that Tuvalu is represented by the Sydney Morning Herald 
through a “lens of vulnerability” (2005, p. 289). This sees Tuvalu as a stereotypically 
victimised marginal island due to rising sea levels caused by a lack of actions by industrialised 
nations (Farbotko, 2005). As later sections of this chapter discuss, traditional island features 
such as smallness and isolation are commonly used to support these discursive constructions 
of Pacific communities (Gillis, 2014; Hau’Ofa, 1993).   
 
Critics of this discursive construction of climate migration have tended to come from the social 
sciences, migration or refugee studies (Dun and Gemenne, 2008; Gill, 2010). Critics initially 
took issue with environmental factors being framed as the only, or main driver, of migration 
decisions (Bilsborrow, 1992; Black, 2001; Kibreab, 1997; Lonergan, 1998; Suhrke, 1994). 
They argued it is not possible to narrow migration solely to climate change or environmental 
factors, given that migrants decisions are based on multiple factors (Black et al., 2011b; Brown, 
Figure 2.1: Traditional understandings of climate change migration as a simple, linear 
process. Adapted from the discussions of: Black (2001) Black, et al. (2011b), Morrissey 













2008; Morrissey, 2012). Early critics such as Black (2001) questioned the evidence for 
environmental migration and argued that environmental factors cannot be separated from other 
drivers of migration. Critics such as Black (2001) and Lonergan (1998) noted that though the 
environment may have some part in migration, the key issue that causes migration is global 
development inequalities and differences between the Global North and Global South. As such, 
climate change is seen to exacerbate existing inequalities, development issues, human security 
and injustices (Piguet et al., 2011).  
 
The issue of lack of evidence remains for climate migration because unless it is due to a sudden 
event like an earthquake or a flood, migration is slow-onset (Dun and Gemenne, 2008). This 
means that it is hard to pinpoint a specific event that caused migration. Additionally, though 
there is irrefutable evidence of the impacts of climate change, there is still uncertainty about 
how this will impact PICs specifically, combined with a lack of information about migration, 
meaning predicting climate migration is difficult (Barnett, 2017; Tacoli, 2009).  
 
In attempting to paint a more nuanced picture of the drivers of migration, critics therefore argue 
that this is a complex process driven by multiple interrelated factors (See Figure 2.2).  
 
For example, Nawrotzki (2014) argues it is difficult to separate environmental and economic 
drivers of migration and additional population growth that interact. While there may be some 
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Figure 2.2: Conceptualising mobilities decisions as complex and multi-faceted. Adapted 
from the discussions of Morrissey (2012), Black, et al. (2011a), Nawrotzki (2014) and 
Suhrke (1994). 
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connection between climate change and the movement of people, different social and physical 
contexts of populations and households must be considered (Baldwin et al., 2019; Farbotko 
and Lazrus, 2012). Migration outcomes are therefore based on “the specific cultural, historical, 
political, and geospatial context” (Nawrotzki, 2014, p. 71). 
 
Climate change-related migration is entangled with other drivers of migration such as social, 
political, cultural, economic and environmental factors that are also “overlaid with individual, 
family and community vulnerabilities and capacities” (MFAT, 2018, p. 2). It is important then, 
that these differing factors of migration are considered, rather than taking a one-dimensional 
view of migration that attributes migration solely to impacts caused by climate change. In 
particular, discussions of migration that are at least partly driven by climate change should be 
embedded in the wider context of mobilities and non-mobilities (Kelman et al., 2015). This 
includes the social, religious, cultural, and economic factors involved in decisions to migrate 
as well as the broader politics, and power involved in mobilities. The ability to migrate is also 
dependent on the individual, depending on their economic capabilities, and the visa categories 
available according to the passport held, and may take different forms such as temporary, 
circular or within country migration (Baldwin et al., 2019; Barnett and Webber, 2010; 
McLeman and Smit, 2006; Morrissey, 2012). For some people, migration may not be possible, 
particularly internationally, due to the expense (Black et al., 2011). Thus, the ability for climate 
migration depends on the context and the individual.  
 
Over time major international organisations begun to agree on the complexity of the drivers 
and challenges of migration. For example, the IOM acknowledges the importance of 
recognising the multiple factors involved in migration decisions, stating that environmental 
and climate change induced migration is a multi-causal and multidimensional phenomenon 
(IOM, 2014). However, it is important to note that critics did not entirely deny that 
environmental factors could play a contributing factor in migration decisions. Rather, as 
Morrissey (2012) discusses, there is a lot of agreement between the proponents and critics, 
which has increased over time. The debate is more focused on the representation of the 
relationship between the environment and migration through terms like climate refugees, rather 
than the actual relationship between the environment and migration. The complexity of 
migration that this section has established suggests that there is nuance to the connections 
between migration and climate change, something this thesis will aim to uncover in relation to 
representations of Kiribati.  
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2.6.2 Definitions, Numbers and Evidence  
Another area that is subject to debate are issues with definitions, evidence and numbers used 
by proponents to support their claims of the validity of the category of climate migration. As 
the previous sections have shown, it is hard to pinpoint the exact reason for migrating and if 
climate or environmental factors caused migration, creating issues for defining who a climate 
migrant or refugee is (Baldwin, 2016; Black, 2001; Kibreab, 1997). Even in early discussions 
of environmental refugees, there was acknowledgement that it is difficult to identify 
environmental causes of migration compared to other factors, meaning that most refugees 
could fit into this category (Saunders, 2000). Additionally, despite the amount of discussion 
around climate migration, there is little evidence to support it as an isolated phenomena (Black, 
2001). There is little empirical evidence and uneven amounts and quality of data about 
migration due to environmental/climate factors (Morrissey, 2012; Oliver‐Smith, 2012).  
Climate change is an ongoing and long process, meaning it is difficult to show what effect 
climate change has for migration, particularly due to the difficulties of linking extreme events 
to climate change (Burrows and Kinney, 2016). However, more empirical work has begun to 
emerge as the impacts of climate change become increasingly visible in debates (Morrissey, 
2012). Despite this, numbers of empirical studies attempting to demonstrate the links between 
environment and migration remain low (Neumann and Hilderink, 2015). 
 
Linked to challenges of evidence are the numbers that are estimated. Widely used numbers 
such as those by Myers (2005, 1997) and Christian Aid (2007), that were previously mentioned, 
have been contested. There are issues with accurately estimating numbers and even Myers 
concedes that due to a lack of availability of data, the numbers he quotes are estimates that 
required extrapolations and are therefore tentative (Black, 2001; Brown, 2008; Burrows and 
Kinney, 2016). Because the suggested numbers of climate migrants can be questioned and there 
is little evidence of such movements, these numbers are problematic (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018). 
However, these numbers have been used by many NGOs and policy-makers, despite not being 
supported empirically or verified (Brown, 2008; Findlay and Geddes, 2011). Further, as 
Kelman (2019) points out, there are limitations in estimating numbers of climate change 
migrants because numbers have been quantified through different methods and definitions. 
This results in numbers that vary and are not necessarily reliable. Accordingly, currently there 
is little agreement on an estimate of climate migrants/refugees, and no consensus on 
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appropriate methods to predict these numbers (Gemenne, 2011). In spite of this, these large 
numbers have been used by the media to sensationalise climate migration (Gemenne, 
2011)(Bryant-Tokalau, 2018). Thus, numbers are crucial for discourses of climate migration.   
 
2.6.3 Securitisation of climate migration  
Proponents of climate migration have also linked the supposed inevitability of intensification 
of climate migration to issues of security and conflict (Dun and Gemenne, 2008; Hartmann, 
2010). As early as the 1990s academics were criticising these links being made between climate 
migration and security (See for example: Kibreab, 1997; Suhrke, 1997). Kibreab (1997) for 
instance, criticises the idea of climate/environmental refugees as depoliticising the reasons for 
displacement and positioning the Global South as a ‘threat’. The securitisation of migration is 
seen as an issue because it simultaneously presents these migrants/refugees as ‘helpless’ and 
‘victims’ without agency and in need of humanitarian assistance, while also presenting ‘climate 
refugees’ as having agency to the extent that they are a threat to security of nations (Morrissey, 
2012). This allows for Western nations to prevent migration and frame refugees as a problem. 
From this perspective, climate change mobility internationally is seen as a security risk, and 
may have influenced tightening of migration policies in the Global North (Kibreab, 1997). 
Indeed, climate migration has been at the centre of discussions by the UN Security Council, 
NGOs and other bodies about the security implications of climate change and climate migration 
“has now entered the arena of high politics, where it is regularly framed in the language of 
security” (Baldwin et al., 2014, p. 122). However, the concept of climate/environmental 
refugees allows the ‘blame’ for migration to be put on the environment rather than states 
(Castles, 2002). Thus, this relation between climate migration and security is an issue as it 
deflects from the responsibility and role that the West have played in climate change. 
 
The securitisation of climate highlights the issue with these discourses that mainly focus on 
nations in the Global South. This also occurs through ‘apocalyptic’ and future focused language 
that focuses on defending nations of the Global North from ‘floods’ of climate/environmental 
migrants from the Global South (See Bettini, 2013). For example, Turton (2003) argues that 
this metaphorical language around being ‘inundated’ or ‘swamped’ dehumanises refugees. 
This allows migrants to be seen as a threat, while language such as ‘floods’ frames the issue as 
something that was not created by ‘us’, is not preventable, and thus must be defended against 
(Turton, 2003). Securitising and militarising climate migration through discourses that present 
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“mythical flows of helpless people” (Kelman, 2015, p. 134) is problematic. These narratives  
of climate migration construct dramatic ideas of masses of migrants that induce fear and ideas 
of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Kelman, 2015). Chaturvedi and Doyle discuss the imaginative geographies 
that originate mainly from northern nations, that envision “millions of impoverished Afro- 
Asians being uprooted and displaced from their habitat and crossing borders in search of the 
greener and securer pastures” (2015, p. 109). Here the climate migrant embodies the 
imaginative geographies of climate change that is threatening and gradually causing change, 
creating a physical and mental ‘otherness’ as these ‘millions’ of  migrants are viewed as a threat 
to national security as they cross borders (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015, 2010). Similarly, Piguet 
et al. stresses the connection between the post-colonial imagination of “the archetypal victim 
of climate change as a poor peasant from the south” (2018, p. 359), and the focus on issues of 
security, as well as climate migration scholarship in Global South communities. Thus, 
imaginative geographies of migrants/refugees that threaten the security of Western/Global 
North nations are at the core of this securitisation. In this thesis, I intend to interrogate further 
the way that these geographic imaginations present Kiribati and influence the issue of climate 
migration.   
 
These constructions of climate migration counter studies that have shown communities and 
leaders from PICs and SIDS have stated they do not wish to migrate and that if migration must 
occur, they do not wish to be refugees, but migrants on their own terms (See Bettini, 2013; 
Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Hartmann, 2010; McNamara and Gibson, 2009; Noy, 2017). For 
instance, as will be discussed to a greater extent throughout the thesis, Kiribati leaders, have 
resisted being labelled ‘climate refugees’ and have been vocal about the international 
community reducing their emissions (McNamara and Gibson, 2009). Therefore, there are 
contrasting discourses and understandings of security in relation to climate migration. Despite 
a lack of proof and certainty around connections between climate migration and conflict or 
security issues, these links continue to be asserted (Burrows and Kinney, 2016; Morrissey, 
2009). 
 
Human security has also entered the discussion of climate change migration through the idea 
of climate migration as adaptation, which has ‘softened’ ideas about security, based on human 
security and resilience (Bettini, 2014). Some have argued that approaching the links between 
climate change and human security would be more appropriate (Böge, 2013). The IPCC AR5 
report has a chapter called ‘human security’ stating that climate change threatens human 
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security through compromising livelihoods, culture and identity, as well as causing migration 
to be necessary by those who would rather not migrate, with states no longer being able to 
“provide conditions necessary for human security” (Adger et al., 2014, p. 758). This may signal 
a shift from securitisation of the issue of climate migration, to more of a focus on migration as 
adaptation and human resilience.  
 
2.7 Discursive Constructions of PICs and Differing Understandings of 
Mobility   
Pacific Island Countries and other Global South nations have particularly been the focus of the 
ongoing debate over climate migration. Discourses of climate migration have highlighted PIC 
communities as vulnerable, passive victims, and an example of the effects of climate change 
(Bettini, 2013; Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Farbotko, 2005). Atoll nations Kiribati and Tuvalu are 
seen as the “canary in the coalmine” (Farbotko, 2010, p. 53), used as the ‘human face’ and 
example of future consequences if climate action is not taken (Felli, 2013; Gemenne, 2017). 
As an extension of this discursive construction, climate refugee discourses tend to construct 
PIC populations as victims of an environmental injustice that need legal protections and options 
for relocation (McNamara and Gibson, 2009). However, there is ongoing criticism that while 
these discourses of climate migration often see nations and regions as uniform, these nations 
are heterogenous and the different approaches of nations and communities in question for 
migration must also be considered (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018). Discussing Tuvalu and Kiribati, 
Farbotko et al. (2016) notes the differences between approaches to climate migration in these 
nations, highlighting the importance of understanding that migration as a way to adapt to 
climate change depends on the context. As such, this suggests that discursive constructions of 
climate migration that uniformly frame PIC communities as future climate migrants support 
the previously discussed geographic imagination of climate migrants, and does not account for 
this diversity of approaches and perspectives within PIC communities.  
 
In contrast to these Western views of PICs and migration, the Pacific region has a long history 
of migration (Teaiwa, 2018). Migration has long taken place within the region, including 
circular, temporary, permanent and within country migration (Barnett and Webber, 2010; 
Bedford, 2016; Campbell, 2014; Connell, 2016; Greiner and Sakdapolrak, 2016). Tacoli (2009) 
argues that pessimistic estimates of large-scale permanent climate migration from the Global 
South to the Global North is unlikely to occur. Instead it is more likely that there will be an 
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increase in already-occurring patterns of migration by people looking to diversify their 
incomes, as well as migration for shorter times and distances (Tacoli, 2009). It is also noted 
that the most poor and vulnerable are unlikely to be able to move (Tacoli, 2009). This is 
particularly the case for nations such as Kiribati and Tuvalu due to a lack of funding available 
for relocation internationally (Farbotko et al., 2018). However, others have argued migration 
can be a form of agency and thus should be seen as a proactive, rather than reactive, choice 
(Faist and Schade, 2013). It has also been noted that immobility may be chosen by communities 
as a way to assert their agency (Suliman et al., 2019). This shows the variety of ways that 
migration can occur, beyond simple Western understandings of one-way permanent migration. 
 
Constructions of PICs in relation to climate migration show broader issues of Western 
knowledge, discourses and power relations. There are key ontological differences in 
understandings of mobility between those in Western countries and PICs. Migration by people 
from PICs is often portrayed as a ‘crisis of mobility’ by public discourses and governance 
(Bettini, 2013; Farbotko et al., 2016). Western understandings of climate migration tend to be 
based on sedentarist understandings of human mobility (Hastrup and Fog Olwig, 2012). Here 
migration is seen as failing to adapt and as one-way migration from a ‘poor’ nation to a ‘rich’ 
nation (Brown, 2008; Klepp, 2017; Tacoli, 2009). Discourses of ‘floods’ of migrants focuses 
on migrants from a “sedentary, or state-centric perspective” (Turton, 2003, p. 4). Sedentary 
ontologies of mobility see stability, place and meaning as ‘normal’, while the ‘abnormal’ is 
change, distance, and lack of place (Sheller and Urry, 2006). Remaining in place is viewed as 
important for identity, community and socially, while mobility is seen as destabilising, 
threatening for social cohesion and generally negative (Morley, 2017). This can be linked to 
broader discourses that surround Pacific Islands, such as the way these nations are envisioned 
as individual islands that are small, isolated and disconnected (Gillis, 2014; Hau’Ofa, 1993). 
These views have been labelled neo-colonial and problematic (Hau’Ofa, 1993).  
 
Though the Pacific region is often portrayed as distant, small and isolated, it can be viewed as 
connected. “Our Sea of Islands’, a seminal work by Hau’Ofa (1993) describes how pan-Pacific 
identity is formed and the islands are not seen as a separate small landmasses but a connected 
‘sea of islands’ that informs migration and movement that is part of many Pacific people’s 
lives. Mobility is a key aspect of this identity, and much informal movement between islands 
occurs. Rather than being small, isolated islands that cannot support themselves, Hau’Ofa 
(1993) writes that these islands are Oceania, a connected and expansive ‘sea of islands’ where 
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mobility is a key connecting factor for community, skills and trade. Others such as Lazrus 
(2012 p. 285) emphasise how PICs are ‘often deeply globally connected’ rather than being 
poor, small, and isolated, something that is crucial to addressing climate change in a just 
manner. People living in these PICs have long adapted to environmental changes with 
migration being part of these strategies (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018). As has been noted above, the 
Pacific region has a long history of migration, so this is now not always seen as adaptation 
failing, but instead as a form of adaptation to climate change (Betzold, 2015; Teaiwa, 2018). 
This includes circular migration where a long period of time is spent away before returning, 
something that still occurs in the Pacific today (Teaiwa, 2018). Strong links between the land 
and culture in PICs adds complications to the potential of forced migration (Weir et al., 2017). 
Having to migrate due to climate change for people from nations such as Kiribati would involve 
the loss of place that shapes their culture and identities (McNamara et al., 2018). Teaiwa 
explains how Pacific peoples have “created powerful origin stories of their links to land and 
place that continue to form the basis for contemporary territorial claims” (2018, p. 65) even 
while moving. These local and indigenous knowledges, worldviews, and context are clearly 
important to understanding issues of climate change and human mobility, however currently 
these ideas are often not considered. As such, exploring the mainstream representations of 
climate migration in relation to Kiribati will help to uncover what role or presence these 
knowledges may have.  
 
2.8 Recent shifts in Discourse: Climate Migration as adaptation 
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that climate migration is a shifting, debated and 
developing area of study. As already mentioned, there has been a change in terminology to 
label those displaced by climate/environmental factors ‘migrants’ rather than ‘refugees’(Gill, 
2010). This change in language has more recently been accompanied by a shift by policy-
makers and academics to consider migration as a positive adaptation solution to the effects of 
climate change (See for example: Barnett and Webber, 2010; Foresight, 2011). The climate 
migration-as-adaptation discourse signals a change from previous understanding of migration 
as a failure by local communities or states to adapt to climate change (Bettini, 2014;  Bettini et 
al., 2017; Black et al., 2011a; Brown, 2008; Felli, 2013; Methmann and Oels, 2015). However, 
scholars such as Gemenne (2017) have contended that migration being portrayed as a last resort 
to be avoided is inaccurate, as migration is used as a way to cope with environmental changes. 
From this perspective, migration offers the opportunity to increase resilience and diversify 
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incomes to increase assets and abilities to adapt to climate change (Tacoli, 2009). It also reflects 
a move from ‘alarmist’ and securitised discourses of climate migration, to a more accurate 
portrayal of mobility and its complexities (Bettini, 2014; Bettini et al., 2017; Rosenow-
Williams, 2015). Thus, current iterations of this discussion often revolve around ideas of 
climate change being seen as a positive adaptation method. 
 
Despite being touted as a positive shift, climate migration as adaptation raises a number of 
questions and has faced criticism. One of the key concerns in relation to this discourse is that 
it depoliticises climate migration (Bettini, 2013; Bettini et al., 2017; Felli, 2013; Kelman, 2014; 
Kibreab, 1997; Klepp, 2017). By framing climate migration as adaptation, the responsibility is 
placed on the individual to migrate, compete in labour markets, and support themselves 
economically (Bettini, 2014; Bettini et al., 2017; Felli and Castree, 2012). This creates an 
understanding where climate change is no longer politicised but instead a “political economic 
phenomenon to which one must accommodate oneself” (Baldwin and Fornalé, 2017, p. 324). 
Climate migrants are seen as ‘resilient’ individuals that can adapt and participate in the global 
workforce (Felli and Castree, 2012; Klepp, 2017). This view of climate migration as an 
adaptation strategy positions climate change as something ‘matter of fact’ that can no longer 
be prevented rather than something that can still be avoided (Methmann and Oels, 2015). This 
effectively depoliticises the issue, and frames climate migration as a ‘rational strategy’ to adapt 
to climate change, making the ‘millions’ displaced by climate change rational and accepted 
(Methmann and Oels, 2015). This is a major shift from the previous framings of climate 
refugees or migrants where this was to be ‘avoided at all costs’ (Rosenow-Williams, 2015).  
 
In addition, climate migration as adaptation is criticised for removing aspects of justice that the 
problematic term ‘climate refugee’ was argued to have. Stopping the use of ‘climate refugee’ 
has depoliticised climate migration by removing the idea of persecution that must be present 
to qualify as a refugee (Gemenne, 2017). By removing the idea of a ‘refugee’, this puts climate 
migration into the realm of environmental policy rather than the political, and in turn this means 
those migrating due to climate related reasons are not seen as persecuted (Gemenne, 2017). 
Because migrants are framed as responsible for adapting themselves, this risks shifting the 
focus from states responsibilities to contribute to adaptation (Rosenow-Williams, 2015). By 
framing this as a humanitarian issue with individual responsibility to adapt, attention is no 
longer on compensation or responsibility, or on contesting the effects of climate change (Felli, 
2013). Thus, the depoliticised nature of this discourse points to neoliberal understandings of 
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climate change. Bettini and Gioli (2016) argue that this more recent understanding of climate 
migration is problematic because it does not examine deeper structural inequalities.  
 
The change to understand climate migration as a positive adaptation strategy also shows 
similarities to how development discourse has at various times framed general migration as a 
positive development strategy through remittances (See Bettini and Gioli, 2016). In 
development, migration has been viewed as a strategy for PICs to access employment, 
education, and other opportunities (See: Storey and Steinmayer, 2011; de Haas, 2010). The 
current development stance to view migration optimistically is also reflective of neoliberal 
ideas of ‘self-help’ through remittances and a shift towards foreign aid privately through 
immigrants rather than states (de Haas, 2010; Kapur, 2003). These neoliberalised tendencies 
are also present in the discourse of climate migration as adaptation and the way this discourse 
depoliticises issues of migration. Climate migration as adaptation therefore fits with these 
notions of migration as a development approach that has become mainstream (Bettini, 2014). 
Climate migration also provides the ability to send remittances to help those still in the 
migrant's home country manage impacts from climate change (Black et al., 2011b; Campbell, 
2014). Focusing on benefits to the host country, remittances and individual knowledge and 
behaviours reflects neoliberal values (Felli, 2013). Felli and Castree (2012) are especially 
critical of these neoliberal portrayals of climate migration. These authors critique the Foresight 
(2011) report that encourages the promotion of climate migration as a way to flee climate 
impacts, bring development benefits to migrant's home nations, as well as the benefit these 
migrants bring to the workforces of Western nations (See further: Felli and Castree, 2012). 
While the climate migration-as-adaptation discourse may be empowering through the agency 
it returns to migrants, this is a neoliberal individualised way of approaching the issue that needs 
to be problematised.   
 
It is clear that climate migration has a history of contestation and changing discourses. While 
there have been numerous studies of climate migration, PICs and the implications of climate 
migration, much fewer studies have examined representations and discourses of climate 
migration by media, NGOs and industrialised nations Governments in the context of Kiribati 
and New Zealand’s geopolitical relationship. This is something I aim to address in this thesis 
by focusing on Kiribati and New Zealand in regard to climate change migration and adaptation. 
Understanding these broader issues of climate migration, development, and discourse over time 
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is crucial for discussing further the representations and understandings of climate migration 
and adaptation in Kiribati and New Zealand’s role in these issues.  
 
2.9 Justice, Responsibility and climate migration  
A final consideration important for understanding climate migration are issues of justice and 
responsibility. As the beginning of this chapter highlighted, climate change is 
disproportionately affecting countries in the Global South, including many PICs, that 
contribute minimally to GHG emissions in comparison to wealthier northern countries 
(Betzold, 2015; Kumar et al., 2020; Mearns and Norton, 2010). Climate change is seen as a 
major social justice issue that supports already existing uneven power relations between 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (Mearns and Norton, 2010). In the context of climate 
migration, issues of justice become apparent when those who face the risk of migration and 
other impacts of climate change are often those who have contributed the least to GHG 
emissions (Dwyer, 2020). However, high GHG emitting nations generally fail to take 
responsibility for these contributions and the inequalities in impacts of climate change for PICs 
(Klepp and Herbeck, 2016). Climate migration therefore raises questions of justice and more 
broadly highlights the inequity in Global North and Global South relations. Studies have 
considered legal and human rights issues (See: Biermann and Boas, 2010; Boas and Biermann, 
2012; Dreher and Voyer, 2015); the moral and ethical responsibility of high GHG emitting 
nations for governance mechanisms and assistance for climate migrants (Nawrotzki, 2014; 
Wyman, 2013); and others have interrogated how ideas of justice have been excluded from 
current discourses of climate migration as adaptation (Bettini et al., 2017).  
 
The potential for whole nations to become uninhabitable and the loss of culture, livelihoods 
and having to migrate raises issues of justice (Dreher and Voyer, 2015; Dwyer, 2020; Klepp 
and Herbeck, 2016). Industrialised countries have been hesitant to accept responsibility for 
climate migrants. For example, discussing Australia, McNamara (2008) argues that 
Governments are reluctant to recognise environmental refugees and responsibility for this 
issue, due to the potential need to compensate these communities, and to be obliged to mitigate 
climate change. If Atoll nations become uninhabitable in future, Barnett and Adger (2003) 
argue, there is no adequate compensation for Atoll nations losing their land. As noted in the 
previous section, current approaches of climate migration as adaptation have been criticised as 
removing the aspects of justice, rights, and responsibilities that were contained in previous 
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(though problematic) iterations of climate refugees (Bettini, 2014; Bettini et al., 2017; Felli and 
Castree, 2012). It is also an injustice that discourses of climate migration as adaptation shift 
the responsibility to migrate to individual migrant while promoting this as labour mobility to 
fit with current neoliberal systems (Farbotko et al., 2018; Felli, 2013). There is a risk that 
framing climate migration as something that individual migrants are responsible for will 
absolve large emitting nations of their part and responsibilities to mitigate and reduce 
emissions, and to support adaptation within these PICs (Allgood and McNamara, 2017; 
McNamara, 2008, 2007). Discourses that present Kiribati and other nations as becoming 
uninhabitable in the near future may also discourage aid and foreign investment (Barnett and 
Adger, 2003).  
 
Considering the different ways that justice and responsibility have been conceptualised in 
climate migration literature, this has generally been approached from an individual perspective 
with an historical, polluter pays approach (Dwyer, 2020; Nawrotzki, 2014). This often takes 
the approach of ‘causal connection’ between industrialised countries that have had detrimental 
effects for climate change as a duty to assist climate migrants, along with ‘corrective justice’ 
for past wrongdoings (Wyman, 2013). This approach to responsibility uses a legal liability 
model that directly links the cause and effect of an injustice, often from the past, punishing and 
holding accountable those who caused the harm (Dwyer, 2020). However, it is difficult to place 
responsibility on industrialised countries through causal connections, corrective justice, or a 
liability model due to the need for proof of the GHG emissions from these nations to be causing 
climate migration and other effects of climate change (Dwyer, 2020; Wyman, 2013). As 
previous sections of this chapter have illustrated, these direct connections lack evidence.  
 
There are exceptions to this individual approach such as Risse (2009) who suggests that the 
concept of collective ownership of the earth is useful rather than the polluter pays approach, 
due to the difficulty to blame past polluters who did not know their actions were detrimental. 
A collective ownership approach would make relocation a human right, and mean that I-
Kiribati could migrate should climate change make their nation uninhabitable in the future (See 
Risse (2009) for further details). Another approach that might be better fitted to understanding 
responsibility and climate migration could be those ideas of Iris Marion Young’s (2011) social 
connection model of responsibility. Young argues that everyone shares responsibility to change 
unjust structures that they participate in. Rather than a backward looking liability model based 
on individual blame, this approach is forward looking and based on the relationship of people 
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to the structures that produce and uphold structural injustices (Young, 2011). Approaches of 
blame frame people as passive and unable to address the injustices through dividing people 
into “powerful wrongdoers and those who are innocent” (Young, 2011, p. 116), whereas this 
model holds people collectively responsible for structural injustices.  
 
Young’s (2011) model of responsibility has rarely been applied to climate migration 
specifically. One recent example where this model is considered is Dwyer (2020) who suggests 
its applicability to environmental migration and understanding the role that people have in 
climate migration. Dwyer focuses on this model to bring attention to the ethical issues of 
environmental migration, addressing the social structures that contribute to an increased 
likelihood of climate migration. Building on the work of Dwyer (2020) in the context of climate 
migration, I argue it may also be useful to explore further how ideas of such as Young’s (2011) 
collective model of responsibility in the case of Kiribati, and New Zealand’s approaches and 
responses to climate migration. This may provide a way to counter disempowering narratives 
of PICs as ‘other’ and requiring assistance from the West, while also holding Western nations 
accountable for their part in the climate change issues that PIC populations such as I-Kiribati 
face. Therefore, to further this understanding in this study, I have aimed to further explore the 
different roles and understandings of justice and responsibility within New Zealand and 
Kiribati actors approaches to climate change migration and adaptation.  
 
2.10 Conclusions and research gap  
This chapter has outlined the theoretical approach this thesis will take and the current debates 
and approaches to climate migration from academics, NGOs and policy-makers. I have argued 
for the value of a post-structural approach that focuses on the knowledge, discourses and power 
relations that are inherent to climate change, development and the way PICs have been 
discursively constructed by Western nations. This chapter has argued for the importance of 
connecting post-structural ideas of knowledge, power and discourse to understand the way 
climate migration is connected to broader knowledge of climate change and development. This 
chapter has also illustrated the dominance of Western knowledge in relation to climate change 
adaptation and migration from PICs. It has also shown the how climate migration has shifted 
over time from early neo-Malthusian and deterministic ideas of environmental migration to 
current understandings of migration as adaptation. The way justice and responsibly are 
conceptualised in this debate have also been argued as important for these discussions.  
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It is clear that Western knowledge has been privileged in these discourses and may not be an 
accurate representation of PIC communities, and for this reason this thesis aims to uncover 
how these discourses have been represented in relation to Kiribati. Importantly, this review has 
illustrated an absence of literature examining the relationship between Kiribati and New 
Zealand in terms of New Zealand’s role in representations and approaches to climate migration 
and adaptation. I have argued that while there has been a move to use post-structural 
approaches to exploring climate migration, these studies are still limited in comparison to the 
numerous studies on climate migration, and few have been focused on New Zealand 
specifically. It is this gap that I aim to contribute to through exploring the way Kiribati is 
represented and approached by New Zealand NGOs, Government and to explore perspectives 
New Zealand based I-Kiribati and media representation of climate migration and adaptation. 
A final point that is important to note is that although there is debate over whether migration 
from Kiribati will have to occur in future, it is not the intention of this thesis to answer whether 
or not migration from Kiribati is an appropriate ‘solution’ or if migration will be necessary. It 
is also not the intention to speak for those in Kiribati or to downplay the severity of impacts 









The Kiribati and New Zealand Context: Approaches 
to Climate Change and Development  
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter will provide details about the context of the two countries that are the focus of 
this in study: the Republic of Kiribati, a country that is at the centre of the climate migration 
debate; and New Zealand, a neighbouring country from the Global North that is also involved 
in these discussions. This chapter will begin with an overview of Kiribati with a focus upon 
the country’s development and climate change goals, approaches, and discussion of the 
possibility of climate migration. Following this section, New Zealand’s approaches to 
development and climate change Kiribati and the Pacific will then be outlined including what 
is being discussed in relation to climate change migration. This chapter illustrates and provides 
context and shows how Kiribati and New Zealand have been connected through global 
discussions of climate change migration, and suggests that both nations are still uncertain of 
future approaches to issues of climate change migration.  
 
3.2 The Republic of Kiribati: context, development, and climate 
change  
The Republic of Kiribati is located in the Central Pacific Ocean and consists of 33 islands with 
811 km2   land area altogether. 32 of these islands are atolls with one coral island (Banaba) 
(KNTO, n.d.). There are three groups of islands, the Gilbert Islands, Phoenix Islands, and the 
Line Islands that cover approximately 3,900 km2 with an EEZ of over 3 million km2 (see Figure 
3.1)(GoK, 2016c). Kiribati has high biodiversity and is part of the Polynesia-Micronesia 
Biodiversity hotpot, though this biodiversity and endemic species are extremely threatened 
(GoK, 2016c). The islands of Kiribati are low-lying with the highest point being three metres, 
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and due to its geography the nation has limited access to potable water or land for agriculture 
(Storey and Hunter, 2010). Kiribati was colonised by Great Britain and governed as part of the 




With a population of 117,606 (World Bank, 2019) Kiribati faces a number of development 
challenges and is considered a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) and a Least Developed 
Country (LDC) by the UN (GoK, 2019). The poverty rate of Kiribati is among the highest in 
the Pacific region (Loughry and McAdam, 2008). In most areas of Kiribati infrastructure and 
cash are limited and I-Kiribati live subsistence lifestyles through fishing, copra and bananas 
(Loughry and McAdam, 2008; Kuruppu, 2009). Other challenges include the water, sanitation 
and hygiene (WASH), food security, rapid population growth, internal migration and 
overcrowding in the main island of Tarawa where almost half the population live, urbanisation 
and informal housing, unemployment, education, health challenges, and a reliance on foreign 
aid (Storey and Hunter, 2010; Wyett, 2014). Though development issues are important for the 
sustainable future of Kiribati, these challenges tend to receive less attention compared to issues 
Figure 3.1: Map of Kiribati showing the three island groups – the Gilbert islands, 
Phoenix Islands and Line Islands (GoK, n.d.)  
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like climate change (Carden, 2003; Storey and Hunter, 2010). As Kiribati is seen as at risk 
from climate change, aid organisations have also began focusing on adaptation to climate 
change (Donner and Webber, 2014). Others have noted that these development challenges, for 
instance food security and health, are being exacerbated by climate change (Cauchi et al., 
2019).  
 
Though there are pressures to migrate from Kiribati, the people of this nation have limited 
migration options especially in comparison to other PICs (Voigt-Graf and Kagan, 2017). Like 
many PICs, Kiribati populations have a long history of migration, starting from the mid-1800s 
when many I-Kiribati participated in circular migration, working in various labour roles around 
the Pacific region and Australia (Bedford et al., 2014). British colonisation resulted in 
phosphate mining of the Kiribati island Banaba from the 1900s, and due to environmental 
damage, from the 1940s I-Kiribati from Banaba were relocated to Fiji and later to the Solomon 
Islands (Loughry and McAdam, 2008; Bedford et al., 2016; Voigt-Graf and Kagan, 2017). A 
large part of this labour migration was to work on Pacific islands such as Banaba and Nauru 
where phosphate mining occurred until the 1990s when the Nauru phosphate mine was closed 
(Bedford et al., 2014; Bedford et al., 2016).  
 
Seafaring is now the most common source of labour migration from Kiribati with the country 
having a Marine Training Centre to since 1967 (Bedford et al., 2014; Voigt-Graf and Kagan, 
2017). I-Kiribati seafarers work on merchant or fishing ships and provide remittances for their 
communities (Borovnik, 2006). However, as maritime freight has become more efficient and 
phosphate mining has ended in the Pacific region, there have been less labour migration 
opportunities for either short or long-term work (Bedford et al., 2016). More recently, labour 
migration has occurred through seasonal employment in agriculture through New Zealand’s 
Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme (RSE) and the Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP) in 
Australia. However, only small numbers of I-Kiribati able to participate in seasonal 
employment programmes of these two countries. This is due to the distance and cost, 
competition with larger PICs that have more access to resources for their Department of 
Labour, but also due to recruitment difficulties as Kiribati does not have a recruitment agency 
for seasonal workers (Bedford et al., 2014; Voigt-Graf and Kagan, 2017).  
 
Despite the clear significance of labour migration for the people of Kiribati, the country has 
fewer options for longer-term international migration compared with other PICs that have well 
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established connections to nations such as New Zealand for migration (Oakes et al., 2016; Dean 
et al., 2017). An avenue for  permanent migration is the Pacific Access Category Resident Visa 
(PAC) which allows 75 I-Kiribati to permanently migrate to New Zealand each year 
(Immigration New Zealand, 2020b; Curtain et al., 2016). Applicants are chosen through an 
annual ballot system, and to be eligible for this scheme I-Kiribati must be between 18-45 years 
old, meet the English language requirements, and they or their partner must have employment 
in New Zealand secured (Immigration New Zealand, 2020b; Curtain et al., 2016). Pressure to 
migrate is likely to continue to grow in Kiribati, with increasing development challenges such 
as a lack of employment options, and growing effects of climate change (Voigt-Graf and 
Kagan, 2017). Thus, strategies to increase access to overseas labour migration options have 
been increasingly important for Kiribati (Bedford et al., 2016).  
 
3.3 Climate change and Kiribati: effects, policies, and approaches  
As previous chapters have already touched on, Kiribati is facing many impacts from climate 
change. Kiribati is a nation of low-lying atolls and because of this is at risk from sea level rise, 
erosion, flooding, loss of land, and contamination of the fresh-water lens by salt-water (Bedford 
and Bedford, 2010; Aretaake, 2019). In addition, increased extreme events such as droughts 
and storms, and rising temperatures and ocean acidification impacting sectors such as 
agriculture, fisheries and tourism also create challenges (GoK, 2016a; GoK, 2016b). Climate 
change therefore creates new challenges and exacerbates existing ones throughout Kiribati’s 
islands, such as loss of land, internal migration and population pressures, food security and 
access to freshwater (GoK, 2016b). However, there are limited options to migrate within 
Kiribati as the nation is low-lying and narrow (Wyett, 2014).   
 
While it is clear that a changing climate will impact Kiribati to an even greater extent in the 
future, it should also be acknowledged that there is still uncertainty around exactly how 
severely Kiribati will be affected by climate change and this varies between the islands that 
make up this nation. An example of this is the uncertainty around rates of erosion and accretion 
of shorelines in Kiribati. Studies of Kiribati atolls and of other PICs have shown that while 
there is erosion, atolls are dynamic and many shorelines are accreting. If these trends continue 
many of the atolls that are predicted to be inundated may still be stable by the end of the century 
(For more detailed discussion see: Webb and Kench, 2010; Rankey, 2011; McLean and Kench, 
2015). More generally it is difficult to accurately forecast all of the potential future impacts for 
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the country because are gaps in knowledge and data available about climate change in Kiribati 
(World Bank, 2009). The uncertainty of sea level rise and other climate change impacts means 
Kiribati needs to consider longer-term precautionary adaptation approaches such as land 
reclamation or migration abroad (Donner and Webber, 2014).  
 
In terms of the implications for human development, available data demonstrates that climate 
change clearly poses a risk for Kiribati and the Government of Kiribati is working on projects 
such as water, sanitation, food security, and coastal protections with development partners 
(GoK, 2018). There are a number of approaches and policies being taken by the Government 
of Kiribati currently. It is these approaches and policies that are the focus of the next section. 
 
3.3.1 Climate change related policies and approaches in Kiribati  
The Government of Kiribati’s climate change and development plans have shifted focus in the 
past few years. These changes align to an extent with the change in government from former 
President Anote Tong to the current government led by President Taneti Maamau. Currently, 
climate change is incorporated into the overall development plans for the Kiribati, through the 
Kiribati 20-Year Vision (KV20) development plan (2016-2036) which is the long term 
development plan, and the shorter term Kiribati Development Plan (KDP) 2016-19 (See: GoK, 
2016c; GoK, 2016a). The KV20 acknowledges that “Kiribati’s vulnerability to climate change 
as a key constraint to achieving the desired outcomes” (GoK, 2016a, p.9). This plan focuses 
on a ‘whole-of-country’ approach through four pillars for transformative development: wealth, 
peace and security, infrastructure, and governance (GoK, 2016a). The KV20 and the KDP fit 
with the current global approaches of adaptation as development, with a focus on sustainable 
development and mainstreaming of development into climate change (GoK, 2016a; GoK, 
2016c). 
 
Along with the KV20 and KDP, Kiribati also has the Kiribati Climate Change Policy (KCCP). 
Connected to the KCCP is the Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and 
Disaster Risk Management (KJIP) which is Kiribati’s National Action Plan and way of  
implementing the KCCP (GoK, 2016b; GoK, 2019). The KCCP is focused on climate change 
adaptation with the goals of: safeguarding communities in Kiribati; strengthening resilience of 
institutions and communities; mainstreaming climate change into development plans; and 
using whole-of-island and whole-of-government approaches that acknowledge the shared 
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responsibility of climate change adaptation and disaster reduction (GoK, 2016b). The goal of 
the KJIP is to “To increase resilience through sustainable climate change adaptation and 
disaster risk reduction using a whole-of-country approach” (GoK, 2019, p.9). The KJIP 
focuses on implementing holistic approaches to climate change across sectors and has 104 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction actions as priorities. Kiribati’s 
development and climate change/disaster risk reduction plans link together and are embedded 
in ideas of sustainable development, resilience, and mainstreaming of adaptation into 
development (GoK, 2019). The KCCP and KJIP are also designed to support the larger 
development plans (the KV20 and KDP) by being in line with the vision of these development 
plans (GoK, 2016b).  
 
In the past the UNDP assisted Kiribati in developing its National Adaptation Programmes of 
Action (NAPA) to identify what adaptation needs are urgent and fit with development or 
climate change adaptation strategies of Kiribati (GoK, 2007). The NAPA was implemented 
with the Kiribati Adaptation Project (KAP) as complementary projects that allowed for 
collaboration and shared information. The NAPA concentrated on ‘urgent and immediate 
needs’ of Kiribati while the KAP addressed plans for long-term adaptation (GoK, 2007).   
 
The KAP was enacted in three stages by the Government of Kiribati with the support of The 
World Bank, NZAID (Now MFAT), AusAid (now Australian Aid), and the Global 
Environmental Facility (Elrick and Kay, 2009). The goal of the programme was to reduce 
vulnerability to climate change through three phases:   
1. Preparation and mainstreaming of adaptation (2003-2005) 
2. Implementation of pilot adaptation measures (2006-2010) 
3. Extension of pilot measures from Phase II to major islands and sectors (2010-2015) 
(Kay, 2008; Elrick and Kay, 2009).  
This project used a mix of hard approaches such as sea-walls, and soft approaches through 
planting mangroves (Donner and Webber, 2014). The KAP is an example of an attempt at 
mainstreaming climate change into sustainable development planning (Storey and Hunter, 
2010). Generally, this project has not been considered successful. The KAP was criticised for 
being overly ambitious, donor driven and bureaucratic, not taking into account Kiribati 
institutions, cultural values and approaches and focusing mainly on Tarawa compared to the 
outer islands (See further: Donner and Webber, 2014; Donner, 2015; Barnett, 2017; Dean et 
al., 2017). This project was dependent on environmental policy designed outside of Kiribati, 
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and consultants who often had limited understanding of Kiribati who were in-country for short 
time periods (Storey and Hunter, 2010; Klepp and Chavez-Rodriguez, 2018). World Bank 
managers also acknowledged that the needs of Kiribati community have not been well 
considered (Klepp and Chavez-Rodriguez, 2018). Considering that over $10 million (USD) 
has been spent on the KAP (IEG Review Team, 2019), there have been few tangible outcomes 
from KAP (Gaillard, 2012; Klepp and Chavez-Rodriguez, 2018). Some of these outcomes 
include two causeways, four sea-walls, planting of mangrove trees, and research assessing 
groundwater reserves (Gaillard, 2012).  
 
It is common in PICs such as Kiribati for adaptation projects and policies to be implemented 
and funded by external actors (Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020). Indeed, in addition to the KAP, 
Kiribati has been supported by international organisations such as the UNDP and World Bank, 
to develop policies and to implement climate change adaptation projects. For example, the 
UNDP has created projects that focus on food security in three islands (UNDP, n.d.b) and 
enhancing the ‘Whole of Islands’ Approach to increase resilience and institutions capacity to 
support the KJIP (UNDP, n.d.a). In addition to these external projects, former President Tong’s 
Government also bought land in Fiji with the intention of improving food security through 
agricultural, and as an economic investment. However, for many I-Kiribati this land purchase 
signalled the potential for migration in the future (Hermann and Kempf, 2017; Hermann and 
Kempf, 2019). As well as these measures by the Government of Kiribati and external donors, 
I-Kiribati communities have also undertaken their own adaptation through the building 
defences and relocating on a temporary or permanent basis (Allgood and McNamara, 2017).  
 
A final point to consider is how Kiribati leaders may be tailoring climate change and 
development plans and approaches to fit with current ideas of adaptation as development, to 
gain access to climate financing from global institutions. For example, Webber (2013) has 
suggested the term ‘performative vulnerability’ where vulnerability to climate change is 
enacted by officials in Kiribati to gain access to finance and aid from international donors. 
Vulnerability in Kiribati is therefore produced by the power relations between consultants and 
I-Kiribati officials interactions, in both a material and discursive ways (Webber, 2013). The 
KAP and Kiribati’s approach to adaptation illustrate power relations present in donor-recipient 
relationships where even though local actors have power “ultimately they are expected to 
reframe development needs in terms that make them fundable” (Dean et al., 2017, p.68). In 
Kiribati a ‘climate-development-finance nexus’ has formed due to a focus on projects that are 
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funded by international donors rather than support for local knowledge and community projects 
(Mallin, 2018). This also has implications for representations of Kiribati and climate migration.  
 
Additionally, it has been suggested that the former President Tong used vulnerability to climate 
change and the discourse of ‘sinking islands’ to access funds from the international community, 
while also turning attention away from the other socio-economic issues the nation faces such 
as overcrowding or unemployment (Korauaba, 2015; Klepp and Chavez-Rodriguez, 2018). 
Korauaba notes that “Getting the international community to solve as many problems as 
possible because they seem to be linked to climate change is a card now being played by the 
president and other Pacific leaders” (2015, p.235). However, despite clear efforts to mobilise 
external finance and expertise in this way, Kiribati has continued to face a range of socio-
economic issues. There has been concern that the focus on aid aligning to climate change 
adaptation may shift funding and attention from existing socio-economic and daily issues of I-
Kiribati (Gaillard, 2012; Klepp and Chavez-Rodriguez, 2018). This also points to broader 
issues of privileging of climate change that results in depoliticization of other development 
challenges (See: Kelman, 2014). Thus, the way adaptation is now included in development 
may have ongoing effects for climate change approaches in Kiribati.  
 
3.3.2 Kiribati and climate migration: ‘Migration with Dignity’ or adaptation?  
Kiribati is at the centre of climate change migration discussions, being seen as a ‘canary in the 
coalmine’ (Farbotko, 2010 p. 54). Former President Tong has been outspoken internationally 
about the vulnerability of Kiribati to climate change and the need to migrate, arguably 
contributing to representations of I-Kiribati as ‘victims’ (Korauaba, 2014). This has brought 
attention internationally to the impacts of climate change on Kiribati and the potential for the 
nation to become uninhabitable. However, migration was still seen as undesirable by Tong and 
his government. Instead, there was a focus on maintaining the habitability of Kiribati for as 
long as possible, with gradual migration over time, instead of a collective forced migration of 
I-Kiribati at some point in the future, something that is considered a last resort (Bedford et al., 
2016; Farbotko et al., 2016).  
 
The ‘Migration with Dignity’ policy was part of a relocation strategy by the Government of 
Kiribati which would involve opportunities for voluntary international migration (McNamara, 
2015). It also worked on improving education and upskilling I-Kiribati to improve migration 
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options internationally (McNamara, 2015). This built on existing international labour mobility 
from Kiribati through education and economic migration (Farbotko et al., 2016). Migration 
with dignity would also assist with building an I-Kiribati diaspora in countries such as New 
Zealand and Australia that could support future migrants and provide remittances (McNamara, 
2015). By upskilling and preparing the Kiribati community, citizens would be able to migrate 
on their own should they wish to, and would be attractive choices for permanent migration  
(McNamara, 2015; Voigt-Graf and Kagan, 2017). This policy was therefore focused on dignity 
and on the agency of I-Kiribati to migrate, rather than being labelled refugees. Academics have 
argued that this policy was positive because it removes the problematic term of refugee that 
PICs have been vocal in stating they do not want (Klepp, 2017). However, this policy was not 
without issues in providing inequitable migration options, catering to those with the means to 
migrate, while lower literacy and I-Kiribati with subsistence livelihoods would be less able to 
migrate (McNamara, 2015). It can also be argued that this policy still reflects neoliberal notions 
of migration as adaptation (Felli, 2013; Farbotko, 2017).  
 
Kiribati’s change in leadership is an example of disagreement over approaches to climate 
change. Both Tong and Maamau’s approaches to migration were similar in that they focus on 
ensuring I-Kiribati can live in Kiribati for the short to medium term (Hermann and Kempf, 
2019). However, contrasting to the former President, the current President Taneti Maamau has 
shifted the Government of Kiribati’s focus away from migration with dignity (Remling, 2020). 
The current government instead focuses on citizens remaining in-country for the long-term, an 
approach that fits with the views of many I-Kiribati who wish to remain (Hermann and Kempf, 
2019). To facilitate this, the Government of Kiribati’s approach is based on improving living 
standards, temporary labour migration for economic growth through remittances, tourism and 
infrastructure (Rytz, 2018; Hermann and Kempf, 2019). Climate change constrains the 
potential achievement of these goals, so Maamau's government has also maintained many 
aspects of climate change policy from the previous government, and at an international level 
continues to seek financial support, mitigation and local level adaptation to secure the future 
of Kiribati (Hermann and Kempf, 2019; Hermann, 2020). Maamau’s decision to focus on 
remaining in Kiribati is also influenced by his religious beliefs. Maamau stated in a video for 
the U.N. Climate Change Conference, COP23 that: "Climate change is indeed a serious 
problem… But we don't believe that Kiribati will sink like the Titanic ship. Our country, our 
beautiful lands, are created by the hands of God." (Maamau cited in CBS News, 2017; Rytz, 
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2018). This faith signals the importance of local beliefs and context in climate change 
approaches, which will now be discussed.  
 
3.3.3 Knowledge, religion and climate change  in Kiribati  
The Government of Kiribati’s change in approach signals the importance of the local context 
and knowledge for approaches to climate change. The importance of religion is one example 
of this. Traditionally, Kiribati has been a collective society with residential kinship groups 
(Bataua, 1985; Kuruppu, 2009). However with the arrival of Christianity, colonisation and 
eventual independence this has changed to society being based on villages, with the importance 
of being part of a community such as the church or village (Kuruppu, 2009). The cultural values 
of Kiribati society are family based and involve egalitarian ethics to support the wellbeing of 
everyone in the community (Borovnik, 2005). For I-Kiribati the maneaba is a meeting house 
where community issues are discussed and decisions are made with each family getting a seat 
(Bataua, 1985; Kuruppu, 2009). Over time in some villages, communities have become more 
involved in the church and these maneaba have become part of the church (Kuruppu, 2009). 
Christianity is therefore now an important part of I-Kiribati society. 
 
In Kiribati, 57 percent of the population are Roman catholic, and another 31 percent are part 
of the Kiribati Uniting Church, a Protestant Church. Less than 1 percent of the population have 
no religious affiliation (U.S. Department of State, 2019). As mentioned above, religion plays a 
part in the current Government of Kiribati’s decision to focus on remaining in country rather 
than migrating. Religion has also been used in Kiribati politics to delegitimise the approach of 
the previous government in terms of migration with dignity and scientific understandings of 
climate change (Kempf, 2017). Studies have explored the important role faith and religious 
institutions play in climate migration, adaptation decisions, and understandings of climate 
change in the Pacific region and Kiribati (See: Farbotko, 2005; Kuruppu and Liverman, 2011; 
Kempf, 2012; Kempf, 2017; Fair, 2018; Hermann, 2020).  
 
For the population of Kiribati there is uncertainty around the science of climate change, and 
though the effects of a changing climate can be seen by I-Kiribati, some believe that these 
impacts are God punishing them (Loughry and McAdam, 2008). For some this is a sign of 
apocalyptic world end times (Gagaeolo et al., 2020). Others have faith that God will protect 
them as the climate changes. This is often placed in the belief that Kiribati’s future is secure 
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due to the promise of God to Noah in the bible, that he would not flood earth again (Loughry 
and McAdam, 2008). Kuruppu and Liverman (2011) for instance, find that around 20 percent 
of I-Kiribati participants saw faith in god as a reason not to be concerned by climate change. 
This was viewed as an avoidance tactic as well as being limiting to I-Kiribati agency. 
Contrasting this, the Noah story has also been shown as a way for I-Kiribati to elicit agency 
and power over their future through counternarratives and co-opting dominant discourses of 
the science of climate change (Kempf, 2017). However, it should also be noted that many I-
Kiribati have also accepted that climate change is a danger for Kiribati (Hermann, 2020). There 
have also been those that advocate for the inclusion of religious understandings in climate 
change responses to contribute to climate change narratives that are meaningful locally (See 
for example: Fair, 2018). The Church and religion can also be an important agent for social 
change in issues such as climate change.  
 
As an agent of change, the Church can be an important institution for the dissemination of 
climate change knowledge to communities. Because the majority of I-Kiribati attend church, 
these institutions offer opportunities for communicating awareness and information about 
climate change and adaptation (Nunn, 2010). While Kiribati church leaders have campaigned 
for action by richer nations, some such as Korauaba (2014) have expressed doubt that these 
leaders would go against the bible and their faith by telling their congregation to discount the 
promise God made to Noah. However, contrasting to this more pessimistic view, there are cases 
where the Church has been involved in climate change policy and awareness within Kiribati. 
In 2010, awareness raising workshops were held by Catholic Youth in some outer islands, as 
this group campaigned for protection of the environment (Hermann, 2017). Another example 
is the Roman Catholic Church being asked to create a play during the second phase of the KAP 
to raise awareness around of environmental issues and behaviours to counter climate change 
(Kempf, 2012). This play was created and then performed by a Catholic youth group. The role 
of the church and religion therefore differs depending on context and may change over time.  
 
Within the population of Kiribati there are varying levels of awareness and education in relation 
to of climate change and its impacts. A focus for the KAP was climate change awareness raising 
activities (Elrick and Kay, 2009; Dean et al., 2017). As part of KAP an awareness survey found 
that most I-Kiribati spoken to knew about climate change but did not have detailed knowledge 
of the impacts (Kaiteie and Hogan, 2008). This awareness study also found that most 
respondents sourced their information about climate change from the Government radio 
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station, with this and workshops being the most effective way to communicate information 
about climate change adaptation (Kaiteie and Hogan, 2008). This reflects research showing 
that in the Pacific radio is a respected medium, and face-to-face meetings with traditional 
cultural protocols in the local language are the most successful (Nunn, 2010). It has also been 
argued that there are issues with media coverage in Kiribati particularly in relation to climate 
change (Korauaba, 2014). Korauaba states that the Government’s “closed door policy, top 
down approach and its one-way communication have restricted the media’s access to 
information relating to climate change” (2014, p.3). It is clear, then, that there are issues for 
communicating climate change information in Kiribati. It is worth noting also that while there 
may not be scientific knowledge, those in Kiribati, like other PIC communities, have traditional 
knowledge from adapting to environmental changes for centuries (Nunn, 2010; Bryant-
Tokalau, 2018). I-Kiribati have strong connections to the land seeing it as a “living presence, 
linking the people on it to the ancestors” (Hermann, 2017, p.55). Communities that have lived 
in the same area for a long time are deeply aware of the land, being able to see environmental 
changes, and now the impacts of climate change (Hermann, 2017). It is therefore important to 
include this local knowledge and practices, and to have community led approaches to climate 
change (McNamara, 2013).  
 
3.4 New Zealand’s involvement in climate change and development  
This thesis is focused on the role that New Zealand Government and NGOs/development 
agencies have in Kiribati in terms of representations and approaches to climate change and 
migration. As has already been noted in previous sections, New Zealand is involved in the 
debate around climate refugees and potential migration pathways for Kiribati. New Zealand is 
involved in the Pacific region through responses to natural disasters, development and climate 
change adaptation, and through Official Development Assistance (ODA) with the majority 
(60%) of this fund going to the Pacific region (MFAT, 2018). New Zealand has strong current 
and historical connections to PICs, as a Pacific nation with close geographic proximity and 
shared heritage of Māori and Pacific peoples, as well as through colonialism. Under colonial 
rule, New Zealand was responsible for various PICs from 1901, governing on behalf of Great 
Britain. This was mainly administrative and trade related and over time responsibility for 
necessities such as infrastructure and education developed, with New Zealand’s aid policies 
for the Pacific beginning in the 1960s (Overton, 2009). New Zealand’s approaches to aid have 
generally been affected by geopolitics, such as Pacific independence in the 1960s, and 1970s, 
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and the debt crisis (Banks et al., 2012). In the 1980s to 1990s, neoliberalism meant the shift to 
market-led oriented development aid and pressure to reduce New Zealand’s aid budget 
(Overton, 2009; Murray and Overton, 2011). During the 1990s, New Zealand’s focus shifted 
from poverty alleviation to how aid could provide prospects for trade and economic growth, 
reflecting these neoliberal changes (Overton, 2009). However, after the 1990s, this again 
shifted to focus on the state-centred aid that centred on poverty alleviation and the needs of 
those receiving aid (Murray and Overton, 2011).  
 
The way that the New Zealand government interacts, and funds NGOs has also undergone 
shifts overtime, particularly through the 2000s to present where it has changed again. In 2002, 
the semi-autonomous agency within MFAT called the New Zealand Agency for International 
Development (NZAID) was formed (Adams, 2010). This agency was tasked with providing 
poverty alleviation particularly in the Pacific (Banks et al., 2012). NZAID existed for seven 
years, focusing on best practice and partnerships, and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) with a holistic approach that centred on poverty alleviation and the Pacific region 
(Banks et al., 2012). While it existed, NZAID had increased staff and funding to development 
aid, though the increase in ODA from 0.24% GNI to 0.30 was still low for the OECD (Adams, 
2010). However, with a change of government after the 2008 elections, NZAID was 
reintegrated to become part of MFAT in 2009 (Adams, 2010; Spratt and Wood, 2018). This 
signalled another shift in New Zealand’s approach to aid in the Pacific, with a greater alignment 
of aid to MFATs trade and foreign policy, with economic development becoming a main focus 
(Spratt and Wood, 2018). Thus, when NZAID was incorporated into MFAT, the priorities of 
aid changed as the National-led government shifted focus to sustainable economic 
development rather than poverty alleviation (Overton, 2009; Banks et al., 2012). This has 
resulted in widespread impacts on New Zealand’s aid sector, for example, affecting relations 
between government and NGOs and their funding, and lowering ODA contributions (Zweifel 
and Hill, 2015).  
 
Currently, another shift is underway in how New Zealand provides aid and development to the 
Pacific region, with the Pacific Reset. The Pacific Reset was announced in 2018, as a new 
approach to the Pacific that involved building partnerships rather than one of donor and 
recipient relationships (ERS, 2018; Peters, 2018). The Pacific reset involves two components; 
one is focusing on diplomacy in the region, and the other is restoring capacity and funding to 
the Pacific and ODA. This is important for climate change adaptation in the Pacific, as it will 
 59 
allow more funding for focusing on climate change issues in the Pacific (Peters, 2018). New 
Zealand, the USA, and Australia having traditionally been the ‘powers’ in the Pacific region. 
However the influence of China and Taiwan has been growing in the region (Zhang, 2017; 
Zhang and Lawson, 2017). The Pacific Reset may signal New Zealand changing its approach 
in part to counter this influence (Steff, 2018; Corbett and Connell, 2020). This shift is 
significant to the current research, as it has implications for the way that aid in the Pacific 
region is approached and could therefore effect how New Zealand NGOs approach aid in 
countries such as Kiribati, due to changes in funding availability and processes, and the 
priorities of aid. Overall, these changes may have implications for the way that New Zealand 
development agencies and organisations approach the Pacific, in terms of climate change 
adaptation and migration.  
 
3.5 New Zealand and climate change adaptation in the Pacific region 
The New Zealand Government contributes $200 million NZD to support climate change in the 
Global South, with the Pacific being the priority region. This mainly occurs through bilateral 
development assistance, regional organisations in the Pacific, and multilateral organisations 
such as the World Bank and the UNDP (MFAT, n.d.a).  Climate change related support mostly 
occurs through the New Zealand Aid Programme (NZAP) and MFAT states that “We primarily 
deliver our climate-related support as part of activities designed to achieve sustainable, 
inclusive and resilient development that meet the aspirations and needs of our partner 
countries.” (MFAT, n.d.a). This reflects the cross-cutting approach taken by the NZAP where 
the focus is on addressing multiple challenges including climate change, environmental 
protection, human rights, and well-being (MFAT, n.d.b). New Zealand also provides support 
for climate change through contributions to the Green Climate Fund and the UNFCCC climate 
finance (MFAT, n.d.a). Outside of the New Zealand Government, there are also a range of 
NGOs and organisations from New Zealand operating in the Pacific region on environmental 
and development issues. MFAT provides funding as well as partnering with many of these 
NGOs (MFAT, n.d.d). This collaboration is important as these NGOs have experience and 
more reach within the community (MFAT, n.d.d).  
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3.6 Kiribati and New Zealand: Development, climate adaptation and 
migration 
New Zealand is involved in Kiribati through development initiatives and various migration 
pathways. New Zealand has been involved in supporting projects such as the KAP and more 
generally with development. For the three-year period of 2018-2021 the NZAP has been 
allocated $2.2 billion NZD dollars, of which $86.33 million of the total budget is allocated to 
Kiribati. New Zealand’s development program in Kiribati is focused on a range of areas, 
including supporting the KV20 development plan, population pressure in South Tarawa, 
education and health, governance, fisheries, and climate change adaptation (MFAT, n.d.c). 
This shows that despite the focus on climate migration from Kiribati in research and media, 
New Zealand’s aid is focused on a range of development areas. While climate change 
adaptation is included in this, the focus is again on folding adaptation into development. 
Indeed, there is also no mention of climate change migration in MFAT’s approach to aid and 
development in Kiribati. Despite this, Kiribati and New Zealand have been connected in 
discourses of climate change migration.  
 
As a relatively large nation that is geographically near to PICs with existent Pacific expat 
communities, New Zealand is considered a suitable choice for future climate migrants if this 
were to occur (Cameron, 2013). As discussed in a previous section, New Zealand offers two 
migration pathways that include Kiribati, the PAC for permanent migration, and the RSE 
scheme for seasonal agricultural workers from PICs (Immigration New Zealand, 2020b; 
Immigration New Zealand, 2020a). Some have suggested that migration pressure occurring 
due to various reasons, including climate change, could be eased by greater access to New 
Zealand’s Labour market through the PAC and RSE schemes (Bedford and Bedford, 2010). 
The PAC in particular has been mistaken for an environmental refugee policy internationally 
(Shen and Binns, 2012). However, though New Zealand is involved in the Pacific region and 
Kiribati, it does not have any specific formal processes or laws in place for accepting migrants 
or refugees from PICs due to the effects of climate change (Bedford and Bedford, 2010). 
 
Though New Zealand currently has no specific pathway for those displaced by climate change, 
the nation is still involved in the debate internationally. New Zealand has had 11 claims by 
individuals from PICs such as Tuvalu and Kiribati for protected refugee status, due to the 
effects of climate change (Manch, 2018; Walters, 2019). None of these attempts have been 
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successful due primarily to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which does 
not include environmental factors as a reason for refuge (see Chapter Two for further 
discussion) (Shen and Binns, 2012). One of these climate refugee claims that received attention 
in New Zealand and internationally is the case of loane Teitiota. Teitiota is from Kiribati and 
applied for refugee status in New Zealand through the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees in 2013 due to impacts of climate change (Baker-Jones and Baker-Jones, 2015). 
However, after several appeals including to the New Zealand Supreme Court, Teitiota’s claim 
was rejected as it did not fit the convention because Kiribati is still inhabitable (Baker-Jones 
and Baker-Jones, 2015). Had Teitiota, or any of the other cases, been accepted this would have 
set a legal precedent to allow other climate refugees to make a claim (Walters, 2019). Despite 
the fact that the claims of Teitiota were rejected, this case did bring attention to the possibility 
of a climate change refugee visa from New Zealand. 
 
Possibly due in part to the claims for refugee status, in 2017 the NZ government suggested an 
‘experimental’ humanitarian visa category for ‘climate refugees’ (Manch, 2018). This 
Humanitarian visa was suggested in late 2017 by the Green Party, and would allow 100 people 
displaced by climate change in the Pacific to migrate to New Zealand (Green Party, 2017). 
This Humanitarian visa would be “available to applicants from any Pacific Island Nation who 
have a genuine fear of permanent displacement because of environmental changes or damage 
due to climate change” (Green Party, 2017, p.8). This suggested visa was notable as no other 
countries have a policy explicitly for those who are displaced by climate change (Fiennes, 
2019). However, the suggested visa ultimately failed to be created. After discussions with 
Pacific Island communities and leaders revealed an individual visa approach was not the most 
appropriate – instead they argued that a collective solution that maintains the identity and 
culture of these nations is needed (Manch, 2018). New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, 
who was previously vocal about climate migrants coming to New Zealand, has since stated that 
this is not a policy discussion currently because Pacific leaders are not asking for this, and do 
not want to leave their countries (Lynch, 2019). This reflects earlier discussions about citizens 
of PICs such as Kiribati maintaining that they do not want to permanently migrate due to 
climate change (McNamara and Gibson, 2009; Noy, 2017). It also emphasises the importance 
of PICs populations making the decision if they should migrate, rather than this being forced 
on them when other options may be possible (Kelman et al., 2015). Significantly for the 
arguments advanced in this thesis, this also suggests a disconnect between what is happening 
 62 
in New Zealand and Kiribati compared to the popular representations of climate change in the 
media and other organisation reports, something the later chapters of this thesis will explore.  
 
Another reason for this change from the Humanitarian Visa suggestion is that the Pacific Reset 
announced in 2018 involved a different approach to migration. With the Pacific Reset in 2018, 
MBIE began reviewing migration from the Pacific. This focused on reviewing New Zealand’s 
existent visas such as the RSE scheme for temporary and labour migration from the Pacific 
“investigating how the temporary migration policies can better contribute to migration 
readiness and climate-related outcomes in Pacific countries” (MBIE, 2018, p.11). There are 
three suggested stages; the first and second stages in 2018 and 2019 were to research and 
review existent migration policies such as the RSE and PAC. The potential third stage would 
be an investigation into the “need for, and design of, changes to visa setting for people 
displaced by climate change”(MBIE, 2018, p.11). This stage would occur post-2024 after 
foundational work on this has been completed and is based on the Cabinet paper by MFAT 
(2018) called “Pacific climate change-related displacement and migration: a New Zealand 
action plan”. In MFATs action plan, the focus is to build resilience as well as further discussion 
of potential migration options, regional dialogue, and using ODA to prevent or to delay 
displacement due to climate change (MFAT, 2018). Immigration options will only be 
considered from 2024 onwards once a longer term approach begins to be investigated based on 
these earlier actions (MFAT, 2018). MFAT has acknowledged that migration might be 
necessary in the future and that immigration policies should be flexible to respond to this need 
(MFAT, 2018). Aupito Tofae Su’a William Sio, New Zealand’s Minister for Pacific Peoples, 
has also stated similarly that it is important for New Zealand to have policies in place to address 
migration caused by climate change (Sio, 2018 cited in Cass (2018)). Thus, this approach by 
the New Zealand Government means that a Humanitarian Visa may still occur but will not be 
investigated for some time.   
 
A final note worth mentioning when considering New Zealand’s role in Pacific climate change 
issues, is the securitisation of climate migration. In 2018 the New Zealand Ministry of Defence 
and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) released a defence assessment on climate change 
and security particularly in the South Pacific region (New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2018). 
This report focuses on climate change as a risk for security in terms human security and the 
potential for conflict due to climate change. Migration is mentioned in this document, however 
in contrast to the literature that discusses the securitisation of climate migration, the NZDF 
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appears to be focused on the pressure climate change will cause for its Humanitarian and 
stability operations in the Pacific region, and creation of conflict rather than security of borders 
(See: New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2018). This is something this thesis will discuss 
further in later sections.  
 
In addition to the New Zealand Government discussion of climate migration, other suggestions 
have been made by NGOs and Academics for New Zealand’s role in Kiribati and other PICs 
migration. One of the suggestions is that the borders be opened to residents of PICs such as 
Kiribati. For instance, Kumar (2015) suggests that a merger of microstates such as Kiribati and 
Tuvalu with a larger Pacific nation such Australia or New Zealand through a free association  
agreement or federation would be a possible solution to the issues of climate change 
displacement. This would allow for gradual migration over time as communities needed to. 
The World Bank Pacific Possible report also suggests something similar, proposing an 
‘Australia-New Zealand Atoll Access Agreement’ which would allow open labour market 
access for Kiribati and Tuvalu due to climate change (Curtain et al., 2016). Both Kumar and 
the Pacific Possible report argue that migration would be gradual enough that New Zealand 
and/or Australia could cope with numbers that migration. It is clear that whatever approach is 
taken, New Zealand is involved and is likely to continue to be involved in discussions of 
climate change migration from Kiribati and other PICs. The way climate change has been 
approached and portrayed by western governments, organisations, NGOs and media, raises 
questions about New Zealand’s role and responsibility in the Pacific region for adaptation and 
in the debate around climate migration, something this thesis aims to investigate further. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the context of Kiribati and New Zealand’s involvement in discussions 
of climate migration. The Government of Kiribati’s approaches and policies for climate change 
and development have been outlined, along with the changes from ‘migration with dignity’ to 
the current stance to remain in Kiribati long-term. Additionally, issues of context, knowledge 
and religion have also been discussed. New Zealand’s approaches to development and climate 
change in the Pacific region and how these have shifted over time have been outlined, focusing 
particularly on approaches to Kiribati and the ongoing exploration of a Humanitarian Visa or 
pathway for those displaced by climate change. In this chapter, I have argued that Kiribati and 
New Zealand have both historic and current connections through development and labour 
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migration, but also that the two nations have been linked in climate migration discourses. By 
expanding on the context of these two nations it is clear there are several questions and areas 
that can be explored further to understand the way Kiribati is represented and what role new 
Zealand Government and NGOs are having in adaptation and climate migration approaches. In 
the next chapter I will explain the methodology and methods I have used to explore these 









Methodology and Methods  
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss and justify the methodology and methods used for this thesis. To 
begin I will discuss poststructuralism, the methodological approach taken in this research. I 
will then introduce the two qualitative methods used in this thesis, a media discourse analysis 
and semi-structured interviews. Both of these methods will be outlined in detail beginning with 
the media discourse analysis, focusing on why this method is useful, the article selection 
process, and the analysis of this data. Semi-structured interviews will then be discussed along 
with the process of participant recruitment and data analysis. Finally, ethical considerations of 
the project will be covered along with my positionality and the importance of remaining 
reflexive at all stages of the research. In discussing the methodology and methods, I will show 
how these have been crucial to gain a range of perspectives on climate migration to understand 
representations of Kiribati in relation to climate migration, and the role that New Zealand had 
in these issues.  
 
4.2 Methodology: Poststructuralism  
In this thesis I take a poststructuralist approach to knowledge. Poststructuralism focuses on 
how meaning is produced, and the links between knowledge and power that result in socially 
accepted practices and knowledge (Fawcett, 2008). From a poststructuralist perspective 
“society and the world is understood through culturally specific language and discourse” 
(Panelli, 2004, p. 217). Reality is seen as being constantly produced “on the surface by various 
sets of relations” with this horizontal understanding of the world contrasting to other 
worldviews that centre on structures and stability (Cresswell, 2013, p. 208). Poststructuralism 
also encourages questioning of assumptions about the world and ourselves (Wylie, 2006), 
which has been key in my approach to this project. Poststructuralism is therefore a useful 
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methodology for this research because it allows for the various perspectives and knowledge of 
different groups and individuals to be explored, and how this impacts representations and 
approaches to climate migration. This was particularly important for my project, to allow for 
the exploration of various perspectives in the media and from New Zealand based I-Kiribati 
and NGOs, or government informants.  
 
In addition, the concept of discourse is central to poststructuralism as “a set of unspoken rules 
which govern, control, and produce knowledge in culture” (Berg, 2009, p. 216). Discourses 
legitimise certain understandings of knowledge as they are performed and incorporated into 
various daily activities or institutions (Panelli, 2004). Poststructuralist concepts such as 
discourse are applied throughout this project by using qualitative methods and particularly the 
discourse analysis of media representations of climate migration in Kiribati. Thus, 
Poststructuralism offers an appropriate approach from which I consider the various 
perspectives, approaches and knowledge of climate migration in Kiribati and New Zealand’s 
approach to this. Post-structuralism informed the two methods used in this research, a media 
discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews.  
 
4.3 Methods: Discourse Analysis and Interviews  
Traditionally, climate change has mainly been studied through a scientific and natural science 
lens (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014). However, there has been a growth in social science focusing 
on climate change with the acknowledgement that “the effects of climate change are mediated 
through social, cultural and economic structures and processes” (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014, 
p. 417). In this project I aim to add to social science understandings of climate change by using 
qualitative methods of a media discourse analysis and interviews. The media discourse analysis 
provides broad themes and understandings of popular representations from the media 
surrounding climate change migration and adaptation in Kiribati. This larger, less specific data 
offers context for the more detailed discussions from the interviews with NGOs, Government 
and New Zealand based I-Kiribati. Used together, these two methods are complementary and 
allow for data triangulation to strengthen the findings of the research (Davies et al., 2002). 
Along with the literature and policy, these multiple methods allowed for deeper insight and 
perspectives to be explored when addressing the research aim and questions. Each of these 
methods will now be discussed.  
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4.4 Discourse analysis  
As seen in Chapter Two, in the international media people of PICs such as Kiribati are often 
presented as ‘victims’ of climate change that lack agency and will be forced to migrate in future 
(Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Gillis, 2014; Hingley, 2017). While some studies have completed 
discourse analysis of PICs and climate migration (See for example: Bettini, 2013; Farbotko, 
2005), few have examined mainstream media representations of Kiribati. Therefore, I have 
undertaken a media discourse analysis to uncover the popular representations of the issue of 
climate migration in New Zealand, Pacific based, and other international newspaper articles. 
This was to help address the aim of the research and particularly the first research question 
which asks how mainstream media groups have represented climate change in the Pacific 
region, specifically focusing on representations of Kiribati in relation to climate change 
migration and adaptation. This analysis of media coverage of climate migration and adaptation 
will be based on Foucauldian Discourse Analysis methods. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
aims to “reveal how particular ideas that help to forge social realities become understood as 
common sense” (Waitt, 2010, p. 238). Based on the ideas of Michel Foucault, a French 
philosopher, this method is centred on the connection between power and knowledge, and the 
idea that no knowledge is objective, universal, or free of values (Cheek, 2008). This method is 
therefore useful for the current research due to the focus on understanding what discourses and 
knowledge of climate migration are dominant. In doing this, more can be revealed about the 
way that the nation of Kiribati has been discursively constructed in relation to climate change, 
and what the dominant understandings of climate migration are.  
 
Ideas of discourse and power are important to consider when studying representations and 
approaches to climate migration in Kiribati and the role of New Zealand. Foucault describes 
this concept of discourse in a number of ways but generally it refers to “sets of ideas ‘and’ 
practices that give statements, texts, rhetorics, and narratives particular kinds of meanings” 
(Berg, 2009, p. 215). According to Foucault, what is valid or can be said depends on discourses 
that are governed by ‘rules of knowledge production’ (Waitt, 2010). These discourses “order 
reality in certain ways” with power relations resulting in some discourses occurring more or 
having more authority (Cheek, 2008, p. 356). While there are multiple different discourses in 
existence at once, usually one is dominant and shapes how the world is known (Berg, 2009). 
Together, these discourses create what are known as discursive frameworks that limit or allow 
particular ways of thinking about the world, enabling or constraining knowledge production 
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(Cheek, 2004). Thus, discourse analysis can be used to explore how certain ideas and realities 
are constructed as ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ and why they continue to be accepted as the norm 
(Cheek, 2008). A discourse analysis provides the opportunity to consider what discursive 
constructions of the issue dominant, what knowledge is considered valid, and likewise what is 
silenced. This method is therefore useful for understanding the narratives and debates around 
Kiribati and climate migration.  
 
The following sections will outline the process of article selection, followed by the stages of 
analysis that were undertaken. In general, there is a lack of guidelines or instructions for 
conducting a discourse analysis. This is mainly due to Foucault and others being reluctant to 
provide an outline or template that could result in this method becoming too systematic or 
prescribed (Berg, 2009; Waitt, 2010). However, Rose (2001) has set up a method for discourse 
analysis which involves seven stages of analysis. These stages have since been adapted by 
Waitt (2010) who outlines an interpretation of the seven stages as: 1. choice of source texts, 2. 
Being reflexive and suspending pre-existing categories, 3. Familiarisation and thinking 
critically about the texts, 4. Coding, 5. Identifying ‘regimes of truth’; 6. Identifying 
inconsistencies within sources, and; 7 silences as discourses (See Waitt, 2010, p. 220). 
However, both Rose (2001) and Waitt (2010) are clear that these strategies are suggestions and 
a starting point to be used when conducting a discourse analysis. These two authors’ guidelines 
provided a starting point for the analysis that I have adapted to form the basis for this analysis. 
Section 4.4.2 outlines my interpretation of these methods and the resulting steps I have 
followed for my analysis. The resulting process I used is mainly based on Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis. However, I have also included some content analysis that looks at the 
number of articles discussing certain topics, and the differences between the two groups of 
articles in terms of use of language and the focus of content.    
 
4.4.1 Selection of sources  
The purpose of the media discourse analysis was to understand the popular representations of 
the issue of climate migration in Kiribati by the media. Because of this, the database Factiva 
was used to select relevant newspaper articles. Two main searches were completed to select 
articles: Firstly, a search for articles that directly discussed climate migration or climate 
refugees in relation to Kiribati and New Zealand; Secondly, a search for articles talking more 
broadly about climate change adaptation or mitigation in Kiribati. The goal of these two 
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searches was to create two groups of articles that could be separately analysed to understand 
the dominant discourses for discussion of climate change migration and climate change 
adaptation in relation to Kiribati. These two analyses could then be compared and contrasted 
to explore the differences in representations and discussion of climate change in relation to 
Kiribati. For each search on Factiva the following criteria was used select articles: 
1. Time: Articles from between 01/01/2013 and the 01/03/2020 were chosen. During this 
time a range of climate change related events that may have influenced discourses 
around Kiribati and climate change occurred including: the notable and ongoing legal 
case of I-Kiribati man Ioane Teitiota that began in 2013; changes to both the Kiribati 
and New Zealand Governments’ in this time period and how climate change is 
approached; a Humanitarian Visa suggested by New Zealand for climate ‘refugees’ in 
2017; and general media attention around climate change encouraged by events such 
as the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and the global School Strike for Climate in 2019. 
 
2. Location: the Factiva searches were limited to the Kiribati and New Zealand regions in 
order to find articles that discussed one or both of these regions.  
 
3. Relevance: After the Factiva searches were completed the results were manually 
skimmed to assess the relevance of the topic. If the topic did not discuss climate change 
(either adaptation or migration) or this was not the central focus of the article it was not 
selected. In addition articles that did not directly discuss and focus on Kiribati, such as 
those that briefly mentioned Kiribati as an example, were also not selected. 
Table 4.1 shows the specific search terms used to select each group of articles, the number of 
search results, the amount of articles selected from this search, and the final amount of articles 
selected once further screening had taken place.  
 
The initial Factiva searches using the above criteria resulted in a pool of 248 news articles for 
the migration/refugee related search and 75 news articles for the adaptation/mitigation 
searches. The articles from these initial searches were read in greater detail to ensure they met 





Table 4.1: Summary of search terms and article numbers 
Date range  01/01/2013 to 01/03/2020 
Regions Kiribati or New Zealand  
Source and Authors All sources and Authors 
 
Search 1: Climate Migration and Kiribati 
Search terms used Kiribati AND climate change and (migration or refugee) 
Results found  669 – 198 duplicates = 471 initial articles  
Number of articles initially 
selected from search  
(Titles and  skim read for 
relevance) 
248 
Narrowed selection after 
reading articles in depth 
97 (87 articles related to Teitiota climate refugee case also 
removed and recorded in separate list)  
Total articles for analysis:  97 
 
Search 2: Climate change mitigation and adaptation in Kiribati 
Search terms used Search 1: Kiribati AND climate 
change adaptation 
Search 2: Kiribati AND 
climate change mitigation 
Results found  74 – 13 duplicates = 61  18 – 4 duplicates = 14 
Number of articles initially 
selected  
42 9  
Narrowed selection after 
reading articles 
34 4 
Total articles for analysis  38 
 
During this phase of selection it became obvious that the migration related search was 
dominated by articles relating to the legal case of Ioane Teitiota, a man who attempted to claim 
refugee based on the effects of  climate change in his home of Kiribati (See Baker-Jones and 
Baker-Jones, 2015). While this is an important event that drove further discussion of the 
potential for climate migration from Kiribati, many of the articles related to this case offered 
short legal updates on the case rather than focusing on Kiribati. As a result, 87 articles were 
removed that simply provided a legal update on the Teitiota case in New Zealand and did not 
directly discuss the climate change situation in Kiribati. These articles were recorded in a 
separate list so coverage of the issue over time could be tracked. These particular news articles 
did not add information that was useful for the purposes of the discourse analysis, and removing 
these articles made the amount of data more manageable.  
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In total, 99 migration related articles and 38 adaptation related articles were selected for the 
discourse analysis (see Table 4.1). The number of articles for each year during the time period 
varies and Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of these articles over time.  
 
To my knowledge, few previous studies of the Pacific region and climate migration have 
conducted a discourse analysis with a large dataset such as this. Rather, the focus of these 
studies has been on a specific newspaper or set of reports and analysed these in great detail 
(See for example: Bettini, 2013; Farbotko, 2005). I intentionally chose to use this large dataset 
and the two different groups of articles to gain an overview of how this issue has been 
represented over time, rather than the specifics of one event or type of news coverage. By 
including more articles, and using two separate searches, it is possible to analyse a larger time 
period, and to consider what the major discussions have been. This was useful as the purpose 
of this media discourse analysis was to gain a greater understanding of what the popular media 
representations of climate migration and adaptation have been in relation to Kiribati. 
 
When selecting both groups of articles, I aimed to include a wide range of articles. I initially 
noticed fewer results in the adaptation search compared to the migration search. Because of 
this I conducted two different searches “Kiribati AND climate change adaptation” and “Kiribati 
AND climate change mitigation” to find a larger range of news articles (shown in Table 4.1). 
However, even with these two searches to find a larger amount of articles, there were far fewer 





















results than the migration search found. For this reason, only 38 articles are included in the 
adaptation analysis compared to the migration analysis which had 97.  
 
After the final group of articles had been selected, these articles were entered into a two excel 
spreadsheets (one for the adaptation related articles and one for the climate migration related 
articles). Here the article title, newspaper, author, year published, wordcount, the 
country/region it was published in, and some of the main themes identified when reading the 
article were noted. This was a useful way to overview the development of the issue over time, 
and compare the two data-sets. These spreadsheets were later labelled with article numbers for 
easy reference during the results chapter (see Appendix A for full reference records of the 
included articles). With the articles selected, sorted and the initial screening completed, the 
next phase was data analysis.  
 
4.4.2 Analysis of the articles 
As discussed above, I have approached this analysis based on Waitt’s (2010) interpretation of 
Rose’s (2001) seven stages of discourse analysis. The stages Waitt (2010) outlines include: 
choice of source materials or text; suspending pre-existing categories; familiarisation; coding; 
Identifying ‘regimes of truth’; inconsistencies within sources; and silences (for further 
discussion of each stage see Waitt (2010); Rose (2001); Berg (2009). I have adapted and built 
on this approach resulting in five stages of analysis, though the analysis of these articles was 
an iterative process with many of the stages being revisited or occurring simultaneously (see 




Stage One: Reflexivity  
Reflexivity is central to my approach to this research, and overarched all stages of the discourse 
analysis (see Figure 4.2). As section 4.7 discusses in detail, reflecting on and being a aware of 
my positionality and potential biases has been crucial throughout every stage of this research. 
This includes the media discourse analysis. Waitt notes it is not possible to ‘suspend pre-
existing knowledge’ so instead it is important to be aware of existing knowledge and ideas 
through being reflexive (2010, p. 225). I entered the discourse analysis with pre-existing ideas 
and assumptions about climate change migration and adaptation in relation to Kiribati. It was 
crucial that I attempt to address these biases through being reflexive and carefully considering 
my position in relation to the research and how my ideas were influencing the analysis. I also 
used ‘open coding’ where I approached coding the articles without having a premade coding 
framework. This allowed codes and themes to organically develop based on what was 
presented in the news articles, rather than fitting this information into a pre-existing framework 
based on my assumptions or the literature.  
 
Stage 1: Reflexivity  
Stage 2: Reading articles for 
familiarity/context 





Stage 4: recognising silences and 
inconsistencies in the articles 
Figure 4.2: The stages analysis used for the Foucauldian discourse analysis adapted 
from the stages suggested by Rose (2001), Waitt (2010), Berg (2009).  
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Stage Two: reading the articles for familiarity and ‘open coding’  
The next stage of analysis was becoming familiar with the news articles. This involved being 
aware of the social elements of a source, for example who wrote it and the audience it is written 
for, along with the social context (Waitt, 2010). I began the process of familiarisation during 
source selection as each article was skimmed for relevance and then read in detail. I became 
familiar with the articles and their sources – that is whether the article was from a New Zealand 
or a Pacific based source, or an international source, and who the intended audience might be. 
During this familiarisation ‘open coding’ also occurred as any codes or ideas were noted as I 
read (Crang, 2005). This coding and familiarisation helped build a foundation for Stage Three 
where analytical and descriptive codes were developed.  
 
Stage Three: Analytical and descriptive coding  
Following familiarisation, the articles were coded into descriptive and analytical codes as 
suggested by Waitt (2010). The descriptive codes focused on the background and contextual 
information (Cope, 2016). These codes related more directly to the content allowing me to 
build an idea of what the main events and points of discussion were. This was useful for 
comparing and contrasting the points that were covered or not covered in the two analyses. 
Analytical codes covered the more complex and detailed ideas of the articles (Cope, 2016). 
These codes allowed for exploration of the underlying themes and messages of the articles, 
discourses that dominated and voices that were not represented. The process of coding also 
involved thinking about what the voice and style of writing was and looking for any underlying 
or implied meanings in the articles. The coding programme ‘Dedoose’ was used to code each 
group of articles separately into codes, and sub-codes, allowing for the easy management of a 
large dataset. Coding was an iterative process that required reorganisation, sub-codes, and new 
codes as the analysis went on. These codes were later combined in Stage Five. 
 
Stage Four: recognising inconsistencies and silenced voices  
As another part of the analysis, I considered what voices or discourses were silenced and if 
there were inconsistencies in the articles. This step is crucial to the analysis as it shows how 
certain aspects of knowledge can be silenced by other knowledge that is considered common 
sense or the norm (Waitt, 2010). In the context of this study, it was important to investigate 
what the popular representations of climate migration and adaptation are and how this might 
set up certain types of knowledge as ‘normal’ and common sense, while ignoring or silencing 
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others. Again, this stage was an ongoing process that occurred throughout all stages of analysis. 
To do this as I coded articles, I kept a separate document where I noted any inconsistencies in 
the articles, or any voices and ideas that were dominant or did not seem to be present, and 
created codes around these.  
 
Stage Five: Combining codes and recognising themes 
The final stage involved organising the codes from earlier stages to create larger categories and 
themes. I also considered here what the ‘regimes of truth’ might be, that is the knowledge that 
makes a particular discourse valid (Berg, 2009; Foucault, 1980). By combining codes into 
larger themes, in this stage I was able to consider some of the broader differences and 
similarities in themes between both groups of articles. I used the analysis from the previous 
four stages to identify what some of the drivers of these themes and discourses might be, and 
what sort of knowledge and context underpinned these narratives. During this stage I also did 
content analysis, noting the percentages of articles from each search that discussed certain 
codes and contributed to certain discourses. It is worth noting here that a discourse analysis is 
a subjective method and as discussed in the previous stages, my own ideas and assumptions 
influenced the type of codes and knowledge that was produced. Even though I used quantitative 
methods to calculate percentages of articles that discussed certain themes, these were not 
intended to be representative of all articles or objective. Therefore, I did not necessarily expect 
these percentages from the content analysis to inform me of how the themes were discussed or 
the specific discourses and representations these contributed to. Instead these percentages were 
used to compare and contrast the two groups of articles and highlight what narratives and topics 
dominated or were not discussed within the selected articles. This was useful to gain an overall 
sense of what themes were emphasised and which were less present in the articles, which also 
added to stage four of the analysis by highlighting some of the silences in the articles.  
 
4.5 Semi-structured interviews with NGOs, Government workers and 
I-Kiribati 
Semi-structured interviews took place with those who work for NGOs or the New Zealand 
Government and with members of the New Zealand I-Kiribati community. The goal of the 
interviews with Key Informants from NGO and New Zealand Government was to provide 
perspectives and details on what these groups are currently doing in Kiribati and the Pacific to 
address climate change, and how this relates to climate change migration and representations 
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of climate migration. I-Kiribati participants were equally important in this project, to balance 
the views of the NGO/Government workers with the perspectives of those who have either 
lived in or have direct connections to Kiribati. These interviews were intended to build on and 
enrich the data from the media analysis, providing more detailed accounts of the viewpoints, 
approaches and representations of climate migration by New Zealand and Kiribati. Interviews 
were chosen because these generate in depth and detailed information about participants’ 
perspectives, experiences, and understandings of an issue (Dunn, 2016; Kitchin and Tate, 
2000). This was useful for adding to the broad information gathered in the discourse analysis, 
and provided diverging perspectives, information, and voices to be heard that the news articles 
may not have represented. This proved crucial for this thesis, to understand the actual 
approaches that are being taken within Kiribati to combat climate change, and what role New 
Zealand organisations have in these responses.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were also used because of the flexibility this method allows to adapt 
and reword questions to explore the interests, opinions and experiences of participants 
(Valentine, 2005). The interviews covered a range of topics related to climate change and 
Kiribati, with the interview questions being tailored for each participant based on a set of 
questions designed the NGO/government participants (Appendix B contains this interview 
guide) and another for I-Kiribati participants (see appendix C). The NGO and government 
workers questions mainly focused on topics such as their perspective on the challenges of 
climate change in Kiribati or the Pacific region; development aid; climate change adaptation 
approaches by New Zealand and how these might be improved; climate change migration; and 
representations of climate migration in the media. For I-Kiribati participants the topics were 
similar but more focused on their own experiences and perspectives of climate change 
adaptation and migration in Kiribati, their perceptions of aid and approaches by countries such 
as New Zealand, along with any other topics they felt were relevant to the project.  
 
4.5.1 Participants and recruitment  
Participant recruitment took place from October 2019 to February 2020, with the majority of 
interviews being conducted in January and February 2020. The recruitment and interview 
process took place over this long time period due to the necessity to liaise with various groups 
and individuals to locate potential participants. The aim was to speak with approximately 10 
NGO or Government workers, and 10 New Zealand based I-Kiribati.  
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Purposive sampling was used to select participants based on their relevance to the research 
topic (O’Reilly, 2009). For example, those who worked at environmental or international 
development NGOs focused in the Pacific were targeted. Snowball sampling also took place 
to connect with others who might like to participate in the project. This was done by asking 
participants if they knew any other organisations or individuals that might like to be involved 
(Valentine, 2005). To recruit NGO and Government stakeholders, I emailed information about 
my research to organisations involved in public discussion of climate migration or adaptation 
or that worked in Kiribati asking them if they would be interested in participating. After these 
initial connections were established, further communication was made either via email or 
phone to explain the project further and arrange an interview. In some cases when the 
organisations were unable to be involved, I was referred to resources on their website or to 
other groups or individuals who might wish to participate.  
 
Recruitment of I-Kiribati participants was more challenging. As a university student of New 
Zealand European descent, I am an outsider to the New Zealand I-Kiribati community. This 
required me to approach recruitment in a sensitive and appropriate manner (this is discussed 
further in the ethics and positionality sections 4.6 and 4.7). In order to do this, I first approached 
a Dunedin I-Kiribati community member to discuss the possibility of reaching out to the 
Kiribati community in New Zealand. Ongoing discussion with this contact was extremely 
beneficial in terms of ensuring that I was the least imposing to this community possible. This 
was particularly important because I was informed that climate change is an issue that is often 
studied in relation to the New Zealand I-Kiribati community and that individuals might be 
reluctant to be involved in a study.  
 
After this discussion, I reached out to various New Zealand based Kiribati groups around the 
country as well as being connected to some individuals by this contact. During this process it 
became clear that climate change migration can be a sensitive topic that some are reluctant to 
be involved in research around, while others did not feel they had anything to contribute to the 
project. I-Kiribati individuals and organisations in Dunedin, Southland, and Wellington were 
contacted. This resulted in four interviews being arranged with I-Kiribati living in Dunedin. 
Due to time limitations, further recruitment beyond this could not take place. This is a limitation 
of the research, and if further research were to be conducted, I would aim to have a much larger 
representation of I-Kiribati participants. However, I am grateful to have had the opportunity to 
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speak with all the participants and their willingness to share their knowledge and experiences 
with me. Though the numbers of I-Kiribati were limited, each of these participants adds unique 
perspectives and insight to the research that otherwise would not have been explored.  
 
Thirteen semi-structured interviews were conducted in total. This included nine interviews with 
NGO/government workers and four interviews with New Zealand I-Kiribati. Table 4.2 shows 
a list of the participants and their organisational affiliation or if they were I-Kiribati.  
 
Table 4.2: Participant Number and Organisation Type  
Participant Number  Organisation Type/I-Kiribati  Interview Location  
Participant 1 New Zealand I-Kiribati  Dunedin 
Participant 2  New Zealand I-Kiribati  Dunedin  
Participant 3 New Zealand I-Kiribati  Dunedin  
Participant 4  New Zealand I-Kiribati  Skype interview  
Participant 5 Development NGO Skype interview  
Participant 6 Development NGO Wellington  
Participant 7 Development NGO Wellington  
Participant 8 Development NGO  Wellington  
Participant 9 Development NGO Wellington  
Participant 10  Development and former MFAT 
employee 
Wellington  
Participant 11 Development NGO  Wellington  
Participant 12 Climate change NGO  Wellington  
Participant 13 New Zealand Government agency Wellington  
 
Interviews took place in both Dunedin and Wellington, New Zealand, with two additional 
interviews taking place via Skype. These locations were chosen due to the University of Otago 
being located in Dunedin, and contacts made with the I-Kiribati community through university 
colleagues and resources. Two trips were also taken to Wellington in January and February 
2020 as this is a major centre for NGOs and Government agencies, allowing for face to face 
interviews with these participants. The interviews took between 30 minutes to 90 minutes 
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depending on the participant. These meetings took place in a location of the participants choice 
and in most cases, this was their workplace or a public space such as a café.   
 
In addition to these interviews, email communication was conducted with two organisations, 
as well as one New Zealand Government Party, and a Kiribati Government worker. While these 
individuals were not able to or did not wish to participate in an interview, they provided 
relevant sources to read and answered questions I had about climate change migration and 
adaptation that has helped inform this thesis.   
 
4.5.2 Analysis of the interview data  
Analysis of the interviews involved three steps. Firstly, all interviews were transcribed from 
the audio recordings and coded using an open coding technique. This process involves reading 
each interview transcript and writing on it any themes or ideas that emerged (Crang, 2005). 
Secondly, in a word document each interview was manually coded into themes using 
descriptive and analytical codes. A descriptive code is often basic background or contextual 
information that relates directly to the interview questions and involves descriptive accounts 
from the participants (Cope, 2016). In the case of this research, descriptive codes included 
information such as what projects an NGO had in Kiribati, or the countries the organisation 
worked in.  
 
In contrast to these simple codes, there was also complex and in-depth information that made 
up the analytical codes (Cope, 2016). These codes were more detailed and based on the themes 
that developed of importance to the research. Most of the interview codes were analytical  
covering themes such as climate migration, responsibility, and media representations. Finally, 
using the notes from the open coding as well as these analytical and descriptive codes, 
Saldana’s (2009) coding model was used to collate and organise codes into categories and these 
categories into overarching themes. An example of this coding framework applied to the codes 
in my project is shown in Figure 4.3.   
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This process of coding helped to visualise and organise the codes into main themes for further 
analysis and presentation of the results and discussion in relation to the literature.  
 
4.6 Ethical Considerations  
There were a number of ethical considerations taken to ensure that this project is valid and 
ethical research. Firstly, there were the formal ethical processes required by the University of 
Otago, including ethical approval, Maori Consultation and informed consent from all 
participants. Ethical approval from the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee 
(Category B) was granted for the research design and methods, recruitment, participant 
information sheets and consent forms (see Appendix D and Appendix E for copies of the 
information sheet and consent form). Before each interview participants were given the 
information sheet and consent form to read. The information sheet informed them that their 
participation in the project was voluntary and should they feel uncomfortable at any point 
during the interview they could withdraw from the project or decline to answer a question. The 
form also explained that anything they said would remain confidential and the term ‘Key 
Informant’ would be used to rather than a participants name to preserve their anonymity to the 
best of my ability. After participants read the forms I explained this information to them 
verbally and answered any questions that were raised to ensure that each participant fully 
Theme: New Zealand’s 
responsibility  
Category:  
New Zealand moral/ethical 
obligation 
Category:  






















PAC and RSE) 
Code: 




Figure 4.3: An illustration of the coding framework used during the analysis. Based on 
Saldana’s (2009) model of coding that uses codes, categories and themes.  
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understood the research project and its aim. Each participant signed the consent form before 
the interview began. In addition, permission was requested from participants to audio record 
the interviews so these could be transcribed for analysis.  
 
Other ethical considerations were made in addition to the formal university procedures. In an 
effort to be reflexive and participatory, all participants were sent a copy of their interview 
transcript. This gave participants the chance to comment on anything that they might wish to 
clarify or have omitted from the final results. The option to be sent a summary of the results of 
the research was also offered to all participants.  
 
Beyond this, I also communicated with a member of the New Zealand I-Kiribati community, 
meeting to discuss the potential of I-Kiribati participation. From this discussion it became clear 
that this community has been approached for various climate change related projects on several 
occasions. I was therefore conscious of my responsibility as a researcher to ensure that I 
approached potential participants in an ethical way. This meant ensuring that potential 
participants understood their right to decline an interview, that they fully understood the 
intention of my project, and ensuring that they could give feedback on their interview transcript 
should they wish. Finally, being respectful and sensitive to the beliefs, understandings and 
experiences of all participants was vital to ensure the research was ethical (Hay, 2016). This 
was particularly important because the topic of climate change migration can be sensitive or 
upsetting for some participants. For example, in some interviews, participants became visibly 
upset when discussing climate change and migration. In any case where a participant was 
hesitant, uncomfortable, or upset I offered to pause the interview, and reminded them that we 
could stop at any time or move to the next question. However, in all cases participants wished 
to continue. Beyond this, to ensure ethical standards were upheld I reflected on my position in 
the research and my relationship to participants, which will now be discussed. 
 
4.7 Positionality and Cross-Cultural Research  
When conducting this research, it has been crucial that I am aware of the role that my 
positionality has in shaping the research design, data and my interactions with participants 
(Crawford et al., 2017). As a researcher, my position influences the way that knowledge is 
produced and understood (Mansvelt and Berg, 2016). I am a female university student in my 
twenties and of New Zealand European descent. I have some knowledge of environmental 
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issues, climate change and development from my undergraduate and postgraduate studies in 
geography. This meant that entering this research I had existing ideas and understandings of 
climate change migration, Kiribati, and New Zealand’s role in this issue based on the media 
and my studies. These ideas and my positionality have influenced all stages of the research and 
my interactions with and assumptions about participants. Likewise, participants will have made 
their own assumptions about me that affected the information they chose to share with me, 
shaping the results of this project. Because it is not possible to be entirely objective during 
research, acknowledgement of my own position and assumptions I may make is necessary by 
being reflexive in all stages of the research (Rose, 1997; Scheyvens et al., 2011). Thus, 
reflexivity has been key in an attempt to be actively aware of what biases and ideas I brought 
to the research.  
 
While I have studied geography and environmental management and have an interest in climate 
change and development issues, I have not worked in these fields professionally. Because of 
this, when interviewing NGO and government stakeholders, there was a power difference and 
my position as a university student may have influenced participant’s answers and what they 
were willing to share with me. Key Informants may also have shared information that they 
believed would reflect positively on their organisation – this was one reason for reminding 
participants that their identity (including their organisation) would remain anonymous in order 
to encourage an open discussion. Though these differences existed, there were also similarities 
between myself and these participants from my studies as well as shared interests in the 
environment, climate change and development issues. These commonalities as well as being 
born and raised in New Zealand with a familiarity of Wellington where these interviews mostly 
occurred helped to create familiarity that countered differences in position.  
 
Throughout the research process I considered the ethical implications and impacts that my 
project might have for I-Kiribati. For example, I was careful to discuss participant recruitment 
with someone who is part of this community before approaching groups and individuals. As 
discussed above, this conversation helped me be aware of the importance of appropriately 
approaching this community and the potential sensitivity when discussing climate change with 
I-Kiribati participants (see section 4.5.1 for more details). My position as an outsider may also 
have influenced the type of information that I-Kiribati participants shared with me and the type 
of questions that I asked. For example, participants may have viewed me as a university 
researcher and a pakeha ‘Kiwi’ and may not have felt comfortable sharing certain opinions or 
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knowledge with me. However, again there were similarities that helped to break down barriers 
in discussion with I-Kiribati participants. For instance, the I-Kiribati participants had either 
been born in New Zealand, lived here for several years, or for the majority of their lives. Being 
in my twenties and a female university student from Dunedin also created other similarities in 
age, gender and lifestyle between myself and the I-Kiribati participants. Thus, these shared 
experiences could be drawn on to break down barriers and build rapport during the interviews.  
 
Finally, there were a range of ethical considerations because the research is cross-cultural due 
to the focus on the nation Kiribati and the inclusion of New Zealand based I-Kiribati 
participants. It was therefore crucial that I was aware of my position as an outsider to the New 
Zealand I-Kiribati community. Being positioned as an outsider to participants can cause 
challenges and ethical issues related understandings of communities (Liamputtong, 2010). 
Because of the cross-cultural nature of this research there were power differences created by 
my position as an outsider and potential cultural differences (Skelton, 2009). For example, 
issues that can arise include being an outsider to the community, cultural differences, lack of 
benefit of the research for the community, and the uneven power relations that can arise from 
the research (Skelton, 2009, 2017; Smith, 2016). There can also be differences in personal 
boundaries, privacy and hospitality that must be considered and adapted to, to ensure that the 
project is inclusive for those involved (Skelton, 2017). In addition to these ethical challenges 
of cross-cultural research, I was also aware of the wider issues that return to the issues discussed 
in Chapter Two regarding the dominance Western knowledge and expertise in climate change 
issues and development (Escobar, 1999, 1995; Hulme, 2008; Kothari, 2005; Power, 2003). Due 
to the range of ethical issues, power relations and other challenges that arise from cross-cultural 
research, it was crucial that I remained reflexive and aware of my positionality and how this 
impacted the research (Smith, 2016).  
 
As previously mentioned, I have attempted to remain reflexive in every stage of this project. 
From the beginning of this project I have been aware of my position as a researcher and the 
power relations that arise from me as an outsider entering a community that is often researched 
and may not have their own interests considered. The relationship of a ‘researcher’ and the 
‘researched’ is not easy to overcome and is something that troubles me. In order to address 
some of these uneven power relations and challenges of cross-cultural research I have chosen 
to approach this research from the perspective of representations of Kiribati by mainstream 
media, and what role New Zealand has in the issue. I feel this is a more appropriate angle given 
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my own positionality in the research, as this means a focus on international media sources, and 
hearing the perspectives of New Zealand NGOs, Government and New Zealand-based I-
Kiribati. By exploring the issue from this angle, I hope to highlight the way Kiribati has been 
presented and the actual approaches being taken to climate change here, without causing harm 
to the I-Kiribati community.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methodological approach and methods used to design and conduct 
this research. In order to explore representations of climate change migration in relation to 
Kiribati and New Zealand’s role in this issue, a poststructuralist approach was chosen. This 
approach is particularly helpful because issues of power, knowledge and discourse are central 
to this thesis and to understanding issues of climate migration in Kiribati. A poststructuralist 
approach also aligns with the methods of a media discourse analysis and semi-structured 
interviews that were used to address the aim of this thesis. These methods help to gain a variety 
of perspectives on issues of climate migration and adaptation in Kiribati. The media analysis 
helps to uncover the dominant representations of Kiribati in terms of climate change and what 
perspectives might be less heard. Semi-structured interviews then add new perspectives that 
are useful for understanding what the actually occurring approaches to climate change 
migration are. These qualitative methods were complementary and together allow for an in-
depth exploration of climate change migration in relation to Kiribati. Coding was used for both 
methods to understand the broader themes in the data which could then be combined with the 
literature. Finally, it has been important to conduct this research in an ethical and reflexive 
manner. Doing this has involved ethical considerations and constantly reflecting on my own 
position at all stages of the research. The methodology and methods discussed in this chapter 
have been crucial to understand representations of climate change in relation to Kiribati and 
the role that New Zealand has in these issues through allowing for a variety of perspectives and 
understandings of climate migration to be explored. The following three chapters (Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven) will discuss the results of the project, beginning with the findings of the 








Media Representations of Climate Change in 
Kiribati  
 
5.1 Introduction    
In this thesis I contend that there is a need to explore representations of PICs such as Kiribati  
in relation to climate migration, to consider how this impacts on Global North and Global South 
power relations. To do this, in this chapter I will explore the way that Kiribati, New Zealand, 
and other international media sources have contributed to representations of climate change 
migration in relation to Kiribati. Using the results of the media discourse analysis, I will build 
on the previous chapters to further understand the way that climate migration discourses form 
and the implications this might have for the way New Zealand and Kiribati approach climate 
change policy, migration and adaptation. Specifically, this chapter aims to address the first 
research question: 
i) How has climate change in the Pacific region been represented by mainstream media 
groups? The specific focus has been in terms of migration and adaptation, specifically 
in relation to Kiribati and in representations by New Zealand. 
The media analysis will also help to inform the second research question that Chapter Six will 
more explicitly address:  
ii) How do popular representations of climate migration reflect how the issue is understood 
and approached by New Zealand Government, NGOs, and policy makers who are 
involved in this issue? 
The main factors considered in this chapter will be the way the media has discussed the issue 
of climate migration from Kiribati, who has been discussing this, and the differences between 
the two media searches that were undertaken using the Factiva database. It should be noted it 
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is not the purpose of this chapter, or this thesis, to decide if climate change migration is an 
appropriate or inappropriate approach to the challenges that Kiribati faces. Instead, the 
intention is to uncover and compare some of the ways that narratives are formed, New 
Zealand’s role in this, and what the implications of these discourses might be for climate 
change discussion in relation to Kiribati. 
 
This chapter will begin with a brief outline of the way that the media analysis was conducted, 
and an overview of the major events that were present in the articles. I will then discuss four 
major themes from the media analysis: first, the differing perspectives that were present in the 
articles; second, the notion of international responsibility; third, the presence of development 
challenges; and finally the dominance of Western expertise and science. The final section of 
the chapter will discuss local knowledge, and the lack of representation for certain perspectives. 
I argue that while there has been extensive media coverage of both climate change migration 
and climate change adaptation in relation to Kiribati, much less of this coverage has been 
detailed accounts of Kiribati in a way that allows non-Western perspectives to be heard. Instead 
of a focus on the agency, abilities and local knowledge in Kiribati, the dominant discourses in 
the articles are of the danger Kiribati is in, vulnerability and victimhood. However, there are 
hints in some of the articles of the potential for local approaches, knowledge and agency, these 
counternarratives could be built on further to resist disempowering representations. Overall, I 
contend that these representations reproduce an iteration of Western-based geographic 
imaginations that influence public perception of PICs as ‘other’ and lacking agency, continuing 
power relations between the Global North and South.  
 
5.2 Summary of Methods  
As outlined in Chapter Four, there were a number of methods used to gather and analyse data 
from the media. These will be briefly summarised in this section (see Chapter Four for a more 
detailed discussion of these methods). The purpose of this media analysis was to provide an 
overview of the major representations of climate change in relation to Kiribati by international, 
Pacific and New Zealand media sources. It was also intended to illustrate the differences or 
similarities between adaptation and migration focused articles (using two searches) and to 
highlight any perspectives that may be missing from the articles. Using a Foucauldian discourse 
analysis allowed for exploration of power relations, knowledge, and how ideas become 
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‘common sense’ or certain discourses shape how the world is known (Berg, 2009; Cheek, 2008; 
Waitt, 2010). To do this a Factiva search was used to select two groups of articles:  
i) One search focused upon articles relating to climate change migration in Kiribati and  
ii) a second search relating to climate change adaptation in Kiribati.  
From the articles returned in the search, articles were selected based on their relevance to the 
topic. After this process of narrowing the articles was completed there were 97 migration 
articles and 38 adaptation articles. The reason for keeping a large number of articles was due 
to the intention that this media analysis would provide an overarching understanding of what 
the common discourses are over a longer time period, rather than focusing on a specific 
discourse relation to a particular time or event. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of articles 
over time and illustrates how particular events (which will be outlined next in section 5.3) may 
have been linked to an increased discussion of Kiribati in relation to climate change migration 
and adaptation.  
 
Following the selection of articles, a five-step process was used to analyse the articles. These 
stages were adapted from Waitt’s (2010) stages of discourse analysis, interpreted from the work 
of Rose (2001). The five steps I followed were: i) reflexivity, ii) reading the articles for 
familiarity and ‘open coding’, iii) analytical and descriptive coding, iv) recognising 
inconsistencies and silenced voices, v) combining codes and recognising themes2. This process 
allowed for an in-depth exploration of discourses in the media and how these representations 
 
2 See Waitt (2010), Rose (2001) or Berg (2009) for discussion of these authors’ suggested steps to Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis that I have interpreted for my approach to this media analysis.   





















form and become dominant or less dominant. The following sections will discuss the major 
themes and points that emerged from this analysis and the discursive constructions of Kiribati 
that these contribute to.  
 
5.3 Main events covered in the articles 
This section will briefly outline the key events covered by the news articles included in the 
media discourse analysis. The major events covered in the articles aligned with those discussed 
in Chapter Three where the context of Kiribati and New Zealand’s involvement were discussed. 
Figure 5.2 shows a timeline of the major events and decisions around climate change migration 
and Kiribati since 2013.  
 
 
In 2013 the main event that appeared in the articles was the Teitiota case, a migrant from 
Kiribati who tried to claim refugee status in New Zealand based on the impacts of climate 
change (For more information about this case see Baker-Jones and Baker-Jones (2015)). This 
continued into 2014 with the major events being the appeal of Teitiota’s climate refugee case, 
as well as some coverage of ‘migration with dignity’ and the Government of Kiribati’s 
purchase of land in Fiji as a possible place to migrate or use as farmland. In 2015 the Kiribati 
‘climate refugee’ appeal was rejected and Teitiota was deported from New Zealand. The other 
articles focus on migration as a last resort and the responsibility of countries like New Zealand 
to Kiribati. The main focus of articles in 2016 was promoting ‘Migration with Dignity’ and 
President Anote Tong’s perspective, along with discussion of potential adaptation options.  
 
2013 
Kiribati ‘climate refugee’ case 
begins and rejected 
Kiribati migration with dignity 
discussion 
  
‘Climate refugee’ case appealed  
Kiribati purchases Fiji land 
2014 
2015 
Kiribati ‘climate refugee’ appeal 
rejected, deported from NZ 
Migration last resort & NZ 
responsibility  
  
Migration with dignity 
Kiribati adaptation projects 
2016 
2017 
New Zealand Climate 
change Humanitarian 
visa suggested  
Kiribati climate change 
film criticism.  
     2018 
2019 
Migration with Dignity  
UN Climate refugee 
ruling 
2020 
Figure 5.2: A timeline of major events that occurred in relation to climate change and 
adaptation in Kiribati from 2013-2020.  
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In 2017 the main topic in the articles was the suggestion by the New Zealand Green Party to 
offer a Humanitarian Visa for those impacted by climate change in the Pacific. Following this, 
in 2018 there was less discussion of Kiribati and climate change (see figure 5.1). The few 
articles there were focused on the political issues between former President Anote Tong and 
the current Kiribati government in relation to the documentary ‘Anote’s Ark’. The Kiribati 
government tried to prevent the viewing of this film, and there was general debate over the film 
and its portrayal of Kiribati (See further: RNZ, 2018). 2019 also did not have many articles 
compared to previous years. Those articles that were published focused on migration with 
dignity and alternatives to migration, and adaptation occurring in Kiribati. Finally, in January 
2020 the focus of the articles was on the UN Climate refugee ruling to allow for climate change 
refugees (See: UNHCR, 2020). 
 
5.4 Differing perspectives and uncertainty on approaches to climate 
change in Kiribati  
The results of the media analysis covered a diversity of perspectives and discourses. One of 
the main themes in the articles was discussion of different potential approaches to climate 
change adaptation in Kiribati. This included disputes about whether migration was necessary 
and inevitable, the potential for climate change adaptation options rather than migration, and 
finally the uncertainty of Kiribati’s situation. This theme encompasses these three areas, and 
each will now be discussed.  
 
5.4.1 Migration likely or inevitable 
The inevitability of climate change migration was one of the major themes in the articles with 
43% of migration articles and 31.5% of the adaptation articles suggesting this. The idea of 
migration being the only option, or at least extremely likely, was communicated in a variety of 
ways both in the adaptation and migration articles. For instance, in some articles the 
inevitability of migration was stated outright. Discussions of the nation’s ‘demise’ were 
common “In response [to climate change], Kiribati […] has essentially been drawing up plans 
for its demise.” (M62-2016) along with phrases such as “As for Kiribati? It is already too late" 





Table 5.1: Climate change induced migration likely or inevitable  










Even the country's former president, Anote Tong, has no hope. "As 
for Kiribati? It is already too late," (M85-2019) 
In response [to climate change], Kiribati (pronounced KEE-ree-bas 
in the local language) has essentially been drawing up plans for its 
demise. (M62-2016) 
This is the sharp end of climate change. The Pacific Islands […] face 
particular challenges from climate change. Some, like Kiribati, 
Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, face a genuine threat of 
disappearance. (A34-2017) 
Scientists warn rising sea levels caused by climate change will 
submerge many islands around the world and the 33 of Kiribati, 
barely two metres (6.5 feet) above sea level, could be among the 
first. (M55-2015)  
In response, the government of Kiribati bought land on the island 
of Vanua Levu in Fiji, where its people can again grow food and, 
eventually, resettle as their country sinks below the waves. "This 
is the last resort," President Anote Tong has said. "There's no way 
out of this one. Our people will have to move as the tides have 
reached our homes and villages." (M19-2013)  
With its pristine sands, glistening saltwater flats and gently 
swaying palms, Kiribati ought to be a tropical paradise -- but this 
precarious slice of heaven on Earth is living on borrowed time. 
The low-lying Pacific nation of 33 atolls and reef islands is facing 
the unstoppable rise of the sea and will be gone before long, 
making its people the world's first nation of climate change 
refugees. (M77-2018) 
Most of Kiribati sits about two metres above sea level. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates sea levels 
will rise at least two metres before the year 2100. This gives 
Kiribati no more than 80 years. (M84-2019) 
… the 33 small islands which make up the country of Kiribati are 
under particularly intense threat from the unfolding climate 
emergency. There is an immediate problem of lack of access to 
freshwater, while sea level rise threatens to submerge the nation 
completely within a matter of decades. Some of the islands are 
already effectively uninhabitable, with the entire country likely to 
be uninhabitable within just 10 to fifteen years. (M97-2020) 
 
This sort of language speaking of the “threat of disappearance” (A34-2017) or article titles 
declaring “sinking islands” (M85-2019) and “a drowning island“ (M52-2015), contributes to 
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developing a narrative of Island nations that are unable to overcome the challenges of climate 
change. This idea of Kiribati no longer being inhabitable reflects the (usually Western) 
discourse of climate change in the Pacific region that focuses on climate migrants, and 
communities in nations such as Kiribati as victims of climate change (Farbotko and Lazrus, 
2012; Klepp and Herbeck, 2016). This is disempowering and portrays island states as ‘helpless 
victims’ of climate change, due to the lack of action by Western nations (Farbotko, 2005). This 
discourse also represents broader understandings of the Pacific as small separate islands that 
are resource poor and dependent on aid and the West (Gillis, 2014; Hau’Ofa, 1993). 
Nevertheless, these narratives of inevitability of migration are similar, though not as extreme, 
to studies that have noted the ‘apocalyptic’ and alarmist language used to construct climate 
migrants or refugees (e.g. Bettini, 2013; Methmann and Rothe, 2012). 
 
Here it is also worth considering the influence of former Kiribati President Anote Tong, who 
has campaigned for awareness of the challenges Kiribati faces and the eventual need for 
migration, and his ‘Migration with Dignity’ policy (see: McNamara (2015) and Korauaba 
(2014)). As Table 5.1 shows, many of the articles make reference to, or quote, Tong, or are 
written by him. Representation of Tongs’ ideas was about the same in both groups of articles 
(31% migration, 30% Adaptation). It is also interesting to note that in comparison, the current 
Kiribati Government and President Taneti Maamau were not nearly as vocal/present in either 
set of articles (7 migration articles and 1 adaptation article). Arguably, the difference in 
coverage  is because what Tong discusses fits with the international media's existing narratives 
of migration and vulnerability (See Farbotko, 2005; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Klepp and 
Herbeck, 2016), while the current government is focused on citizens remaining in their country 
and are not as vocal about climate change or migration. Whatever the case, it is clear from 
these quotes that Tong’s vocal campaigning has implications for the way climate change 
migration in Kiribati is represented, through contributing to power relations that produce 
climate migration from this nation as a ‘truth’ (Foucault, 1984, 1980). Thus, I-Kiribati are 
represented as vulnerable and likely to have to migrate in future.  
 
5.4.2 Options other than migration possible (adaptation) 
In contrast to those articles that focus on migration as likely or inevitable, there was a smaller 
number of articles (10.5% migration, 21% adaptation) that discussed the potential for 
remaining in Kiribati through adaptation. This discussion centred on ways to counter the 
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impacts of climate change and to ensure that migration did not have to take place in future (see 
Table 5.2).  
Table 5.2: Other options than migration possible   












The world keeps telling the people of Kiribati their country will 
soon be underwater. Even their own leaders have said the Pacific 
Island is the most vulnerable of the vulnerable. But a Gold Coast 
adviser is adamant this proud country, a paradise of 33 coral atolls 
and reef islands, is far from lost. "There are a lot of hard working 
people ... from Kiribati and its neighbours ... who are doing their 
bit to make the world a better place ... and it all starts with 
education." (M64-2016) 
Encouraging the population to migrate is of course the option with 
the lowest costs. But we should not fall into the trap of thinking it 
is the only option. We don’t need to allow this island to drown. 
(M82-2019) 
Maamau argues that if quality of life increases in Kiribati, the 
islands' capacity to prepare for the myriad costs of climate change 
will increase with it. His plan envisions more money coming to the 
islands from international aid, access to fisheries and increasing 
tourism, and he's focused on expanding the coconut trade to boost 
income for his people. But here, too, climate change is already 
intervening. (A35-2017/M74-2017) 
The largest adaptation project in the country aims to improve 
water security by reducing leakage in the mains water supply, 
increasing rainwater harvesting capacity and installing other 
drinking water infrastructure. The KiriWatSan Project is improving 
water security from the ground up, by addressing sanitation and 
hygiene issues at the village level. The government also released a 
Population Policy and Implementation Strategy to address 
overcrowding, which threatens water security through overuse. 
(A24-2015) 
Do you think Kiribati can still be saved? 
I believe anything is possible. The technology is available, the only 
question is, will the resources be made available for us to be able 
to do that. Given what is possible these days, what is being done, 
it is doable. The simple answer is, if (money from the United 
Nations) gets to us in time and there are sufficient amounts to deal 
with this, then perhaps we have a hope of being ready before it 
happens.(Anote Tong) (M54-2015) 
 Many Pacific Islanders may want to stay in their homes, and not 
jump ship to New Zealand. They may prefer the New Zealand 
government to provide assistance for adaptation and 
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development to help them prepare for climate change. Adaptation 
could involve building sea walls, finding new sources of drinking 
water if ground water salination is a major problem in atolls, or 
creating alternative livelihoods when traditional crops no longer 
grow. (A36-2017/M75-2017) 
Advocates say that while some climate-induced migration is 
inevitable, Pacific Islanders' own preference is to stay where they 
are. (A19-2014) 
Unless significant resources are to be made available from the 
developed world to build capacity to withstand the increasing 
severity of climate change impacts, a community's ability to adapt 
and to remain in its homelands would not be an option. In an 
attempt to provide themselves with any measure of an option 
against the relentless onslaught of climate change, these most 
vulnerable countries have formed coalitions such as the Climate 
Vulnerable Forum. (A30-2016/M61-2016) 
 
For example, articles highlighted how policies that centre on migration were problematic 
because: “rather than providing adaptive capacity and long-term support, these options still 
do not offer true self-determination” (M82-2019). Indeed, this lack of self-determination and 
Pacific communities wish to remain in their home countries were among reasons that led the 
New Zealand Government to halt plans for the Experimental Humanitarian Visa suggested in 
2017 and instead focus on assisting with adaptation (See Chapter Six for more details) (Manch, 
2018). This perspective emphasises that climate ‘refugee’ or migrant policies will not address 
larger issues that require adaptation strategies and the inclusion of these nations indigenous 
understanding of their environments (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). It is interesting then, that in 
these news articles, there are far fewer articles that focus on adaptation options.  
 
Other articles highlighted the views of Kiribati residents who “refuse to accept Kiribati is 
gone” and those of experts that “believe Kiribati’s fate is more nuanced than the narrative has 
allowed for” (M85-2019). Articles such as these also bring attention to the current Kiribati 
Government’s approach to climate change – where migration is no longer a focus but instead 
on increasing quality of life so that “the islands' capacity to prepare for the myriad costs of 
climate change will increase with it” (A35-2017/M74-2017). This approach fits with the 
mainstreaming of adaptation into development (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Methmann, 2010; 
Webber, 2016), something reflected in the Government of Kiribati’s development policies (see: 
the KV20 (GoK, 2016) and the KCCP (GoK, 2016b). Though vocal about the need for I-
Kiribati to migrate in future, in these articles former President Tong also discussed options for 
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technological adaptation approaches to prevent migration: “President Tong has boldly called 
for "fortifying" one or more of the atolls so that the country's physical presence does not 
completely disappear” (M58-2015) (see Table 5.2 for further examples).  
 
Here the ideas of futures other than migration are discussed through the possibility of both 
technical approaches to adaptation (seawalls, artificial islands, improving water supplies) and 
local approaches (planting mangroves, building community capacity, resilience and regional 
coalitions). This echoes the studies that show people from Pacific nations threatened by climate 
change would only migrate as a last resort (Farbotko et al., 2018; Noy, 2017), that adaptation 
may be an option, and at the least the decision to migrate should not be forced on those in the 
Pacific (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Kelman, 2006). Migration is not a matter of fact (Barnett, 2017) 
and there is a possibility that mitigation and adaptation can prevent the need to migrate. For 
example, Kelman notes that “consequences are not inevitable and it must be handled within 
all the other major challenges and opportunities, on Pacific Islanders’ own terms with the 
external support and resources they request” (2017, p. 16). Thus, though many of the news 
articles present migration as ‘common sense’ and form a ‘regime of truth’ (Berg, 2009; 
Foucault, 1980) that discursively constructs migration from Kiribati as inevitable, this section 
has shown this is an assumption that can, and is, countered. This discussion suggests the 
conversation around migration is more nuanced and complicated than the dominant discourses 
of migration as the only outcome for Kiribati suggest.  
 
5.4.3 Uncertainty in climate change discussions 
Finally, a small number of articles hint at the uncertainty of the situations that Kiribati 
communities faced, a theme that runs throughout this thesis. This is illustrated in the two 
contrasting positions that have already been discussed: that migration is inevitable and the 
opposing view that adaptation is possible. This may contribute to uncertainty in this debate. 
For instance, articles mentioned that “The future of their nations is uncertain on a number of 
fronts” (A24-2015) and that “Kiribati is at a crossroads” (M85-2019). Table 5.3 presents 






Table 5.3: Uncertainty in climate change discussions  











The future of their nation is uncertain on a number of fronts, but 
both the strength of cultural identity and the government's 
determination to find sustainable solutions to the management of 
its marine resources demonstrate that Kiribati is not a doomed 
nation, but one that is dynamic and fighting. (A24-2015) 
Kiribati is at a crossroads and families like Ataia's face an uncertain 
future. In one possible scenario, Ataia and his family are forced to 
resettle on a remote Fijian island, 2,000 km away. […] In another, 
the international community meets its carbon targets and pours 
resources into Pacific atolls. The I-Kiribati fight to adapt to rising 
seas and changing weather patterns. (M85-2019) 
The country's land in Fiji is being used as farmland for now, though, 
and Kiribati faces an uncertain future. No full-scale relocation of 
Kiribati's population is currently on the table […] And no political 
appetite exists to create pathways for mass migration between 
countries (M74-2017/A35-2017) 
Kiribati, both poor and vulnerable to climate change, must protect 
itself. Though the causes of rising sea levels and coastal erosion are 
complex, and though Kiribati’s own construction projects may tear 
at its ragged shorelines, and though some scientific prognoses for 
Kiribati aren’t as hopeless as the ones often cited, if Kiribati 
believes climate change could swallow it whole then the island 
nation has two options. It can attempt the impossible, to magically 
compel sovereign states to overhaul international law and provide 
shelter to people as climate refugees. Or, it can make its citizens 
more attractive as immigrants. (M65-2016) 
 
This narrative of uncertainty was not as common as the idea of migration as necessary or the 
possibilities for adaptation, with only 9 migration articles and 5 adaptation articles overtly 
pointing to this. However, in addition to the few articles that do discuss this, the contrasting 
opinions in relation to Kiribati point to the uncertainty surrounding climate change migration 
and adaptation. The uncertainty in the articles highlights the complex decisions Kiribati 
leadership and its’ international partners will need to make now and in the future in regards to 
climate change (McNamara et al., 2018). These decisions will involve factors beyond climate 
change but also economic, social, cultural and political factors (Black et al., 2011a; MFAT, 
2018; Nawrotzki, 2014). In addition, there is uncertainty on the approach that should be taken 
internationally. Though as the following section will show, there was general agreement that 
international action must be taken.  
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5.5 International responsibility – an ethical and moral obligation?  
The next major theme from the articles is the idea that there is an international responsibility 
to assist with climate change migration or adaptation in Kiribati. One of the common narratives 
in both the migration and adaptation articles was the idea that Kiribati should be aided by 
larger, wealthier countries that should take responsibility for their large contributions to global 
emissions. As this section will show, though the responsibilities of wealthier countries were 
not usually the main focus of the articles, this responsibility was nevertheless frequently used 
as a clear reasoning for the need to assist Kiribati and other PICs. The Migration articles 
focused on responsibility more than the Adaptation articles, with 51.5% of the Migration 
articles mentioning this compared to 26% of the Adaptation articles (see Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4: International responsibility for climate change in Kiribati  










Kiribati is at a crossroads and families like Ataia's face an uncertain 
future. In one possible scenario, Ataia and his family are forced to 
resettle on a remote Fijian island, 2,000 km away. […] In another, 
the international community meets its carbon targets and pours 
resources into Pacific atolls. The I-Kiribati fight to adapt to rising 
seas and changing weather patterns. (M85-2019)  
We are at a crucial crossroads, and we must ask ourselves what 
kind of future we want to build for our grandchildren. In pondering 
that question, let Kiribati be a lesson: Its fate will be the world's 
fate if we continue burying our heads in the sand. And even if sea 
level rise doesn't affect everyone, other extreme weather events 
set off by a warmer world will. (President Anote Tong) (M81-2018) 
And the moral challenge for the global community, among others, 
is then: "Are we able to face up to a catastrophe that is of our own 
creation?” (M61-2016/A30-2016) 
Sio encountered many young i-Kiribati voicing disappointment 
over what they see as New Zealand and Australia “dragging their 
feet” over addressing climate change. “On a number of levels 
we’ve got this connection with the Pacific, and we do have a 
responsibility to step up and stand in solidarity with them,” Sio 
says. “There’s a real need for us to have a long-term migration with 
dignity plan in place ... What I saw was some of the outer islands 
of both Tuvalu and Kiribati are no longer inhabitable because of 
constant flooding with their rising tides. So we’ve got to help these 
islands plan for migration.” (A28-2016) 
 97 
The statements in Table 5.4 show how articles incorporate the role of the international 
community into their discussion of Kiribati. For example, some focus on the actions of 
‘developed’ nations that have resulted in climate change, and also a lack of action:  
“These wealthy, industrialised nations – and about 100 corporations largely 
headquartered within them – have been the largest drivers of climate change via fossil 
fuel emissions, while baulking at global agreements to provide meaningful climate 
aid to developing countries.” (M82-2019). 
Other articles advocate for international action and point to the lack of action being taken: 
“many young I-Kiribati voicing disappointment over what they see as New Zealand and 
Australia “dragging their feet” over addressing climate change” (A28-2016). Statements such 
as these illustrate the idea used that internationally there is responsibility to the Pacific, and 
atoll nations like Kiribati in particular, to assist with climate migration or adaptation. However, 
though these nations are disproportionately affected by climate change, often Global North 
countries do not take responsibility for these impacts (Klepp and Herbeck, 2016; McNamara, 
2008).  
 
Some articles approached responsibility from the perspective that if international action was 
taken then Kiribati might not become uninhabitable in future:  
“In another [scenario], the international community meets its carbon targets and pours 
resources into Pacific atolls. The I-Kiribati fight to adapt to rising seas and changing 
weather patterns” (M85-2019).  
Articles advocating for international action build a narrative of Kiribati as a country that needs 
help from the West and more ‘developed’ nations, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
This adds to overall disempowering representations of climate change in relation to Kiribati as 
a victim of climate change (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Farbotko et al., 2018). A sense of moral or 
ethical obligation was also used, particularly in the migration articles where 15 articles did this 
(compared to 2 adaptation articles). The articles use Kiribati as an example to encourage 
climate action and to focus on the wrongful actions of Global North countries. This narrative 
of moral or ethical obligations is driven not only by Western media, but also at times by the 
Kiribati Government. For example, former President Tong has campaigned for international 
action and responsibility for Kiribati as a victim of climate change, something I will argue in 
the later chapters reflects Webber’s (2013) idea of ‘performative vulnerability’ to gain access 
international finance (Klepp and Herbeck, 2016). Overall, international responsibility in these 
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articles exemplifies larger climate change discussions in the media where indigenous peoples 
and their knowledge are portrayed as victims and warnings of the consequences of climate  
 change (Belfer et al., 2017; Felli, 2013). More broadly this also contributes to geographic 
imaginaries from the Global North about ‘other’ populations in the South (e.g. Chaturvedi and 
Doyle, 2015, 2010). 
 
A small number of articles from each search (4.5% migration, 10.5% adaptation) also delve 
more specifically into ideas of justice or injustice:  
“As the people of Kiribati reflect on the frightening future ahead, there is no escaping 
the deep injustice that despite its negligible contributions to greenhouse gas 
emissions, this island nation will be the first to pay the price for other countries' bad 
choices.” (M81-2018) 
As the above quote and Table 5.5 shows, some articles emphasised the minor contributions 
that PICs have made to climate change and the disproportionate impact it will have on these 
countries (Betzold, 2015; Kumar et al., 2020; Mearns and Norton, 2010), exploring ideas of 
justice and the injustice of Kiribati’s situation.  
Table 5.5: Justice and injustice of climate change  













As for Kiribati? It is already too late. But what the international 
community could do is assure the islanders that they will be able 
to migrate with dignity. It is the least they could do. As the people 
of Kiribati reflect on the frightening future ahead, there is no 
escaping the deep injustice that despite its negligible contributions 
to greenhouse gas emissions, this island nation will be the first to 
pay the price for other countries' bad choices. It is time for the 
world to wake up and understand: we are all Kiribati.(M81-2018) 
New Zealand's new government plans to create the world's first 
humanitarian visa for climate refugees. […] The commitment to 
tackle climate injustice should be applauded, but there are 
significant considerations that have to be taken into account when 
developing humanitarian climate policies. (M75-2017/A36-2017) 
Despite this inherent injustice, or perhaps because of it, Kiribati 
was among the first truly vulnerable nations to campaign globally 
about its plight, and former president Tong remains among the 
most famed and affecting speakers on climate change. (A34-2017) 
The UN has agreed with the New Zealand courts in saying that 
Ioane is not deserving of protection, but crucially they also said the 
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These articles draw on injustices as a way to advocate for further climate action to take place, 
or options for climate migration to be created. However, even in these articles, justice was not 
discussed in huge detail, with this often only being mentioned in passing. The articles also use 
justice in different ways. For example, articles use this to advocate for international action to 
be taken to assist Kiribati or to avoid the same fate. Two of these articles (M63-2016; M97-
2020 – see Table 5.5) frame the potential for migration pathways or a climate refugee visa as 
a just outcome for those who are displaced by climate change. While these articles present 
justice as a straightforward concept that is intuitively understood, the idea of justice in climate 
migration has been critically interrogated within academic circles (e.g. Bettini et al., 2017; 
Dreher and Voyer, 2015; Klepp and Herbeck, 2016; Nawrotzki, 2014). Such discussions of the 
possibilities of justice from migration ask if justice can be achieved through ‘migration-as-
adaptation’. These studies point to issues of depoliticization as the onus is put on individuals 
to migrate and climate justice is not included in migration-as-adaptation as it was in ideas of 
‘climate refugees’ (Baldwin and Fornalé, 2017; Bettini et al., 2017; Gemenne and Blocher, 
2017). It appears then, that there is room for more in-depth discussion of justice in mainstream 
media sources.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the international community was often mentioned as not 
doing enough to support PICs or not taking enough climate action (16.5% migration, 13% 
adaptation). Rather than this inaction being discussed in relation to migration pathways, this 
tended to be in regards to reducing emissions and providing financial support for addressing 
climate change issues. Thus, the idea that the international community is not doing enough 
builds on previous ideas of justice, and the need for the international community to take 
responsibility for climate change and its impacts on Global South nations (e.g. Klepp and 
following: "The effects of climate change in receiving states may 
expose individuals to a violation of their rights...thereby triggering 
the non-refoulement obligations of sending states." In essence, 
this acknowledges the category of the climate refugee, at least in 
principle. And that is massive. We are one step closer to justice. 
(M97-2020)  
“If we’re going to have several metres of sea level rise within 50 
years, 150 years or 250 years, we’re still talking about ultimately 
the same thing, which is ... the potential end of cultures here in the 
Pacific that have been around for tens of thousands of years. This 
is a tremendous injustice and it should be a wake-up call.” (A28-
2016) 
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Herbeck, 2016; Nawrotzki, 2014). However, these articles are also critical of what that 
international community is actually doing to take action and the consequences that this might 
have for Kiribati in terms of climate change. This adds to the narratives found in the media 
analysis, that international assistance is necessary from Western countries to help Kiribati and 
other Global South countries. I suggest in this thesis that this contributes to disempowering 
geographic imaginaries of Kiribati and the public perception that I-Kiribati lack agency to cope 
with climate change.  
 
5.6 Development challenges in Kiribati and exacerbation by climate 
change 
As well as issues of migration and/or adaptation resulting from Climate Change, many articles 
also noted development issues faced by people in Kiribati. These were positioned as a struggle 
that the nation faced either in addition to climate change, or that was exacerbated by climate 
change. Development issues were overtly discussed in 26% of migration articles and 21% of 
adaptation articles, though these issues were also underlying, implied, or linked to climate 
change challenges in many others. Development issues were not usually the focus of the article, 
but instead something that would be mentioned to support the need for Western intervention, 
a reason Kiribati would become uninhabitable, or to add to the narrative of vulnerability. The 
main development challenges pointed out in the articles included issues of overcrowding in the 
capital atoll of Tarawa, water and sanitation, health, poverty, and financial constraints/aid 
dependency. These articles use development issues to contextualise further discussion of 
climate change migration or adaptation being necessary for Kiribati (see Table 5.6). 
 
Table 5.6: Development challenges in Kiribati  










While climate change poses a serious longer-term threat, many 
people, including Tong, recognize that breakneck population 
growth is a more immediate problem. (M04-2013) 
Since his electoral win in 2016, Maamau's government has pushed 
policies focused on Kiribati's social woes. And there are many 
social vulnerabilities: paltry sanitation, unemployment, and 
escalating costs of living on South Tarawa, the country's rapidly 
urbanizing administrative hub, to name a few. There, half of 
Kiribati's population of 114,000 cram along a spit of land hardly 
wider than the length of a soccer field. Despite brackish water and 
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disease, i-Kiribati from other islands flock to South Tarawa for 
work, school, and the perceived ease of a more Western lifestyle. 
(A35-2017 – M74-2017) 
There is no shortage of ideas to avert Kiribati’s environmental fate. 
China’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea 
shows the promise of sophisticated island-engineering technology, 
experts say. Mr. Tong commissioned a study on raising Kiribati’s 
coastline. But such measures are financially unrealistic for a 
resource-poor, aid-dependent country like Kiribati. (M62-2016) 
Even the country’s preeminent climate-change tour guide says 
people here worry more about poverty than the environment. But 
money problems can mean climate-change problems. If you’re 
poor, you can’t afford to cope with either too much water or not 
enough of it, or to move away. (M65-2016) 
i-Kiribati living in hardship are most affected in the short-term - 
often living in the most exposed areas. These physical effects of 
climate change in Kiribati are compounded by features shared with 
many Pacific Island neighbours - including great distances between 
islands, a rising urban population in search of jobs and high service 
delivery costs. (M58-2015) 
Over recent decades, numerous studies have detailed factors of 
economic geography that make Pacific island states unique, 
including: small size, distance from markets, expensive transport 
costs, a heavy reliance on imports, a remarkable vulnerability to 
natural disasters and, increasingly, exposure to the effects of 
climate change. […] In this context, orthodox prescriptions for 
economic growth and export-led development do not hold, and 
policymakers must look for unique solutions. Increasingly, 
attention is being paid to opportunities linked with migration and 
mobility. (A33-2016)   
 
This discourse focuses on the ‘bigger’ issues for Kiribati that have more immediate challenges 
such as poverty and overcrowding: “While climate change poses a serious longer-term threat, 
many people, including Tong, recognize that breakneck population growth is a more immediate 
problem.” (M04-2013). This is consistent with findings of previous studies (e.g. Iati, 2008; 
Nunn et al., 2014; Walshe et al., 2018) and especially those of Remling who looked at 
discourses of climate migration by development actors in the Pacific and found: “migration is 
of marginal importance and engagement with socio-economic factors that influence Pacific 
Islands' vulnerability is more pressing” (2020, p. 1). Kiribati faces many development 
challenges and I argue that these development challenges are used to contribute to notions of 
vulnerability. This discursively constructs the need for Kiribati populations to be assisted by 
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‘developed’ countries through the use of Western knowledge by development ‘experts’ 
(Kothari, 2005), and lacks discussion of local opportunities to address these challenges. 
 
As the next section will explore in more detail, the Kiribati population is often portrayed as 
vulnerable, poor, and a victim of climate change, with 28% migration, 24% adaptation articles 
openly presenting Kiribati in this way. Development challenges and their connection to climate 
change or exacerbation by climate change appear to be part of this construction. Some of the 
ways this occurs is through the language used in the articles (key examples shown in Table 
5.6) to talk about Kiribati and climate change. For instance words such as ‘poor’ ‘vulnerable’ 
‘social woes’ ‘resource-poor’ and ‘aid-dependent’ used in these quotes emphasises the struggle 
that Kiribati communities face. This contributes to a narrative that omits local actions, agency, 
and knowledge that I-Kiribati may have. This instead adds to representations of PIC 
populations as passive victims of the environment (Hingley, 2017; Klepp and Herbeck, 2016). 
 
Some of these development articles go beyond describing the challenges Kiribati faces and 
discuss the connections between climate change, development challenges and migration or 
adaptation. For example, articles linked the ability to migrate with development issues such as 
poverty:  
“Even the country’s preeminent climate-change tour guide says people here worry 
more about poverty than the environment. But money problems can mean climate-
change problems. If you’re poor, you can’t afford to cope with either too much water 
or not enough of it, or to move away.” (M65-2016).  
Other articles linked development challenges directly to climate change and showed how these 
are difficult to distinguish between: 
“In the Kiribati population, there has been a rise in waterborne diseases, among other 
climate-change-induced illnesses, including cholera and dengue fever. Warming 
oceans, combined with increased ocean acidification, disrupts sea life, which is the 
cornerstone of Kiribati identity and the country’s economy. Kiribati depends almost 
entirely on its fishing sector for food and revenue, but the catch potential is expected 
to decrease by 70 per cent by the 2050s.” (M83-2019) 
In this article most of Kiribati’s major development challenges are connected to climate 
change. This follows literature that also suggests climate change exacerbates existing 
development challenges, however there are also views that development challenges are another 
factor that must be addressed to maintain habitability (Cauchi et al., 2019; Storey and Hunter, 
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2010). Finally, one article problematised climate migration by considering the interrelated 
nature of climate change and development challenges:  
“… it is clear that climate change is having a significant impact in the Pacific but it 
is hard, except in extreme cases, to prove that it causes migration and displacement. 
This is because migration is driven by many factors – social, economic and political.” 
(M75-2017).  
This was one of the few examples in these discussions that followed academic literature in 
problematising discourses of climate change migration as being simple, arguing instead that 
multiple factors contribute to migration decisions (Black et al., 2011a; MFAT, 2018; 
Nawrotzki, 2014). Thus, though a smaller section of the articles, development discourses 
support or at times counter the previous sections constructions of climate migration as 
‘common sense’ and necessary. 
 
5.7 Knowledge: Science, expertise, and climate change migration 
The final theme in the news articles was the way that different knowledge was used and 
favoured. The majority of the news articles originated from Western news sources. The content 
reflected this, with many of the articles focusing on Western knowledge, organisations and 
scientific studies to understand the impacts of climate change in Kiribati and why migration is 
necessary. This section will examine how differing types of knowledge were presented and 
used in the articles to support the discursive construction of Kiribati as a vulnerable nation and 
the need for climate migration. This occurred in two ways: Firstly, scientific, and expert 
knowledge being used to explain the necessity for migration or adaptation; Secondly, this 
knowledge being used to discount local knowledge and the abilities of those in Kiribati. I argue 
that this contributes to the discursive construction discussed in the previous sections, the overall 
theme in the articles that Kiribati is vulnerable and in need of Western assistance, with less 
content that focused on the views and knowledge of the local community.  
 
A key framing of climate migration and adaptation in the media is through a Western scientific 
lens. In 36% of the migration articles and 34% of the adaptation articles, scientific or expert 
knowledge was used to explain the need to migrate from or adapt in Kiribati. Generally, these 
articles would mention the studies, experts, or science behind climate change and how this 
informed the need to migrate or to adapt, and for the international community to help Kiribati. 
For example, scientific predictions that Kiribati will become uninhabitable were common:  
 104 
“Climate scientists have predicted that in the absence of strong steps on carbon 
emissions, Kiribati, with its 100,000 people, might vanish from the face of the earth 
by 2100” (M51-2015).   
And:  
“Scientists warn rising sea levels caused by climate change will submerge many 
islands around the world and the 33 of Kiribati, barely two metres (6.5 feet) above 
sea level, could be among the first.” (M55-2015). 
From these quotes it can also be seen that the certainty of science is used to confirm that Kiribati 
is threatened or will become uninhabitable. This is used as a justification for migration with 
little consideration for other options or local perspectives. These quotes contrast to the earlier 
theme of uncertainty where it is noted that the need for migration is still not known for certain. 
Indeed, though there is irrefutable evidence of climate change, the future impacts on PICs 
remain unclear due to challenges in predicting these impacts and how the environment and 
social systems will respond (Barnett, 2017, 2001). Table 5.7 provides more detailed examples 
of this occurring in the articles.  
Table 5.7: Scientific perspectives on climate change in Kiribati  
















Last month, leading climate scientists said they were more certain 
that human activity was the main cause of global warming, which 
would bring rising sea levels to swamp coasts and low-lying islands. 
(M28-2014) 
Climate scientists have predicted that in the absence of strong 
steps on carbon emissions, Kiribati, with its 100,000 people, might 
vanish from the face of the earth by 2100. (M51-2015) 
Scientists warn rising sea levels caused by climate change will 
submerge many islands around the world and the 33 of Kiribati, 
barely two metres (6.5 feet) above sea level, could be among the 
first. (M55-2015) 
Higher temperatures and rainfall changes would increase the 
prevalence of diseases like dengue fever and ciguatera poisoning. 
Even before that, scientists and development experts say, rising 
sea levels are likely to worsen erosion, create groundwater 
shortages and increase the intrusion of salt water into freshwater 
supplies. (M62-2016) 
"The science is pretty categorical. It doesn't take a lot of 
intelligence to know that based on the projections put forward by 
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However, here were also articles that used science or expert knowledge to emphasise the need 
for adaptation and action, and the potential for technological fixes by experts:  
“There is no shortage of ideas to avert Kiribati's environmental fate. China's 
construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea shows the promise of 
sophisticated island-engineering technology, experts say. Tong commissioned a 
study on raising Kiribati's coastline.” (A31-2016). 
As these quotes show, expert knowledge is central to building a discourse that justifies the need 
for I-Kiribati to consider climate change migration, technological adaptation, and that the 
nation is vulnerable and in danger of becoming uninhabitable. Within these discussions of 
science, there are few mentions of local approaches, knowledge or perspectives. Instead, 
language such as ‘scientist’ ‘experts’ and various organisations are used to support the narrative 
of a need for international help. Indeed, I suggest these discourses of climate migration reflect 
a Western ‘regime of truth’ that is produced and circulated by science and institutions 
(Foucault, 1980). This goes beyond climate migration and speaks to issues in climate change 
where science is hegemonic and elevated above other forms of knowledge, with the climate 
the (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) we have a huge 
disaster coming up," Tong told AFP. (M64-2016) 
The international community has committed to limit warming to 
the Paris Agreement threshold of 2 degrees Celsius, while aiming 
to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Despite this, 
projections show the rise in the sea’s level by the end of this 
century will be 0.3 meters at best, or as high as 2.5 meters. This 
poses unprecedented challenges to the low-lying atoll nations, 
which require strategic planning and significant action to adapt to 
this and other threats of climate change. (A38-2019) 
There is no shortage of ideas to avert Kiribati's environmental fate. 
China's construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea 
shows the promise of sophisticated island-engineering technology, 
experts say. Tong commissioned a study on raising Kiribati's 
coastline. (A31-2016) 
With the projected rise in sea levels by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of up to one metre within the 
century, the most vulnerable coastal communities and low-lying 
island states -several of which are in Pacific-face the real possibility 
of their islands and communities being submerged well within the 
next hundred years. (A30-2016/M61-2016) 
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being ‘universalised’ and separate from cultural settings (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015; Hulme, 
2008).  
 
When local knowledge is discussed, it is usually in the context of the lack of knowledge or 
abilities of those in Kiribati. This was more obvious in the migration articles with 13 articles 
(13.5%) addressing issues with local abilities or understandings of climate change, compared 
to 3 articles (8%) from the adaptation group. Table 5.8 highlights some instances where this 
occurred.  
Table 5.8: Scientific perspectives on local knowledge/religion and abilities in Kiribati  













There is widespread expectation that vulnerable countries must do 
their bit to ensure local communities change their own behaviour 
to fight climate change, and they try to through NGOs like KiriCAN. 
But they are fighting widespread doubt that climate change exists 
at all. 
Tetiria says this is particularly acute in a highly religious Christian 
community such as Kiribati, where it is commonplace to hear the 
view that whatever happens is God’s plan and therefore not to be 
resisted; and that God would not give them these islands and then 
take them again unless as punishment for something they had 
done. (A34-2017) 
But Maamau now plans for his people to stay. He doesn't deny that 
climate change is happening, but he subscribes to a belief, 
common here, that only divine will could unmake the islands. "We 
are telling the world that climate change impacts Kiribati, it's really 
happening," he says. "But we are not telling people to leave." (A34-
2017) 
The skeptics include the rural and less-educated residents of the 
outer islands who doubt they could obtain the skills needed to 
survive overseas, and Christians who put more faith in God's 
protection than in climate models. (A31-2016) 
While the current President, Taneti Maamau, acknowledges the 
threat of climate change, he does not believe the country will 
disappear. "We don't believe that Kiribati will sink like the Titanic 
ship. Our country, our beautiful lands, are created by the hands of 
God," he said in a recent promotional video. (M85-2019) 
And yet, while we've long known the dangers global warming 
poses to low-lying island nations like Kiribati, the world may not 
realize that Kiribati is also grappling with climate denialism, even 
as it faces the reality of being wiped from the map by 2100. The 
current president, Taneti Maamau, believes that while climate 
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change is real, it is not man-made. Consequently, Maamau has 
announced his government's official intention to "put aside the 
misleading and pessimistic scenario of a sinking, deserted nation." 
That also means putting aside those, like ourselves, who dare to 
speak the inconvenient truth. (M81-2018) 
"They [I-Kiribati] avoid talking about it," says Natalie. "They don't 
believe in the science. They have strong religious views and beliefs 
that they will not be harmed and their land will be saved. They 
have complete faith. Their ancestors have told them that the coral 
will rise with the ocean so they will always be higher than sea 
level." (M18-2013) 
Many I-Kiribati, including one ex-president, refer to the Bible story 
of Noah's Ark which ended with God vowing never to flood the 
earth again. For a deeply religious population, this story is as good 
as science. (M85-2019) 
Those in Kiribati have a strong attachment to their country and 
many pretend that their country is doing fairly well despite 
scientific consensus and evidence on the ground that they are in 
real danger. (M43-2015) 
The [Kiribati] government has said 'Anote's Ark' did not follow 
ethical standards. It said video footage was used misleadingly, it 
was offensive to claim that Kiribati will be sinking or drowning in 
30 or 50 years and local people were not given an opportunity to 
share their stories. 
Mr Tong is a long time change campaigner and has been heavily 
promoting the film. He says the film took in a number of 
viewpoints but he says he is not sure if people in Kiribati were 
aware about the science of climate change. (M79-2018)  
 
Criticisms of local knowledge centre around lack of understanding and education, religion, and 
the approach of the current Kiribati Government. For example, there were suggestions that 
some I-Kiribati are not educated: “The skeptics include the rural and less-educated residents 
of the outer islands who doubt they could obtain the skills needed to survive overseas” (A31-
2016); or that there is a lack of knowledge about climate change:  
“Those in Kiribati have a strong attachment to their country and many pretend that 
their country is doing fairly well despite scientific consensus and evidence on the 
ground that they are in real danger”(M43-2015). 
 In some cases former president Tong used this supposed lack of knowledge to discredit the 
current Kiribati Government’s arguments against the documentary he was involved in about 
climate change was alarmist (See: RNZ, 2018; Rytz, 2018):  
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“I had taken the decision that you cannot involve people who really don't know what 
they are talking about. We are hearing people making statements, even today, but 
really they've not read the background on the science.” (M79-2018).  
I argue that these views of I-Kiribati lacking knowledge about climate change further adds to 
narratives that represent the country’s population as lacking agency and abilities to adapt to 
climate change, and the need for outside expertise and science.  
 
In many cases, this was also tied to religious beliefs (9 migration articles, 3 Adaptation) where 
faith is described as a reason that for denial of climate change: “They have strong religious 
views and beliefs that they will not be harmed and their land will be saved. They have complete 
faith.” (M18-2013). Most articles frame religion as a negative factor in climate change issues. 
However, as discussed in previous chapters, while religious beliefs can at times hinder climate 
action, religion and the church can also do beneficial work in climate issues (Hermann, 2017; 
Kempf, 2012). A lack of local abilities and education was noted throughout all time periods of 
this discourse analysis. However, the later articles began to focus more on the differences 
between the previous Kiribati Government and the current government’s approaches (elected 
in 2016). This discussion particularly focuses on religion and President Taneti Maamau’s views 
on climate change migration, as these oppose former president Anote Tongs’ views. For 
example:  
“While the current President, Taneti Maamau, acknowledges the threat of climate 
change, he does not believe the country will disappear. "We don't believe that Kiribati 
will sink like the Titanic ship. Our country, our beautiful lands, are created by the 
hands of God," he said in a recent promotional video.” (M85-2019) 
The disagreement between Tong and Maamau illustrates that there is not a single position on 
this issue in the Pacific, and that some leaders disagree with Tong’s (and other organisations) 
positioning of migration as inevitable (McNamara and Gibson, 2009; Remling, 2020). This 
also shows it is important not to romanticise or accept knowledge solely because it is local, as 
with any knowledge there can be problems and power relations (Briggs, 2005; Forsyth, 2013).  
 
Thus, in the majority of the articles, the issue of climate change migration is framed through 
Western science and reported by Western based reporters talking to climate scientists, 
development experts, or academics. Additionally, when local perspectives are included, they 
are mainly from the Kiribati Government, and I-Kiribati who speak English, potentially 
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limiting what perspectives are present in these representations. As with the previous sections 
relating to international responsibility and development, the focus on expert and scientific 
knowledge disregards local knowledge and indigenous perspectives. This contributes to those 
in Kiribati being represented as vulnerable and unable to address climate change. This is a 
broader issue with power relations and the construction of climate migration that favours 
particular knowledges such as climate models over other knowledges (Baldwin, 2017; Barnett, 
2010b). The dominance of Western science and development in these narratives is clear from 
the small number of articles that acknowledge the value of local knowledge, agency or the need 
for Kiribati and other PICs to lead approaches to climate change issues.  
 
5.8 Local knowledge, religion and culture – unheard perspectives?  
The previous sections in this chapter have highlighted some of the dominant discourses 
emerging from the media analysis. These discourses represent an uncertain future for Kiribati 
populations; as their nation may become uninhabitable in the future, or they may instead be 
able to adapt; as vulnerable and a victim of climate change and development challenges, and a 
population that needs help from the Global North. These discourses generally come from 
Western sources and as the previous section highlights, are usually based on Western 
knowledge and understandings. The analysis showed a smaller group of articles that considered 
the role of local knowledge, religion and cultural factors that influence climate change 
migration/adaptation approaches in Kiribati (10 migration articles (10%), 6 adaptation articles 
(16%). These articles begin to hint toward the value of local beliefs, knowledge, and ability to 
take action to counter climate change, and the ability to resist power in these ‘common sense’ 
constructions of Kiribati. However, even in these instances, the articles only touched on local 
perspectives and actions rather than offering an in-depth discussion led by I-Kiribati people 
beyond the assertions of the government.  
 
The value of local and indigenous knowledge for climate change adaptation and for 
development has been well established (Briggs, 2005; Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Campbell and 
Barnett, 2010). For example, there has been discussion of the adaptive capacity, traditional 
knowledge and ability of Pacific nations to respond to environmental changes (Bryant-Tokalau, 
2018; Campbell, 2009) and a move towards community based adaptation (Ayers and Forsyth, 
2009; Sovacool, 2011). Likewise, ongoing critiques of international development and 
‘expertise’ have highlighted the need to recognise the important role local knowledge plays 
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(Kothari, 2005). However, as this section highlights there was a distinct lack of local and 
indigenous knowledge and perspectives in the media analysis. 
 
In general, in the few articles that did mention local understanding or abilities, these themes 
were not the main focus of the article. Table 5.9 shows some instances where local knowledge 
or I-Kiribati are considered.  
 
Table 5.9: Local knowledge, religion and climate in Kiribati   











The knowledge inherent in these [spiritual and cultural] spheres has 
been the source of resilience for more than 2000 years in an oceanic 
environment with limited land, flora and fauna, allowing islanders not 
only to survive but to produce complex, creative societies (M83-2019) 
The issue of a mass migration is a contentious one for the Pacific 
Islands facing annihilation under the waves. Many islanders are 
resistant, but understand it may be inevitable. 
“We don’t want to leave our country,” Aram says. “We love our land, 
and it doesn’t have the same meaning to be living somewhere else. We 
don’t want to be migrants of climate, but if there is no change our 
country will disappear into the sea.” 
It feels terrible, he says, to worry about one’s country’s very existence. 
(M66-2017) 
This cultural knowledge, along with these islanders' empirical 
knowledge of the ocean - "they have knowledge about the ocean, their 
lands, their fish that we don't have," Stone says - could be lost if forced 
migration isolates these people from each other over a long period of 
time. (M57-2015) 
An environmental and indigenous rights lawyer, Dayle Takitimu, said 
Pacific communities can model to the world a "zero emissions" 
lifestyle. She said they are, at the most, two generations away from 
living in harmony with the earth. […] Takitimu also urged Pacific people 
to reactivate what she calls ancient alliances to create a powerful voice 
on climate change. (A27-2016) 
Despite the daily challenges, I-Kiribati rarely dwell on the hardships. 
The traits of resilience and resourcefulness have evolved in response 
to the highly variable climate, and coral sands that support a limited 
variety of food crops. (A24-2015) 
[Kiribati] has become an international symbol of vulnerability - on the 
edge of the world and at the end of the line: a nation doomed in the 
face of climate change. But, an insight into the daily lives of the people 
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of Kiribati (I-Kiribati) reveals a story less often told: one of strength and 
resilience. (A24-2015) 
These past few days I have spoken to locals, government officials and 
development partners, and seen their dedication to preserving this 
incredible nation through local action to build resilience - even young 
and old helping to build sea walls with their bare hands. The World 
Bank shares this dedication, and we look forward to continuing to work 
together to find ways we can ensure Kiribati is best prepared to face 
the challenges of climate change head-on - through resilient transport, 
water storage and land protection - for years to come. (M58-2015) 
Korauaba says the media needs to adopt strategies to better report 
climate change and one of those is deliberative journalism, journalism 
that is acknowledged as empowering local people and leading to 
greater, popular decision-making. 
In his research, he regards deliberative journalism - what he terms in 
the i-Kiribati-language as Te Karoronga - as allowing the community to 
be part of climate change adaptation and raising understanding and 
awareness of actions, so the people themselves can take action to help 
save their islands. (A29-2016) 
 
The articles tended to touch on the need to consult the community, the resilience and strength 
of I-Kiribati and culture, or reporters interviewed and spent time with locals to hear about their 
life. Examples of this included articles noting the resilience and knowledge communities have:  
“knowledge inherent in these [spiritual and cultural] spheres has been the source of 
resilience for more than 2000 years” (M83-2019) 
And the actions taken by locals such as building sea walls:  
“These past few days I have spoken to locals, government officials and development 
partners, and seen their dedication to preserving this incredible nation through local 
action to build resilience - even young and old helping to build sea walls with their 
bare hands.” (M58-2015).  
Though the focus on local perspectives was brief, this time taken to focus on local actions, 
abilities and knowledge contrasts to the dominant narratives discussed earlier in this chapter, 
and shows there is some diversity in the articles. These perspectives support calls for inclusion 
of indigenous and local knowledge in climate change approaches (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; 
Campbell, 2009) as well as I-Kiribati stating they do not intend to migrate except as a last resort 
(Farbotko et al., 2018; Noy, 2017). It is also worth considering the broader challenges with 
journalism in the Pacific and the contribution this might have to the lack of Kiribati 
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representation. One article touched on this, noting research into deliberative journalism for 
Kiribati:  
“Korauaba says the media needs to adopt strategies to better report climate change 
and one of those is deliberative journalism, journalism that is acknowledged as 
empowering local people and leading to greater, popular decision-making. In his 
research, he regards deliberative journalism - what he terms in the i-Kiribati-language 
as Te Karoronga - as allowing the community to be part of climate change adaptation 
and raising understanding and awareness of actions, so the people themselves can 
take action to help save their islands.” (A29-2016). 
Thus, larger issues of media in the Pacific and Kiribati may also be contributing to these 
Western dominated representations of climate change (e.g. Korauaba, 2014). The absence or 
indirect discussion of local perspectives is clear. Coverage is largely dominated by Western-
oriented discourses previously discussed in this chapter. Previous research discusses the power 
asymmetries present in the social construction of climate change migrants and refugees 
(Baldwin, 2017). In these constructions, certain forms of knowledge (in this media analysis, 
science and Western notions of development) are favoured over other forms of knowledge 
(Baldwin, 2017). The media analysis shows these inequalities in power through the overall 
absence of I-Kiribati driven knowledge and discourses. However, the fact that some local 
knowledge and perspectives are present in these articles suggests that there are also 
counternarratives to these dominant portrayals of Kiribati. These accounts may contribute 
towards resisting ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault, 1984, 1980) that use scientific accounts to 
discursively construct I-Kiribati as future climate migrants, in need of Western assistance.   
 
It is also interesting to note that though security and the securitisation of climate change 
migration is common (See Baldwin et al., 2014; Bettini, 2013; Boas, 2015) there was little 
mention of security discourses in this media analysis. This suggests that perhaps in relation to 
Kiribati this has not become a common narrative in the news articles, or there has been a shift 
in the way this issue is framed. Thus, while I-Kiribati are discursively framed as ‘victims’ and 
lacking agency, the findings of this chapter do not show evidence of these peoples being framed 
as a threat to security. This contrasts to other discussions of climate migration that see 
securitisation as an issue in these discourses (e.g. Bettini, 2013; Boas, 2015; Hartmann, 2010). 
More broadly this is an interesting contrast to the media construction of refugees as ‘other’, 
based on fear, populism, and securitisation (for example the European refugee crisis (Holmes 
and Castañeda, 2016; Krzyżanowski et al., 2018) and asylum seekers in Australia (Gale, 2004; 
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McKay et al., 2011). It is possible that the existing historic and cultural connections between 
New Zealand and Kiribati communities, the sense of responsibility, or the current lack of 
proven ‘climate refugees’, contributes to these less securitised representations. However, 
further research is required to understand this.  
 
5.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored how Kiribati has been represented in relation to climate migration 
and adaptation. Using a media analysis, I have provided a broad overview of the news coverage 
of climate change migration and adaptation in relation to Kiribati from 2013 to early 2020. The 
results of this discourse analysis showed four key themes:  
i) that there is uncertainty and differing perspectives around the need to migrate from 
Kiribati;  
ii) the need for international responsibility on climate change issues;  
iii) the development challenges in Kiribati that complicate climate change, and;  
iv) the dominance of science and development experts in the representation of climate 
migration.  
This chapter has also considered the lack of local knowledge, and the absence of certain 
perspectives in the news articles. I argue that these narratives have constructed Kiribati as a 
vulnerable island nation in need of external expertise and assistance. In doing this, this 
construction largely leaves out another aspect of this discussion, the perspectives and local 
understandings of Kiribati and the challenges that nation faces. More broadly, this media 
analysis supports the overarching issues with the discourse of climate migrants, which are 
embedded in issues of climate change governance, knowledge and power, colonialism and 
development. However, while the themes in this chapter dominated the way climate change 
was discussed, some articles showed alternatives to these representations through discussion 
of local action, resilience and adaptation. These counternarratives may contribute to resisting 
‘regimes of truth’ that elevate science and represent I-Kiribati as inevitable climate migrants. 
In this thesis I assert the need to explore representations of Kiribati in the context of climate 
migration and consider how this impacts global North and South power relations and 
geographic imaginaries. While the media discursively constructs Kiribati in one way, in the 
following chapters (Chapters Six and Seven), I will show that these representations are not 
necessarily reflective of the Government of Kiribati or donors approaches to the challenges of 






New Zealand Responses to Climate Change 
Migration  
 
6.1 Introduction  
In Chapter Five, mainstream media representations of climate change migration and adaptation 
in relation to Kiribati were discussed. This chapter will now explore what approaches New 
Zealand NGOs and Government are taking towards cooperation with Kiribati in relation to 
climate change. One possible avenue for this cooperation is a visa or other pathways for I-
Kiribati displaced by climate change. I will discuss the geopolitical context within which 
discussions of these pathways take place. In doing this, the chapter will examine what New 
Zealand NGOs and Government are doing in Kiribati and in the wider Pacific region, 
examining how this reflects (or contrasts to) the previously discussed representations of 
Kiribati. As the literature review and the media analysis have shown, representations of Kiribati 
often tend to be dominated by debates around climate change and migration, forming the idea 
of climate migrants, and in some cases, climate refugees. This chapter will address the research 
question:  
• How do popular representations of climate migration reflect how the issue is understood 
and approached by New Zealand government, NGOs and policy makers who are 
involved in the issue?  
This chapter will explore four main areas: first, the discussion will be situated within the 
broader geopolitical relationship that New Zealand has with Kiribati and the Pacific region in 
terms of notions of responsibility; second, the current approaches of New Zealand NGOs and 
Government to climate change in Kiribati will be outlined; third, reasons for uncertainty around 
climate change migration will be covered; finally, the fourth section will explore the 
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Experimental Humanitarian Visa suggested in 2017. I will argue that New Zealand’s 
approaches to climate change migration in Kiribati (and the Pacific region) are embedded in 
the broader geopolitics and relationships between New Zealand and Kiribati in relation to 
climate change and development projects. I contend that there is more nuance to climate change 
approaches in Kiribati than the dominant representations suggest. While climate migration 
pathways have received some consideration in New Zealand policy, the focus of New 
Zealand’s work in Kiribati is on adaptation and development projects to maintain habitability. 
The disconnect between mainstream representations and the actual approaches being taken in 
Kiribati further demonstrates that climate migration remains a developing and uncertain issue. 
It is clear that New Zealand actors feel an obligation and responsibility to assist Kiribati 
communities in their transition towards a future in a changing climate.  
 
6.2 New Zealand and Kiribati: aid, geopolitics, and climate change  
In Chapter Three the context of relations between New Zealand and Kiribati were outlined in 
terms of historical ties, aid and climate change. According to MFAT “New Zealand’s 
development cooperation with Kiribati aims to have a healthy, educated and resilient I-Kiribati 
population in a well-governed country that provides acceptable future choices for its 
population” (MFAT, n.d.c, p. 1). One of the main aspects of this development involves 
supporting the KV20, Kiribati’s 20-year development plan. Areas New Zealand has worked in 
and prioritised include: population pressure in South Tarawa, longevity of fishery resources, 
education and health, governing well, and climate change adaptation (MFAT, n.d.c). Thus, 
while the goals of New Zealand’s development projects in Kiribati have some focus on climate 
change adaptation, there is also a broader focus on other development areas. There is no 
mention of climate change migration, aside from MFAT’s (2018) Pacific Climate Change-
related Displacement and Migration Action Plan Cabinet paper (see Chapter Three for more 
detailed discussion of this).  
 
The relationship, between the two countries, and the way aid is approached by New Zealand 
in Kiribati is key to understanding current climate change approaches and the nation's 
involvement in discussions of climate migration from Kiribati. When talking to Key Informants 
it became clear that political, cultural and historical relationships with PICs elicited a sense of 
New Zealand's responsibility towards Kiribati in terms of climate change. Framed broadly, 
such responsibility could be through assisting with adaptation or migration or through 
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mitigation of New Zealand’s emissions. For example, the historical and cultural ties with 
Kiribati and the Pacific were one reason that some key stakeholders felt New Zealand had a 
responsibility to Kiribati in terms of development and climate change. A Key Informant from 
a New Zealand Government agency summarised this relationship stating that:  
“Do we have any responsibility? You know I don’t even need to speak personally 
here [...] the government has made a clear signal that we have a responsibility, we 
have very strong historical and cultural ties and familial ties to the Pacific, with our 
high Pasifika population, and so there’s a priority there and clearly there’s just a moral 
imperative to deal with climate change because of the scale of harm.” (Key Informant 
13)  
Likewise, Key Informant 8 stressed the importance of New Zealand’s responsibility to the 
Pacific Region and Kiribati due to the close connections to the region. They also stated that if 
migration did have to occur in future there is a diaspora of I-Kiribati who would welcome those 
who migrated into the country and support them. Another noted the larger connection to the 
Pacific region as a need for urgency in responses to climate change:  
“There are critical masses of cultural, Pacific cultural communities in New Zealand 
that, that make us responsible and that make parts of our community particularly 
responsible, and, and a sense of urgent necessity to be part of you know the solution 
to that, to that problem. So to me there’s a lot of different layers there and I’ll, and I 
don’t know how to quantify it, to me it’s like, it’s an intrinsic responsibility and […] 
the first layer should be enough, the layer of humanity to do this.” (Key Informant 7)  
This connection to the Pacific therefore appears to be a contributing factor to the involvement 
of New Zealand Government and NGOs in the issue of climate change migration. MFAT state 
in their aid and development information that 60% of ODA goes to ‘Pacific neighbours’, 
“reflecting our shared community interest in the prosperity and stability of the region” 
(MFAT, n.d.d). It is interesting also to note that it was this connection to the Pacific region that 
New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern drew on when the Experimental Humanitarian 
Visa was suggested, stating to reporters that “we are anchored in the Pacific” and that “I see 
it as a personal and national responsibility to do our part.” (Dempster and Ober, 2020 para. 
1). However, one participant was critical of this idea of connection to the Pacific and Kiribati 
pointing out that there were issues with New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific region:  
“I think to me what’s sad is just the continual portrayal of it [climate migration] but 
no other focus on actually what New Zealand could be doing. You know, I think New 
Zealand’s got a very clever image of being clean and green, and being you know, the 
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Pacific neighbours are at our, you know they’re in our heart and we’re just feeling for 
them and here’s 20 million for this, and here’s something else you know? I think 
whenever I, think about media but even just New Zealand’s policies, they’re very 
good at just putting a band aid on a broken arm.” (Key Informant 12) 
While this criticism was more severe than other Key Informants views suggested, New Zealand 
has been among nations criticised by PICs leaders. For instance, there are suggestions that as 
a member of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), New Zealand gives limited support for climate 
action which can hinder PICs interests (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018). While larger industrialised 
nations have been criticised for lack of strong action on climate change, PICs leaders including 
former President of Kiribati Anote Tong, have championed international action on climate 
change (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Kirsch, 2020; Ourbak and Magnan, 2018). The arguable 
differences between PICs and New Zealand’s action raises questions beyond the scope of this 
project, about the extent to which enough action and responsibility is being taken.  
 
Despite the responsibility that Key Informants felt New Zealand has towards Kiribati and the 
Pacific region, there can also be underlying political and strategic motivations for actions in 
the region. For instance, China has been increasing foreign aid and engagement in the Pacific 
Region (Zhang and Lawson, 2017). New Zealand and Australia have traditionally been 
influential nations in the Pacific region, and thus policies such as the Pacific Reset, that centre 
on partnership and increased funding for the region, may signal New Zealand pushing to hold 
its place in the Pacific (Steff, 2018). This points to how aid and development can be used to 
push for New Zealand’s strategic interests in the Pacific region. I contend that climate 
migration and adaptation may provide an opportunity for New Zealand actors to affirm their 
position in Kiribati.  
 
It is within these historical and current relationships that New Zealand is contributing to 
discussions on climate change migration. The Pacific Reset was noted as a factor that might 
influence the involvement of New Zealand in climate change action. The refocus of this policy 
on the Pacific region and funding, principles of partnership, and breaking down of traditional 
aid/donor relations (ERS, 2018; See: Peters, 2018) clearly also included issues of climate 
change:  
“there’s a very high level of focus on the Pacific, and the, we’ve got a very strong 
mandate to support the Pacific generally. We have a very strong mandate to support 
climate action including in the Pacific, and we have a strong mandate to support 
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climate mobility. So it’s an environment at the moment where we have the resources 
and the interest to proceed with our policy” (Key Informant 13) 
The Pacific Reset was seen by some as a continuation of what New Zealand was already doing 
in the region, and by others as something positive that might allow them to expand their projects 
in Kiribati. The next section outlines the approaches currently being taken by New Zealand to 
climate change migration in Kiribati (and the Pacific region). This will highlight how aspects 
of the Pacific Reset (such as working in partnership) are involved in these approaches to climate 
change, and the NZAP goals in Kiribati. It is within this context of development aid, policies 
and geopolitics that New Zealand’s responses to climate change migration are embedded.  
 
6.3 Current policies and approaches to the issue of climate migration 
Discussions with Key Informants supported the previous literature and findings of this thesis, 
showing that there is no clear-cut decision on an approach to climate change migration to date. 
Key Informants did not have an approach for climate migration specifically, nor did most of 
the organisations they worked for. The focus instead was on mitigation and adaptation projects 
or development projects that addressed challenges within Kiribati. These projects were 
intended to build capacity and resilience so that the habitability of Kiribati could be maintained 
for longer.  
 
However, there is also a sense among some stakeholders that there might be greater focus on 
migration in the future. Key Informant 13 from the New Zealand Government made it clear 
that they are doing work on the issue of climate migration specifically. This was researching 
and building on MFATs 2018 Cabinet Paper on Pacific climate change-related displacement 
and migration (MFAT, 2018). This informant also emphasised again the need for PICs to lead 
on the issue:  
“This particular issue is very sensitive in the region, we are not coming in as saviours 
on a white stallion it’s very much about listening and understanding, so for instance 
we asked the region at the Pacific Island Leaders Forum in 2018 ‘do you want to have 
a discussion on this topic’? The answer was yes […] and we’ve volunteered to lead 
that discussion, or to facilitate that discussion. But we have said and continue to say, 
we have no views on a preferred outcome from that discussion. You tell us what you 
want the region to do and we’ll do our best to see if we can support that. And so that’s 
how we’ve approached it, that’s very much, free prior and informed consent on this 
issue is, is absolutely critical.” (Key Informant 13)  
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It is clear from this statement that the issue of climate migration is being approached by the 
New Zealand Government from a position where Kiribati and the region make decisions. This 
highlights how partnerships involved in the Pacific Reset are significant in how the issue of 
climate migration is being approached. As will be discussed later in the chapter, this focus on 
partnership as part of the Pacific Reset also arguably influenced the way the Experimental 
Humanitarian Visa was proposed and then stopped after Pacific Leaders were consulted. Key 
Informant 7 recounted workshops hosted by their organisation with MFAT, Government 
agencies and Pacific representatives to discuss policy and programmatic approaches to climate 
change displacement:   
“One thing I’ve really appreciated about the people in MFAT involved in this is that 
there’s really a humility around […] working with issues of you know community 
dislocation and relocation, and displacement, we’ve – you know from MFAT saying 
we don’t know how to do that we’ve never really done that, and there’s plenty of 
examples of how community relocation has gone horrifically wrong, including in 
New Zealand, so how do we not get it wrong? So I think they’ve come at it from a 
position of humility, and that’s why they were really keen to have some, some outside 
thought put into what an approach should look like, what a strategic approach should 
look like.” 
From this perspective, MFAT was taking the time to work with PICs and consult in terms of 
the policies it creates for climate related displacement. Thus, it appears that any stance and 
approaches to climate migration from Kiribati and at the regional level are still in a developing 
and research stage to determine the most appropriate approach.  
 
The same appears to be true in the way development NGOs in the Pacific Region are 
approaching climate change migration. One Key Informant from a development NGO noted 
that the organisation did not have a specific climate change project in Kiribati. They were 
instead focused on the broader development challenges and as part of this the interrelated 
climate change impacts effecting Kiribati communities ability to remain there:  
“… for us climate change is more of a crosscutting issue, for example I focus on 
water, sanitation, hygiene, WASH projects, and for our WASH projects, climate 
change is more of like a cross-cutting issue so across all of our projects we try and 
ensure that we’re addressing climate change and resilience, climate change 
adaptation, these kinds of things, I wouldn’t say we have a specific climate change 
project, not in the Pacific, I don’t think so at the moment actually.” (Participant 5) 
Similarly, another Key Informant stated that:  
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“Any of our projects now in the Pacific have to have a climate change lens kind of 
run over them to make sure that we’re not adversely affecting climate change.” (Key 
Informant 10)  
This focus on climate change as a cross-cutting issue reflects the NZAP goals of ‘sustainable 
development’ where climate change is a cross-cutting issue (MFAT, n.d.b). Other Key 
Informants stated that their organisations were focused on projects to improve water, health, 
agriculture and general resilience or capacity. One example of this is Key Informant 9 who 
discussed the food project their organisation has in Kiribati, where increased knowledge of 
local plants and ways to use these as food sources would build capacity and assist with locals 
remaining in Kiribati for longer:  
“in terms of migration away from Kiribati, the ability to, you know, feed your family 
will be a driver. Or the ability to you know have a healthy sustainable diet is a big, 
because [Kiribati is a] coral atoll and not fertile like many other parts of the Pacific 
are actually very fertile […] I think we often think of things like sea level rise being 
the main driver for people leaving. But actually the ability to grow and produce food 
is actually a real challenge for people.“ (Key Informant 9)  
It was noted that a focus on providing knowledge to Kiribati helped to improve abilities and 
agency of I-Kiribati:  
“I think one of the key things about that concept of teaching someone to fish is that 
in any Pacific nation, and particularly Kiribati, there’s a desperate need for 
knowledge. And with knowledge comes an opportunity for them to take ownership 
of their own experience, of their own situation. The more knowledge you have the 
better you can make decisions so I think there’s a, I would want to see some more 
collaboration between New Zealand and the Pacific nations, and particularly Kiribati. 
I know it’s expensive getting there but, coming on short stints has some positive 
impact, but I think coming out longer would be fantastic.” (Key Informant 8)  
This Key Informant pointed out the importance of staying in-country longer, and collaboration 
between PICs like Kiribati and New Zealand. My communication with a Kiribati Government 
employee working on climate change supported this, as they stated that international aid and 
development partners should be seeking direction from the Government of Kiribati and 
ensuring that they provide genuine support based on bilateral partnerships with the 
Government. Policies from Kiribati also support this, with the Kiribati 20-Year Vision (KV20) 
focusing on “strategic and inclusive partnerships between Government and national and 
international stakeholders” and building stronger partnerships with development partners  
(GoK, 2016a, p. 58). Other policies such as the Kiribati Climate Change Policy (GoK, 2016b) 
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and the Kiribati Development Plan (GoK, 2016c) also encourage these international 
partnerships for development and climate change projects and finance. The New Zealand 
Government focus on partnership and supporting the KV20 appear to be aligned with these 
policies and plans by the Government of Kiribati that focus on partnerships (MFAT, n.d.c).  
 
Thus, these findings show that currently NGOs and New Zealand Government are focused on 
climate change adaptation rather than climate migration in Kiribati and the Pacific region. It is 
also interesting to note that adaptation is encompassed by the broader development goals and 
projects. This fits with current moves where adaptation has been ‘folded’ into development 
(Webber 2016). Both the Government of Kiribati and New Zealand appear to be approaching 
climate change from the approach of development as adaptation, fitting with international 
discourses of ‘sustainable development’ and the mainstreaming of adaptation into development 
(Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Methmann, 2010; Webber, 2016). The next chapter will highlight 
further how this global governance of climate change may impact the approaches Kiribati 
actors take to climate change due to the need for financing and support for projects (See further: 
Mallin, 2018; Webber, 2013). It appears from these findings that this influences the approaches 
New Zealand NGOs and Government take to development and climate projects.   
 
Though the current focus is on adaptation, Key Informants also felt climate related migration 
might be necessary in future and suggested some future approaches. Key Informant 13, who 
was a New Zealand Government employee, discussed a number of options if migration did 
need to occur:  
“you could make tweaks to the Registered Seasonal Employer Scheme, specifically 
to target communities where people might need to relocate in the future, so that they 
have some networks in New Zealand. So that could be part of a climate migration 
thing even though it’s just rotational, temporary annual cycles rather than a permanent 
resettlement programme. […] There are lots of options, that could be complementary, 
or just a stand-alone thing, but and/or maybe there is a separate category, or perhaps 
we increase the quota. So [In terms of the] Pacific quota scheme, perhaps we just 
increase the quota for countries that are most likely to be affected. So, there are all 
sorts of different approaches and, yeah, it’s just too early to say.” (Key Informant 13) 
However, this Key Informant also stressed that these issues were still being researched and 
developed (See for instance the MFAT (2018) and MBIE (2018) Cabinet Papers developed in 
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light of the Pacific Reset policy). Other Key Informants, including Kiribati also noted the 
potential for extending the RSE and PAC pathways:  
“amending the, the seasonal worker programme, amending Pacific visa pathways, 
making more space so that we really build in, you know, enough time for New 
Zealand to, to play […] its’ role effectively as a, a receiving country of a lot of people 
that will be displaced (Key Informant 7)  
I-Kiribati Key informants also supported this position:  
“I think the PAC is one good things that the New Zealand Government is doing […] 
I often hear a lot of people telling me there’s like – because at the moment with the 
PAC there’s only like 75 people that can move every year, so we’re on the same 
number with Tuvalu…. And Tuvalu’s population is like half of ours, so a lot of people 
are like oh can you ask them to like, I was like this is not an easy talk, so if like, 
maybe more focus on like that side of the initiative yeah.” (Key Informant 2) 
It therefore appears that there are several ways that New Zealand could approach the issue in 
the future through adjustments to current migration pathways. However, the Government Key 
Informant noted the potential for issues with discussion around climate migration:  
“there are very high levels of concern that if you have, even have a conversation about 
climate migration, that you are opening the door to high polluting developed countries 
to say well it’s cheaper for us to buy 100,000 one way tickets than to implement a 
just transition to our fossil fuels industry for example. So, there are very high concerns 
it will be used as an excuse to not take real action on climate change.” (Key Informant 
13)  
This concern links to other studies that have pointed to the issues with climate change migration 
as an adaptation approach (see: Bettini, 2013; Bettini et al., 2017; Felli, 2013). For example, 
the shift from climate refugees to climate migrants puts the responsibility on those who are 
displaced to prepare themselves for migration rather than focusing on human rights, 
institutional responses, and including climate justice (Bettini et al., 2017). Previous 
understandings of the ‘climate refugee’ that saw climate migration as a failure to adapt or 
mitigate climate change, have now shifted to climate migration being framed as an adaptation 
strategy (Felli, 2013). By focusing on migration as adaptation, there is a risk that attention will 
no longer be on compensation and responsibility (Felli, 2013). There is also a risk that 
industrialised nations will have an excuse for inaction, undermining commitments to reduce 
GHG emissions and support for in-country adaptation projects and solutions (Allgood and 
McNamara, 2017; McNamara and Gibson, 2009; Ryan, 2010). With these perspectives, it is 
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easy to see how discussions of climate migration could be seen as a negative by Kiribati 
communities and other PICs, particularly as this is generally a Western driven discourse.  
 
The approaches to Kiribati and climate change NGO informants discussed echo the Pacific 
Reset policies that centre on working in partnership with PICs. It also reflects climate 
migration literature that emphasises the need for impacted countries to choose what 
approaches to climate change they take, rather than this being imposed by outsiders 
(Kelman, 2017; Kelman et al., 2015). On a larger scale, the approaches of the Government 
and NGOs are embedded in the move to make development aid more inclusive and less 
centred on Western ideals and expertise, for example through Community Based 
Adaptation (CBA) (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009; McNamara, 2013).   
 
6.4 Migration is a last resort: uncertainty in climate change 
conversation  
The previous section has established that adaptation is the preferred option for NGOs and 
Government approaches to Kiribati. Key Informants argued that climate change discussions 
should not focus on migration from Kiribati and the Pacific region. Instead the focus should be 
on ensuring Kiribati remains habitable into the future and migration should be a last resort. For 
example, one Key Informant stated:  
“I mean [climate migration is] a pretty last resort; I mean you don’t want to leave a 
country where you’ve been for over 1400 years or longer, [and] suddenly up sticks? 
And fit into the other country, when that country’s got to accommodate you as well, 
you know? But it’ll have to be in some adaptation technique I think once everything 
else has been explored” (Key informant 10) 
This Key Informant, an NGO and former New Zealand Government employee, emphasised the 
'last resort' nature of migration from Kiribati as well as the impacts this would have for the 
receiving nations. The idea that migration was last resort, and that other options should be 
explored first, was reinforced by another Key Informant:  
“the question I had when I walked away from Tarawa, we just left and came back in 
late December, and I was like what is the future for Kiribati? You know? It requires 
strong leadership, it requires a worldly person that really understands and has a clear 
vision of the future for Kiribati and probably adapt both strategies of – ok so let’s try 
to adapt but let’s also keep this door open of relocation. And then how do we preserve 
this culture? If that happens. and who can help us here?” (Key Informant 8)  
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This shows the preference for remaining in-country but also the potential need to have options 
for relocation, echoing the literature that states migration would be a last resort if mitigation 
and adaptation fail (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Noy, 2017). This focus on adaptation was clear in 
many of the NGO approaches outlined in in the previous section. For example, Key informant 
6 noted more generally in relation to PICs that mitigation and adaptation were the key focus 
for their organisation, a theme shared for the majority of NGOs that participated:  
“I mean our perspective is first and foremost that we need to make sure people can 
stay in their homes. So, it’s about mitigation and adaptation, so that people can stay 
where they are.” (Key Informant 6) 
Despite these perspectives, and the previously outlined policies and approaches, the general 
agreement among Key Informants was also that migration was likely and future migration 
would have to be a part of long-term adaptation strategies. This was based on ideas of the 
inevitability that Kiribati would become uninhabitable in the future:  
“It’s a very real threat, goodness you’ve only got to go to Kiribati and you won’t be, 
parts of it won’t be there in twenty years time” (Key Informant 10)  
One Key Informant noted that although the NGO they worked for had not yet taken a stance 
on climate migration from Kiribati (or elsewhere), migration probably would happen in the 
future:  
“like I said, it’s an important issue and it’s an important discussion. Personally, I think 
climate migration in some ways may be inevitable in some countries, so we can’t, we 
can’t discount it and say it’s not going to happen. I think it probably will happen, but 
I also think it should be a last resort if nothing else works, so I think climate change 
adaptation is something that we should really put a lot of effort into and mitigation as 
well” (Key informant 5) 
Thus, the approaches that development NGOs are taking to climate change in Kiribati seem to 
support the idea of climate migration being necessary in future. This is similar to the findings 
of the media analysis around the Western discourses inevitability of climate migration and 
Kiribati populations as ‘victims’ (Farbotko, 2005; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Klepp and 
Herbeck, 2016). However, unlike many of the media portrayals, there was a continuous 
emphasis that mitigation and adaptation should be the first priority for Kiribati. This reflects 
the latest approaches amongst the development community in the Pacific in terms of remaining 
and adapting rather than migrating, and the PICs including Kiribati that have been vocal about 
remaining and adapting rather than migrating (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; McNamara and Gibson, 
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2009; Noy, 2017). Correspondence with a Kiribati Government employee working on climate 
change supported the focus in Kiribati on building capacity and resilience rather than climate 
change migration. This employee also noted that Kiribati’s climate change policy was created 
after national and public consultations that showed I-Kiribati wished to remain in Kiribati, even 
with the impacts of climate change and extreme weather events.  
 
6.4.1 Implications of the interviews with New Zealand NGOs and Government  
These interviews highlight that climate change migration is still a developing issue in the 
context of Kiribati and the wider Pacific region, that is being debated and the most appropriate 
approach is still being established. Comparing the New Zealand Government and NGO 
perspectives to the findings of the media analysis discussed in Chapter Five, there are 
similarities here to the uncertainty and variety of perspectives that the findings show in relation 
to a number of factors: whether climate migration will need to occur in future, what the best 
approach to migration would be, and the role of New Zealand based government and NGOs. 
Whatever the case, both the Government and NGO Key Informants stated the importance of 
Kiribati and the Pacific region leading on this issue:  
“[I]t’s not up to us really to make these decisions, it’s up to the countries themselves 
and the communities themselves, so it’s, if the communities want to stay then it’s, 
yeah it’s obviously entirely their decision.” (Key Informant 5) 
Another Key Informant discussed the Kiribati leaderships stance on climate change migration 
and how New Zealand’s approach should be supporting Pacific leaders making choices around 
climate change migration:  
“I feel like that's a good approach to take in that New Zealand is sort of just being 
engaged with Pacific leaders and letting them decide what they want to do” (Key 
Informant 11) 
In terms of discussion of climate change in the region Key Informant 7 stated that there was a 
“Fixation on people coming here and somehow that’s problematic”. Rather, the focus needs 
to be on PICs and what these communities need, instead of the supposed ‘receiving’ countries. 
This ‘fixation’ is arguably present in much of the mainstream media (see Chapter 5) but does 
not appear to be reflective of many of the development NGOs and the current government 
policies and approaches by both New Zealand and Kiribati. Part of the NZAP approach is to 
have PICs lead their own development, and New Zealand support these priorities (MFAT, 
 126 
n.d.b, n.d.e). Some Key Informants saw the Pacific Reset as useful for ensuring the approaches 
New Zealand takes are appropriate. Key Informant 6 discussed how the policy encouraged 
dialogue with PICs:   
“if you have an established relationship where you can say what do you need, what 
are your priorities, how can we support and walk alongside, that’s a different – you 
start off at a different point. Because of the way the aid industry is set up often it’s 
hard to start at that point which is why listening and being led by others sounds so 
simple but is, can actually be quite hard to do. But that is the way forward […] the 
Pacific Reset is nice, because it’s about those principles around understanding and 
friendship and partnership, […] partnerships where you can have conversations and 
hold each other to account and disagree with each other respectfully and dialogue and 
discussion, that’s the way forward.” (Key Informant 6)  
This point illustrates the way that there can be a breaking down of traditional power relations 
and expertise in development to focus on local approaches. Bryant-Tokalau (2018) argues that 
there is existing traditional knowledge and capacity in PICs to respond to climate change and 
when Pacific Island peoples have agency in these responses they are likely to be successful. 
However, as one participant noted when discussing portrayals of Kiribati and climate change 
by the media and by development NGOs, Kiribati often does not appear to be leading narratives 
around this issue:  
“I think that the narrative is definitely being led by NGOs and outside organizations, 
I think that this, the whole climate change story is not something that Kiribati people 
themselves, in-country, are sort of leading, they’re not really leading that 
conversation. It's being more talked about them as opposed to they're talking about 
it.” (Key Informant 11) 
This statement raises an important question about the extent to which Kiribati is leading on 
these issues. While the focus of the Pacific Reset, the Government discussion and the NGOs is 
stated to be on PICs such as Kiribati leading issues of climate change. However, it remains to 
be seen how effectively this occurs in Kiribati given that these relationships with countries of 
the Global North are embedded in a history of traditional development relationships and power 
relations. This is something that Chapter Seven will cover in more detail.  
 
6.5 The Humanitarian Visa and other Legal Issues of Climate Change 
Migration 
Having now established the approaches that New Zealand based development NGOs and the 
Government are taking to climate change adaptation and migration in Kiribati, this section asks 
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where the experimental Humanitarian Visa proposal fits into this discussion. The Government 
and NGO Key Informants made it clear that their focus was on climate change adaptation and 
broader development in Kiribati and other PICs. While climate change migration was still 
being worked on ‘behind the scenes’ by New Zealand and other Pacific Governments, there 
was still uncertainty and this was considered a last resort. The experimental Humanitarian Visa 
first suggested in 2017, and later dismissed by the government, raises important considerations 
for what migration might look like if it were to occur in the future. This visa was suggested by 
the New Zealand Green Party and would have provided 100 places that would be “available to 
applicants from any Pacific Island Nation who have a genuine fear of permanent displacement 
because of environmental changes or damage due to climate change” (Green Party, 2017, p. 
8). This Humanitarian Visa was shelved in 2018 when discussion with Pacific leaders showed 
this was not wanted (see Chapter Three for more detailed discussion of this visa). However, 
with the development of New Zealand’s Pacific Reset policy, and cabinet papers showing that 
climate migration is still a focus, pathways such as this visa may be revisited from 2024 (see 
MFAT, 2018).  
 
Despite the briefness of the Humanitarian Visa’s proposal, this visa did open up discussion 
about the issue which had not happened previously (Fiennes, 2019). The results of the media 
analysis illustrate this as in 2017 and beyond, the proposed visa prompted international 
discussion relating to climate change migration and New Zealand’s role in development 
cooperation with nations such as Kiribati. While it was generally acknowledged that migration 
may be needed in the future, these Key Informants and their organisations had mixed views on 
climate ‘refugees’, ‘migrants’, the Humanitarian Visa, and if it would occur, or be needed, in 
future. When asked if this Humanitarian Visa might re-emerge in future, Key Informant 13, 
who worked for the New Zealand Government on issues of climate change mobilities, stated 
that:  
“It’s probably too early to say […] there’s a myriad of different approaches that we 
could take. And there are questions around, you know it’s a complex policy” (Key 
Informant 13)  
This view reflects the New Zealand Governments’ current plan to review the need for an 
Humanitarian Visa for Pacific climate change related displacement from 2024 (See MBIE, 
2018; MFAT, 2018). Key Informant 7 who worked for a NGO also suggested that this 
Humanitarian Visa needed to be more developed:   
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“[the Humanitarian Visa] was an idea that James Shaw had that he put into the public 
realm […] that created momentum because nobody else really was talking about it 
[…] because he was a minister, it had legs, but it wasn’t tied into government policy, 
or a government plan. And so we saw that in the Cabinet paper that it was something 
that was you know, kind of shunted aside with, with like yes this proposal came up 
from a minister so it’s important for us to address, but we don’t have the research or 
the data to know if that’s – so we’ll do the research and so it’s kind of put into the 
pile of, yeah for later […] I mean it was never very well formed to really understand 
what, what it could look like, the specific instances where it would be applied.” 
Others thought something like a Humanitarian Visa was a good idea, that would be needed in 
future:  
“I think [a Humanitarian Visa] is going to have to become a consideration because 
[climate change] is starting to affect people more and more in countries like Kiribati 
[…] I’ve seen families who are struggling, so like I said with more extreme weather 
events which are predicted then the situation will get worse for these families, […] it 
might come to the case for the families themselves decide they have to move, they 
can’t live there anymore, so whether that should be an option, applying for a migrant, 
refugee, status in another country” (Key Informant 5)  
It was also interesting that for a portion of the informants, there was only a vague understanding 
(if any) of the Experimental Humanitarian Visa and its discussion. This suggests that, as Key 
Informant 7 noted, this Visa was something that was brought forward by James Shaw and was 
re-evaluated during conversations with PICs and as Government policies such as the Pacific 
Reset were created and the focus shifted to further research. However, the idea of a visa did 
seem logical to several of the Key Informants who knew little about it or had never heard of its 
proposal:   
“I really don’t want one, but realistically yes, there needs to be one. Because 
otherwise, right now I don’t think policy, immigration policy even recognise anything 
called a climate change refugee, although it is like happening. I think, yeah, I mean 
you think about Kiribati, they’ve purchased land in Fiji, they’re looking at how they 
can stay in the Pacific. But it’s still means that for some of them the option might be 
coming to New Zealand. It’s really hard because I’m very torn between I don’t want 
people to have to come here if they don’t want to come here, but that’s what a refugee 
is, you’re displaced because you have no other place to go.” (Key Informant 12)  
This informant points out the Government of Kiribati’s land purchase in Fiji and that they may 
try to remain in the Pacific region first, something noted in the literature (Tacoli, 2009). 
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However, the participants also suggested there is space for some form of a visa or pathway in 
New Zealand policy for those displaced by climate change.  
 
There have been shifts in the way New Zealand is approaching the issue from the initial 
suggestion of a Humanitarian Visa by the Green Party. Currently, there is research and work 
towards understanding if a visa would be appropriate while focusing on adaptation projects in 
Kiribati. This fits with the way that this issue is developing internationally, where there has 
been a push to move from Global North countries leading conversation on potential climate 
migration (Kelman, 2017; Kelman et al., 2015). The conversation around climate change 
migration by New Zealand Government and some NGOs now appears to be shifting to mainly 
focus on adaptation. I argue that this may be another change similar to that of the shift from 
the ‘climate refugee’ to climate migrants, and migration as adaptation in conversations (See 
Bettini et al., 2017; Felli, 2013; Piguet, 2013). It is also worth considering if the suggestion of 
this Humanitarian Visa indicates a shift in the way that New Zealand talks about and 
approaches climate change in the Pacific region. Such a visa and MFATs current research into 
climate mobilities has the potential to acknowledge responsibility to Kiribati through tangible 
actions.   
 
Key Informants also noted additional challenges underlying the creation of a Humanitarian 
Visa for climate displaced peoples. The main issue discussed was around labelling individuals 
displaced by climate change related factors as refugees. This is due to the UN Refugee 
Convention definition not allowing for environmental factors, meaning there is a lack of legal 
support for climate change induced displacement (Farquhar, 2015; UNHCR, 2010). It is 
interesting, then, that the suggested Humanitarian Visa was embedded in the Green Party 
refugee policy in 2017 but also signalled a response to the lack of inclusion in the UN 
Convention (Green Party, 2017). In contrast, the Cabinet papers that discuss the possibility for 
these in the future do not generally refer to this in a ‘refugee’ term but instead discuss 
investigating the need for a visa for “people displaced by climate change” (MBIE, 2018 p. 11). 
NGO Key Informant 7 stated that they avoided using the term ‘climate refugee’ due to the legal 
issues:  
“we do try to talk about it in terms of climate induced migration, as opposed to things 
like climate refugees, because there is the legal implications of that term and the 
convention around, around refugees, which um, we think that that adds a level of 
legal ambiguity to the discussion” (Key Informant 7)  
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The majority of participants agreed that calling those in Kiribati ‘climate refugees’ was 
problematic. Some Key Informants discussed legal issues beyond how to label potential 
climate displaced peoples. For example, whether this occurred on an individual basis as the 
Green Party Policy suggested (Green Party, 2017), or on a community level as literature has 
suggested (Boas and Biermann, 2012), there are complex legal and non-legal challenges that 
would need to be addressed:  
“It’s a big tricky policy question when they talk about a community level [migration] 
because immigration’s settings traditionally are focused around individuals […] 
When we start to look at whole communities […] let’s say that was the path we’ll 
take, it has different implications for how Immigration New Zealand runs its 
resettlement programmes, it has different implications just in terms of where can we 
relocate a whole community? Let’s say it’s a sizable community […] 500 or 1000 
people, say. How do we find housing that’s in a reasonable proximity, or do we 
develop a new community? A new suburb? or how’s it going to work on the ground? 
Now these are all solvable policy challenges but these are the kinds of questions we 
need to think of. Because the Cabinet paper, the action plan3, talks about the values 
are around respect, you know respecting Pacific culture and self-determination, and 
these are big tricky questions. How do you facilitate that in, in New Zealand? So 
there’s quite a lot of thinking to go on” (Key Informant 13)  
Thus, there are many challenges that would have to be considered if a Humanitarian Visa was 
necessary and needed to be created. An additional point raised by this Key Informant as well 
as another NGO Key Informant was Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the role of Māori in assisting with 
resettlement of potential climate migrants:  
“There are significant Treaty implications. And we’re aware of them and I’ve had a 
number of informal consultations with individual Māori who are in leadership roles 
[…] so we need to engage with them and get a broader understanding of Māori views 
and see how we can work that into policy recommendations.” (Key Informant 13) 
In addition to the Te Tiriti o Waitangi issues, this informant then went on to note the support 
by those they had spoken to:  
“… it’s not necessarily representative of the entire community, and I wouldn’t want to 
suggest that, but all of the [Māori] representatives I’ve spoken to before have a general 
view that ‘yes of course we help people out, if people in the region need to move we 
should help them out. But there are Treaty implications and we want to be involved in 
the process and the decisions around it and the way it happens. Not only because there 
 
3 See the MFAT (2018) Cabinet Paper ‘Pacific climate change-related displacement and migration: a New Zealand 
action plan’ for further details, or the discussion of this paper earlier in this chapter, or in Chapter Three.  
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are Treaty implications though, also because we think we have a lot to offer in terms 
of helping people of a non-Pakeha culture arrive and settle successfully in New 
Zealand’. Māori who are involved, who own businesses who are involved in the 
Registered Seasonal Employer Scheme already have cultural programmes so that 
Māori culture connects with Tongan [or] wherever people come from, they already 
have systems in place. So they’re saying use us, we have systems in place, we know 
how to make this work.” (Key Informant 13) 
This Informant highlights the cultural connections and experience that Māori have to offer, and 
the importance of tāngata whenua involvement in any potential climate migration pathways.  
This is clearly an area that will affect any considerations of Humanitarian Visas or pathways 
for climate displaced peoples in the future. However, this area requires further research in 
future.  
 
The experimental Humanitarian Visa proposal raises a number of questions around climate 
migration from Kiribati and New Zealand’s role in this issue. I argue that the proposal of this 
visa, and its subsequent dismissal, is an indicator of the broader geopolitics of New Zealand 
involvement in the Pacific region, where the focus of aid and development has shifted again 
with the Pacific Reset. This shift to focus on partnership and PICs such as Kiribati leading 
development priorities meant this Humanitarian Visa was not an appropriate response to 
potential climate change related displacement. There is a larger emphasis on PICs being seen 
as partners as opposed to traditional donor and recipient relationships with the goals of the 
Pacific Reset (ERS, 2018; Peters, 2018). This stance appears to go against the traditional power 
relations in development and the geographic imaginaries of the Global South as ‘other’ and in 
need of Global North assistance, that previous chapters have argued are part of traditional 
climate migration narratives (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015, 2010; Kothari, 2005; Kothari and 
Wilkinson, 2010).  
 
However, there may still be a place for a Humanitarian Visa in the future and some such as 
Matias (2020) suggests that a visa may be an appropriate solution to some of the issues with 
climate displaced peoples in future, particularly in regards to the UN Convention issues. An 
outlier to the suggestions for PAC and RSE changes or a climate change visa, one participant 
recounted a suggestion by a World Bank Pacific Possible report (Curtain et al., 2016) to open 
borders to Kiribati:  
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“There’s a World Bank report on migration [..] they had a recommendation in there 
that New Zealand […] should just open our borders to everybody from Tuvalu and 
Kiribati. […] It would provide an outlet for people in those two countries who did 
need to start to move, of course it would be only the wealthy who could afford to get 
across. But it would just help act as a bit of a, as a release valve. And it would have 
[…] no significant impact on our labour market or on anything here. And I, I think 
that’s a great idea. Just say if you’re from Kiribati or Tuvalu, you don’t need a visa, 
just, or you know you maybe need a visa just so we know you’re coming but you 
know, just come. So, I think we should be looking at mechanisms like that, and 
expanding other sorts of mechanisms that are in existence to allow people to move 
more freely.” (Key Informant 6) 
This suggestion to open New Zealand and Australian borders to Tuvalu and Kiribati citizens 
to address the issues of climate change in PICs, makes a strong statement about what the 
relationship between New Zealand and Kiribati could be in future. This would suggest a 
relationship where New Zealand recognises responsibility for the impacts nations such as 
Kiribati face, and the notion of being ‘neighbours’ extending to assistance in the form of open 
borders. However, given the findings of this chapter, it appears that in the case of New Zealand 
and Kiribati, discussions of a Humanitarian visa will not re-emerge for some time yet with the 
suggestion by policymakers of a re-evaluation in 2024. In addition, while approaches by NGOs 
and the New Zealand Government appear to be focused on allowing Kiribati and other PICs to 
lead and contribute to the issue, it remains to be seen if this will be effective, and if traditional 
power relations of aid, adaptation and development can be addressed.  
 
6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the ways in which New Zealand NGOs and Government are 
approaching climate change migration in Kiribati. The findings of this chapter show that the 
approaches taken in Kiribati are embedded in the broader geopolitical relations between the 
two nations. NGOs and Government appear to be focused on ensuring that whatever occurs in 
terms of climate change adaptation or migration is based on what Kiribati and PICs have 
prioritised, as is reflected in the goals of the NZAP and the Pacific Reset policy.  
 
Comparing the findings of this chapter and the previous media analysis (Chapter 5), it appears 
that though discussion of the potential for migration is popular in the media and has received a 
certain extent of consideration in the government policies (e.g. the Cabinet papers) this is not 
the focus of the NZAP. Therefore, it is also not a focus of the development organisations 
 133 
operating in Kiribati and more generally in the Pacific region. However, though this is not 
currently a central focus, there is still work happening in the background by MFAT, should 
climate migration become necessary in future. Thus, this suggests there is more nuance to this 
conversation than the dominant, Western-based, narratives represent in relation to Kiribati.  
 
This chapter has argued that climate change migration in relation to Kiribati and New Zealand’s 
approaches is still a developing issue surrounded by much uncertainty. This uncertainty was 
reflected in the NGO and Government Informants discussions and approaches to climate 
change that are still based on continued discussion and research in the region. Despite this 
uncertainty, the results reveal a clear sense of New Zealand actors responsibility to assist the 
population of Kiribati as this nation transitions to a future in a changing climate. However,   
this chapter also emphasised the importance of Kiribati and PICs leading conversation on 
approaches to climate change. This involves issues of knowledge, power and development in 









Knowledge, Justice and Climate Change Migration 
Moving Forward 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters have mainly focused on the narratives of climate change from the media, 
and the approaches and stances of New Zealand’s Government and NGOs. Chapter Five 
situated the role that dominant knowledge has for forming discourses surrounding climate 
change and migration. Chapter Six subsequently argued that despite the dominance of climate 
migration in representations of Kiribati, there is also nuance in narratives of climate change 
migration, and New Zealand’s development and climate change approaches do not necessarily 
follow the common representations of climate migration.  
 
This chapter will explore further how dominant knowledge (and often Western science) has 
shaped this issue and what might change over time. Kiribati is not silent on issues of climate 
change and there is capacity in the nation to adapt to climate change or make migration 
decisions. It is the perspectives and approaches to Kiribati and knowledge and worldviews that 
this chapter will focus on, as well as how justice and responsibility are conceptualised in this 
discussion. This chapter aims to address the final two research questions:  
1. What are the different perspectives of the New Zealand Government, NGOs and New 
Zealand based I-Kiribati on climate migration, adaptation and approaches taken to 
Kiribati? Have these shifted over time?  
2. How do notions of climate justice and responsibility affect issues of climate change 
migration and adaptation, particularly with regards to New Zealand’s approaches in the 
Pacific? 
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I have argued that this issue of climate change migration is still developing and there is 
uncertainty around what might occur, further asserting that whatever approaches are taken, it 
is crucial that Kiribati and PICs lead. This chapter will consider further the perspectives of New 
Zealand-based I-Kiribati on the issue and what this leadership might look like. I will argue that 
climate migration in relation to Kiribati presents an issue that is based on different worldviews 
and understandings of knowledge. It is crucial for Kiribati to lead on issues of climate change 
to allow for more contextually appropriate approaches to be implemented. Based on 
discussions with key informants in Chapter Six and this chapter, I argue that industrialised 
nations such as New Zealand have a role to play through taking climate change action, as well 
as supporting PICs such as Kiribati through following the wishes of these nations. 
 
7.2 Knowledge and differing worldviews in climate change  
This section will explore the different perspectives that have already been hinted at in the 
findings of the media analysis (Chapter Five) and the interviews by discussing the views of 
New Zealand based I-Kiribati. This section will discuss knowledge and differing worldviews, 
two aspects that are key to understanding and further analysing the disagreements, debates and 
discursive construction of ‘climate refugees’ and ‘climate migrants’ from Kiribati. One of these 
key contrasting points is the tensions between local knowledge and Western knowledge in 
understanding and responding to climate change.  
 
7.2.1 Western and outside knowledge in climate change: space for local 
knowledge?  
The previous parts of this thesis have clearly established the dominance of Western worldviews 
and outside knowledge in the construction of ‘climate refugees’ and climate migrants. This is 
visible in the dominant media representations, as well as the involvement of international 
organisation such as NGOs in climate change approaches and also in development aid.  
 
From speaking with New Zealand NGOs and I-Kiribati, it became clear that there are some 
differences between Kiribati’s current approach and the media and mainstream representations 
of that country. One NGO Key Informant mentioned that these ideas of climate change 
migration were put on Kiribati from the outside:  
“I think it would be fair to say that the climate narrative definitely gets driven by 
outsiders, and almost imposed upon Kiribati people. And I think that  maybe it's just 
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about finding a way to get that knowledge that we have access to here in New Zealand 
to Kiribati people in Kiribati in a way that they can sort of understand it and choose 
to take action from it” (Key Informant 11)  
The findings of the previous two chapters and literature support the assertions of this Key 
Informant, as it has been established that Kiribati and other PICs currently do not plan to 
migrate except as a last resort (see: Farbotko et al., 2018; Noy, 2017). This links to the 
prevalence of Western based scientific knowledge in climate change discussion, and to the 
‘universalised’ understandings of climate that separates the climate from cultural and local 
scales (Hulme, 2008; Mahony and Hulme, 2018). I-Kiribati Key Informants discussed the 
dominance of this Western understanding of climate change:  
“… then of course people feel like science is put in a way that makes people feel like 
science is something we need to believe. I mean science has got a status, so that 
[science] against the actual experiences of people […] that’s hard. Yeah because then 
people feel they have to verify their own knowledge to what their situation is which 
is not considered scientific.” (Key Informant 1)  
This points to the ‘status’ that is given to science in climate change discussions, reflecting more 
broadly the positioning and power of science and Western knowledges in climate change and 
development (Mahony and Hulme, 2018). Similarly, another participant pointed out the 
capabilities of those in Kiribati that are often overlooked:  
“I think come and live in Kiribati and see for yourself [..] it’s being affected by 
climate change, sure. But there’s a lot of positive stuff, people are resilient, and […] 
they’re working, you know if they wanted to leave tomorrow they could leave 
tomorrow, but […] life carries on, let me put it that way. And whatever they get 
impacted by they’ll just roll with the waves I suppose.” (Key Informant 8) 
This suggests the adaptability and resilience of the people of Kiribati to environmental changes. 
While indigenous communities have long faced impacts from environmental change they have 
also used traditional knowledge to adapt successfully (Bryant-Tokalau, 2018; Macchi, 2008). 
This reinforces the need for local and indigenous knowledge to be included more in discussions 
of climate change and migration. The perspectives of Pacific communities and leaders that are 
often not heard must also be supported (Hayward et al., 2020).  
 
Related to this is also the way that climate change is perceived in daily lives. Key Informant 2 
discussed her experiences of witnessing firsthand people in Kiribati moving from their homes 
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because the land had become eroded. She noted how the impacts of climate change became a 
part of daily life that people became used to:  
“Because of sea level rising […] [climate change is] something that we back home, 
living there, it’s like a daily, daily issue and concern […] So it’s like constant, [a] 
constant of the people living there. […] when I discuss it with family members I think 
some of them because they’re used to living like that so it’s not really like something 
of a like as big […] if you go to another country and come back and then you will be 
able to see [climate change impacts]. […] it’s a really big issue here.” (Key Informant 
2) 
It was also noted that those who had seen and experienced the impacts of climate change were 
more concerned about it. This may suggest an observational source of information about 
climate change and its impacts (Rudiak-Gould, 2014) rather than knowledge of climate science. 
While local knowledge and scientific knowledges are often separated as a binary, it should be 
noted that these knowledges are often blurred and merged, do not remain static, and are always 
changing (Campbell and Barnett, 2010; Rudiak-Gould, 2014, 2013). Other I-Kiribati agreed 
that while climate change was a major issue in Kiribati, it was not something that all people 
living in Kiribati were aware of, or believed in. Key Informant 11 who had worked in Kiribati 
and had family links there supported this point:  
“I think that… when you're living in Kiribati, there's a whole lot more sort of 
immediate concerns. And climate change and sea level rise kind of just seems like 
something very far away. Whereas a lot of families are just trying to get their kids 
through school, get enough money to feed their family. And I think there are a lot 
more, yeah, immediate sort of concerns that people have, that and a lot of people I 
think, don't have enough knowledge about what climate change is, is another thing?” 
(Key Informant 11) 
According to these participants, the day to day challenges of life were a bigger focus for many 
I-Kiribati. This finding is supported by other studies of PICs where it has been found that 
communities prioritise development and livelihoods above climate change (Iati, 2008; Nunn et 
al., 2014; Remling, 2020; Walshe et al., 2018). In addition, Key Informants discussed how 
there was a lack of information available to those in Kiribati to make their own choices about 
climate change:  
“I come from a very big extended family and many of them don’t have the basic 
knowledge […] that drive different angles to climate change, they don’t even, it’s not 
really a feature in their – it’s not even important. So for them to participate in thinking, 
they have to start from scratch. Someone has to provide information in a Kiribati 
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appropriate way that ordinary people can understand. Maybe not just written but like, 
information evening where people talk about it, because that’s kind of more their 
way.” (Key Informant 1)  
These Key Informants raise several important points about the construction of climate 
migration. Firstly, they note that climate change is not an important part of daily lives for many 
I-Kiribati. Instead, the focus is on the immediate challenges of their lives such as school and 
finances. This reflects the previous findings where it was stated that development in general 
was often the focus of work in Kiribati. Secondly, there are issues of accessibility to knowledge 
about climate change for those living in Kiribati. Key Informant 1 notes that if local I-Kiribati 
are to be involved in these discussions they would have to ‘start from scratch’. Thus, the 
importance of presenting knowledge in a culturally appropriate and accessible manner is 
emphasised, for example, through radio or in person meetings with the local language and 
protocols, or by those local to the community  (Nunn, 2010, 2009; Rudiak-Gould, 2014).  
 
Access to information around climate change in Kiribati can also be linked to general 
disagreement and uncertainty in relation to climate change. For example, Key Informants 
suggested the debates going on over climate change were not only in Kiribati but a global 
occurrence:  
“I think because climate change is, is in a sense, like, it’s quite a new concept for us 
and we haven’t reconciled, […] I mean there’s still debates are raging whether 
[climate change is] even happening or not you know?” (Key Informant 8) 
This perspective highlights again that the issue of climate change, migration and adaptation in 
Kiribati are embedded in larger challenges of climate change governance where there is still 
uncertainty on what the future impacts of climate change will be. For example, there is 
uncertainty around the effects climate change for Kiribati as shorelines are changing, with some 
eroding while there is evidence of accretion in other areas (Rankey, 2011; Webb and Kench, 
2010). Additional challenges arise in PICs in relation to disagreements and uncertainty among 
PICs populations about the effects and existence of climate change (Iati, 2008). 
 
Though this section has argued for the importance of inclusion of local and indigenous 
knowledges in discussion of climate change migration, this is not intended to ‘romanticise’ 
local and indigenous knowledges and communities as post-development approaches and other 
studies have been criticised of doing (Forsyth, 2013; Goldman et al., 2018; Ziai, 2015). As 
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Chapter Five touched on, there is disagreement and uncertainty around approaches and within 
Kiribati there is no single position on the issue both internationally and in-country. However, 
it is clear that approaches to climate change have been dominated by outside knowledge, 
something that is potentially beginning to shift. Thus, there is a need to incorporate indigenous 
and local perspectives that are constantly evolving over time (Goldman et al., 2018).  
 
7.2.2 Education and awareness  
One aspect of climate change migration that was discussed by many of the I-Kiribati Key 
Informants, as well as some NGO Informants, was the idea of education and awareness of 
climate change and the potential need for migration. There are differences in the 
understandings and awareness of climate change within Kiribati: 
“Even in Kiribati when you talk to some of the locals, and some of the Unimane, 
which are the elders, they’ll say 'no Kiribati has always been this way'. And then you 
speak some other elder and say ‘oh no, it’s really bad’ like they’ve seen changes in 
the last 20 years”(Key Informant 8)  
This difference highlights the themes of previous chapters around the uncertainty and 
developing nature of this issue and the role that knowledge plays. Access to information was 
also involved in these issues of awareness:    
“[Within Kiribati] it's incredibly hard to access internet and resources, so I think it'd 
be fair to say that most people don't have the facts when it comes to climate change, 
and they don't know themselves what's actually happening, but simply because they 
can't access that information” (Key Informant 11)  
Access to information that is appropriate was also important for access (e.g. information in I-
Kiribati rather than English, or in verbal forms rather than written). I-Kiribati informants all 
stated that they had the advantage of knowing English and having lived in New Zealand or for 
some time, hence being aware of the dominant Western understandings of climate change. This 
also links back to arguments touched on in Chapter Five about lack of media coverage within 
Kiribati related to climate change issues (See: Korauaba, 2014). Additionally, studies have 
suggested the Government of Kiribati approaches climate change in a top-down way, and 
communication goes ‘one way’ (Korauaba, 2014). Though this is beyond the scope of the 
current research, it does suggest there may be difficulty accessing climate change information 
in Kiribati.  
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Another participant argued for the need to educate those in Kiribati on the various angles and 
perspectives on climate change, not only in Western science. This would allow them to be 
prepared for the future if climate change impacts did become serious so they could make an 
informed decision:  
“People have to explain it properly not just like in a simple [way] […] If the world’s 
changed and there’s more damage caused to the environment which is affecting 
Kiribati, then there is a problem. And we need to be, we can’t be in denial about it 
because the impact [affects] lots of people, yeah so we need to prepare peoples 
thinking, you know what do they want to do about it.” (Key Informant 1) 
Rather than what she terms a ‘simple way’ this Key Informant consistently pushed for the need 
to focus on ensuring people in Kiribati were educated and made aware of climate change in a 
culturally appropriate manner. There have been awareness-raising activities in Kiribati, 
through for example, the Kiribati Adaptation Project (Dean et al., 2017; Kay, 2008). More 
generally, PICs Governments have focused on awareness-raising campaigns and activities 
though doing this effectively can be difficult (Iati, 2008). Indeed, it is crucial that such 
awareness and education is inclusive and based on local systems rather than pushing outside 
values on PIC communities (Nunn et al., 2014). Connected to these issues of access and ability 
to learn about climate change for informed decisions was education about climate change in 
schools. There were conflicting accounts of the teaching of climate change in Kiribati schools 
with one I-Kiribati Informant noting their education in Kiribati:  
“we were not taught in school [...] the first time I personally became aware of the 
issue [of climate change] is when I started undergrad studies […] and then going back 
and working in the [Kiribati] Government […] I learn of these policies, we’ve had 
them but we were never really taught [these policies] in schools. So I, yeah, I think 
like there should be more of the awareness in education in especially the education 
sector, yeah. So that like growing up as a kid you would know your options and like 
just being aware of the issue that’s going on and knowing what to do to reduce your 
impact on, and then adapting and being resilient and that kind of environment.” (Key 
Informant 2)  
This Key Informant notes their lack of education around climate change and the Government 
of Kiribati’s climate change policies. However, contrasting to this was correspondence with a 
Kiribati Government employee. This employee stated that formal education occurred through 
the curriculum, and that public awareness was occurring through climate change awareness 
programs as part of projects and ministry consultations with the public. Generally, this 
education was part of specific areas such as agriculture or sanitation or food security because 
 141 
climate change is ‘cross-cutting’. However, it was also noted that this was mainly in South 
Tarawa and there was a gap between here and the outer islands. These differing accounts of 
education suggest that climate change education may be shifting over time to be more 
incorporated into the curriculum in Kiribati communities. It is clear that Key Informants 
perceived knowledge and awareness as a key part of issues around climate change migration 
and adaptation in Kiribati.  
 
7.2.3 Context specific knowledge, trust and religion  
The previous section began to touch on the role that context has for the way issues of climate 
change are discussed and understood in Kiribati. Context is an important factor in addressing 
climate change and more generally for development issues. Knowledge, awareness and 
appropriate approaches to climate varies geographically, particularly in PICs where there are 
often differences in these factors between the rural and central islands within nations (Nunn, 
2010, 2009). A clear point that emerged from most of the Key Informants was the role that 
local context plays in climate change issues such as migration or adaptation. Some sources of 
information are trusted or valued over others. A key example of this is the role of religion and 
religious leaders.  
 
As the context chapter has noted, Religion is of central importance in Kiribati with 57 percent 
of the population being Roman Catholic, and 31 percent being part of the Kiribati Uniting 
Church (a Protestant Church). Less than 1% of the population have no religious affiliation (U.S. 
Department of State, 2019). I-Kiribati Informants discussed the central role that religion plays 
in Kiribati, and the potential influence this had for how climate change (both adaptation and 
migration) conversations occurred and were understood:  
“[I-Kiribati] need to be given that opportunity, the information so that they can think 
about [climate change] too. Because a lot of them are in denial no matter what. You 
know they been looking at that, especially, especially because it’s a Christian country 
and I think that also the leaders of the Catholic and other churches, they still believe 
that God wouldn’t do that, wouldn’t purposely destroy a whole nation. Yeah, so, they 
still have that faith that they are being looked after. But I, I still think that you need 
to look at different angles of the problem. But in order to do that, people need to be 
educated about it, yeah, and the education can come from their own people too, it 
doesn’t have to come from foreign people all the time” (Key Informant 1)  
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Here the role of religious beliefs that has been covered in both the media analysis and previous 
chapter is noted again – signalling the role of these organisations and beliefs in decisions. This 
point links back to the need for education and for a variety of perspectives being included in 
conversations and education around climate change issues. This informant also makes a point 
about how the education that needs to happen does not have to come from foreigners, but can 
also come from Kiribati itself. Another noted the trust some have in these institutions:  
“… some of my family say, ‘oh no like just believe’, because we’re like more 
religious, so like I can see the differences in their beliefs and perceptions, they’re like: 
‘oh no, it’s scientists do not determine [Kiribati’s future]’” (Key Informant 2)  
Again, this supports the important role that local context and beliefs like religion have for 
climate change issues. Another noted this:  
“Kiribati itself is a very religious place you know what I mean? And then some people 
believe the oh God created Kiribati so it’ll be there, you know. But one really good 
evidence one of the islands is out of the map at the moment.” (Key Informant 3) 
This I-Kiribati Informant discussed how some people believe God would not let Kiribati 
become uninhabitable, but went on to note that some smaller islands within Kiribati from their 
childhood have disappeared. This Key Informant also spoke about the potential positive role 
churches might have for action and education around climate change:  
“And it depends on who tries to tell them [about climate change] as well. Like if I 
tried to convince my parents […] you’re wasting your time you know? I keep on 
thinking the church could play a really big part in the education bit of it. Because 
people listen to them, they trust them, and if, if not that they trust them but if whatever 
you say is in line with their self, you know like inner belief, you know they’ll agree 
with it and they’ll be interested in asking more questions…” (Key Informant 3)  
Finally, this Informant also explained how the Church could include climate change because 
these were “church-based teachings as well, keeping nature healthy and looking after creations 
and stuff”. Korauaba (2014) notes how there had been campaigns by Kiribati church leaders 
for action by industrial nations. However, it was unlikely these leaders had “reached a point 
where they would attack the very foundation of their faith - the Bible” and tell church-goers to 
discount the promise God made to Noah (Korauaba, 2014 p. 20). Others from religious 
affiliated NGOs supported this observation that the church could play a part in climate change 
in Kiribati. For example, Key Informant 10 hinted at how their organisation was trying to use 
the power churches held:  
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“Wherever you go in the Pacific, everything starts with a prayer. It always concludes 
with prayers. You often go into what they call a Talanoa session where you sit around 
and talk. Everybody goes to church. So we just sort of thought, why don’t we 
increasingly work with leaders, church leaders to influence them who will then 
influence their congregations […] but yeah, if you can influence the church you can 
influence anything in the Pacific” (Key Informant 10)  
The power of the church in the Pacific points to the role that these organisations could have in 
discussions around climate change, and also to the way certain forms of knowledge are trusted 
over others. Certainly, some studies have advocated for religious understandings to be included 
in climate change responses to contribute to climate change narratives that are meaningful 
locally (See for example: Fair, 2018). In Kiribati, churches have been involved in various 
awareness-raising activities for climate change action (Hermann, 2017; Kempf, 2012). 
However, it is also well established in the literature that religion can, at times, conflict with 
understandings of climate change and influence decisions around mobilities (Allgood and 
McNamara, 2017; Farbotko, 2005; Kelman et al., 2015; Oakes, 2019). Clearly then, the future 
role of churches and religion in climate change issues are variable and will require continued 
consideration.  
 
7.2.4 The Geopolitics of knowledge and climate change in Kiribati 
While Western knowledge often dominates discussion of climate change migration in Kiribati, 
there is also nuance to the discussion, and responses to the issue are continuing to change over 
time. Key Informants advocated for the inclusion of more of this nuance through involving 
local knowledge and perspectives. In reference to the media representations of climate change 
migration in relation to Kiribati, an I-Kiribati Informant stated that the dominant media 
representations need to be challenged:  
“I think for any media coverage of anything I think as long as Kiribati is at the centre 
and yeah that they are the ones giving their truth. Yeah I think that, that will be the 
way forward, because sometimes the media […] they have a certain thing about it if 
they want an angle on something they just go for it no matter what and they leave the 
other bits out so you only get one side of the story.” (Key Informant 1)  
Key Informant 1 argued for the need for those actually living in Kiribati to be the central focus 
and sharing their story. One NGO worker also noted this stating that:  
"What overall I would like to see in the media is a bit more of the Human story and a 
bit less of the sensational you know sinking islands. I mean, I think it’s great that the 
 144 
Media are using climate change as a kind of an awareness-raising alert. It’s not 
working. … We haven’t really done much to change our lives or anything as a result 
of all that.” (Key Informant 9)  
It appears that to a certain extent these media representations are beginning to be challenged 
and as Chapter Five demonstrated, there is nuance and contrasting perspectives in the media. 
It should also be noted that some I-Kiribati Informants felt that coverage from the media was 
important for spreading awareness about climate change so international action would be taken 
and funding might be available:   
“I think more of the benefits, because being portrayed as one of the [examples], it’s 
like an awareness of [climate impacts] […]  [Kiribati would] be struggling without 
the world knowing our struggles. So, I think the way that the media always portrays 
us an as an example of being at the forefront of climate change, having it captures the 
attention of other countries in the world as well, yeah. […] there could be more like, 
there could be more like fundings and help. [Because] if you don’t know, you don’t 
know. But if you know, and then it kind of, if it catches your attention and your belief 
and you believe there should be more help to this country (Key Informant 2)  
This I-Kiribati Informant points out several aspects of representations of Kiribati. While the 
nation is represented as being at risk, this brings attention to the issues of climate change 
globally. Another interesting point was that this awareness might help to increase funding and 
international assistance. This is similar to another NGO Key Informant’s point about President 
Maamau’s approach to climate change and his focus on adaptation rather than the ‘Migration 
with Dignity’ policy of his predecessor Tong:  
“… the current, our president, he's sort of more interested in developing like 
infrastructure, and improving the development of Kiribati. So I think he tries to move 
away from that climate change rhetoric because if you say that Kiribati is going to 
sink in 50 years, then why would countries want to come in and give aid if the 
country’s just not going to be there? So I think he's trying to change that rhetoric to 
sort of say, well not Kiribati is still going to be here. So let’s try to improve the lives 
of people now rather than focus yeah, I don’t know that’s what I could sort of gather 
from it. (Key Informant 11) 
This emphasises the important role that outside approaches and understandings of climate 
change have, and the way that development and climate change finance have been linked to 
these understandings. Webber’s (2013) discussion of performativity by Kiribati to enact 
vulnerability in order to receive climate change adaptation financing is relevant to this view 
and the approaches of Maamau. This hints at the way that Kiribati Government may be 
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approaching climate change in a way that fits with the global governance of climate change. 
Though this is beyond the scope of the current project, this is an area that future research could 
explore further. This also raises questions about the extent to which Kiribati will be able to lead 
climate change issues on the nation's own terms if it needs to conform to Western 
conceptualisations and approaches. This Key Informant also highlighted how aid and climate 
change assistance occurred in Kiribati:  
“I think when there are climate change focused initiatives in-country, it's coming from 
outside funding. So, it'll be like NGOs based in New Zealand or Australia or maybe 
like, MFAT or DFAT. Who say if you've got a climate change focus to your project 
or your organization, we’ll provide funding for something. So I think, I don't know 
how accurate it will be to say but it feels like a lot of it's donor driven, not like local 
people might see it as an issue, therefore, they're taking this on.” (Key Informant 11) 
This hints at earlier discussions of climate change being ‘folded’ into development through the 
‘mainstreaming’ of adaptation into development (see Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010; Newll, 
2004; Webber, 2016). The points made by Key Informants in this section suggest that Kiribati’s 
approaches to climate change are informed by the power of differing worldviews and what 
knowledge is dominant and valued.  
 
7.3 Justice, responsibility and climate change migration 
In Chapter Six, notions of New Zealand’s responsibility were discussed in relation to the 
geopolitical relationships and responses to climate change. Reinforcing the arguments of 
Chapter Six, there was recognition by Key Informants of the responsibility New Zealand has 
as a neighbouring and industrialised country to assist PICs such as Kiribati in a transition 
towards a future in a changing climate. When Key Informants were asked their views on justice 
and responsibility, there were differing perceptions on what responsibility and justice would 
look like, ranging from traditional notions of individual responsibility to that of collective 
responsibility. Understanding these varying views of responsibility is helpful to understand 
what climate justice might look like for Kiribati and other PICs. In this section, ideas of 
responsibility and climate justice will be discussed in more detail based on discussions with 
the Government and NGO Informants, and the New Zealand based I-Kiribati.  
 
There were mixed perspectives on who was responsible for climate change migration in 
relation to Kiribati. While many NGO Key Informants saw New Zealand as responsible (see 
Chapter Six), most of the I-Kiribati and some NGO Key Informants felt there was a shared 
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responsibility of New Zealand but also something that globally needed to be worked on since 
this is something that impacts the world:  
“I think climate change is not an issue for Kiribati on its own. A lot of people are 
contributing to that, especially the big countries. So, I think there is a responsibility 
and it’s an ongoing thing. [there are] ties and histories in the past between Kiribati 
and New Zealand in terms of phosphate […] so I think that’s another you know sort 
of factor […] New Zealand has a responsibility there as well. And we’re in the Pacific 
so we should be helping each other. […] climate change I think is the biggest thing 
that I should say not only New Zealand but you know it’s everyone’s problem and 
they should help each other. (Key Informant 3) 
This Key Informant argues for New Zealand’s responsibility due to current contributions to 
climate change but also by drawing on events such as New Zealand’s involvement and historic 
ties to Kiribati through phosphate mining. However, this informant makes a point about shared 
responsibility globally for climate change. This perspective is contrasting to the other 
perspectives discussed so far in the literature and findings where there is more of a sense of 
individual responsibility from developed nations (Dreher and Voyer, 2015; Farbotko et al., 
2018; Klepp and Herbeck, 2016). However, the I-Kiribati Informants views point to the 
recognition by PIC communities that despite being presented as innocent victims of climate 
change, that through consumption and participation in global systems they do contribute to 
anthropogenic climate change (though to a smaller extent than industrialised nations) 
(Campbell and Barnett, 2010; Kirsch, 2020; Rudiak-Gould, 2014). Another I-Kiribati 
Informant echoed this view stating that the focus should not be on blaming, but everyone taking 
responsibility for contributions to climate change:  
“People? Like you know. I mean like us [I-Kiribati] too because we all consume these 
things in life […] we’re not labelled as one of, yeah as people as a country like as 
responsible for climate change, but I feel like I don’t want to, I don’t really like 
pointing fingers, but I believe all of us are people, because even like for me 
consuming these products that are produced in big factories, big industries, I still feel 
responsible for it.  […] there has to be a collective effort to like, to address issues of 
climate change, it doesn’t work with just one person it has to be everyone. Big 
businesses, politics and everyone, individuals.” (Key Informant 2) 
These views reflect the idea of shared responsibility and how it is difficult to pinpoint one 
specific group or organisation who is responsible for historic events. The Informants 
perspectives reflect ideas of shared collective responsibility suggested by Young (2011) in her 
social connection model of responsibility. This model of responsibility is forward looking and 
 147 
based on the social and political connections between people globally, compared to backward 
looking liability models of responsibility (Young, 2011). However, it should be noted that often 
there is reluctance from high-income nations to acknowledge their responsibility for impacts 
of climate change in developing nations (Klepp and Herbeck, 2016). It is interesting that the I-
Kiribati raised this idea of collective responsibility, while the majority of NGOs and 
Government Key Informants were focused on New Zealand and other larger emitting countries 
taking responsibility for their contributions to anthropogenic climate change.  
 
Connected to these ideas of responsibility are notions of climate justice. While PICs are some 
of the least contributing to anthropogenic climate change, they also face some of the worst 
impacts from climate change (Dreher and Voyer, 2015; Nawrotzki, 2014). Therefore, when 
discussing climate change migration from PICs, there are also questions of justice (Dreher and 
Voyer, 2015; Farbotko et al., 2018). Key Informants were asked what they thought a just 
outcome would be for this issue, and if this would be possible. There were two key viewpoints 
on justice in relation to this issue: First, there were those who felt no just outcome is possible; 
second those who felt there was some possibility for forms of justice but ultimately the situation 
was still one of injustice.  
 
There were a number of reasons that Key Informants felt there could not be a just outcome. 
One reason was the uneven impacts of climate change as Kiribati has not contributed much to 
climate change:  
“I don't think there can be a just outcome, because I think climate change isn't the 
Pacific’s fault. Like, I mean, sure, like we contribute to climate change, but overall 
Western countries have contributed more to our issues, and so I don't know what a 
just outcome would look like for Kiribati people who basically have just been living 
their lives going along, as they’ve always done and haven't contributed that much at 
all to this global problem.” (Key Informant 11)  
This Informant also went on to suggest that maybe a just outcome would be Western nations 
adhering to their climate change commitments. However, she explained how even with 
mitigation it seemed unlikely that climate change impacts would be prevented and Kiribati 
would be badly affected:  
“I have no idea what a just outcome look like because the way I see it is, I don’t think 
realistically we're going to solve climate change in a timeframe that would allow […] 
we’re just going to increasingly have more and more problems that are just going to 
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be compounded by climate change, so I don’t know what a just outcome would be, 
unless maybe Western countries stick to their like, their you know their climate 
change commitments, or things that they’ve signed to maybe that could be a just 
outcome but I still feel like in the end we're gonna be affected worse by it regardless.” 
(Key informant 11) 
Similarly, one Key Informant from a climate change organisation saw no option for a just 
outcome for the Pacific. She spoke about her mother whose grave was near a lagoon in a Pacific 
Island Country and how she was concerned sea level rise would mean she had to be moved, 
stating that:  
“… a just outcome would be that [my mother] overlooks the lagoon and a big fear of 
mine is that one day that lagoon will just sweep her away, and that’s a big fear” (Key 
Informant 12) 
She also elaborated on how people might choose to remain in PICs even if they are affected by 
climate change:  
“That is the attitude, you know it’s like I was born here, I’m going to die here, and so 
yeah there is no just outcome, no incentive [to move] can be good enough.” (Key 
Informant  12) 
This draws on the ideas of the consequences of migration surrounding the loss of culture, 
identity and community (Kelman et al., 2015; McNamara et al., 2018). Here there is no just 
outcome for these losses even if migration takes place. 
 
Another NGO Informant noted how approaches to climate change should be focused on 
reducing how bad the injustices are because injustice could not be avoided:  
“I feel like we’re just kind of making a horrible situation less bad, as, as little 
damaging as possible, but the fact- we just need to confront that this just, from start 
to finish an injustice, however we soften the blow, it’s still a blow […] there’s nothing 
about people having to confront in their individual lives, in their family lives, in their 
community lives, in their cultural existence, having to change and dislocate and losing 
all those things that are of intrinsic value. So there’s a positive future, you know those 
cultures will survive, they will adapt, they will find new ways of being, and may even 
thrive, but something’s being lost.” (Key Informant 7) 
The New Zealand Government Informant also discussed this view, focusing on the scale 
of unjust outcomes possible:  
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“In terms of is there any just outcome on climate change and relocation […]  my 
personal reflection would be that the answer has to be no, but there’s a scale of how 
unjust those outcomes are […] it depends on how well the process is managed, how 
aspirational a response is, so sometimes I see in the academic literature “we need to 
protect peoples’ right to water and food” that’s very low aspiration, if all you’re 
providing is water and food. […] there are lots of other things I want in my life to be 
satisfactory beyond water and food. And so, there’s a whole spectrum there and I 
think […] when you look at the [New Zealand] action plan4 it talks about culture and 
self-determination and sovereignty, and that’s much more aspirational and much 
more challenging if we’re going to facilitate this process of relocation [...] if we can’t 
avoid it through mitigation and adaptation we have to deal with migration, then how 
can we deal with it in ways that reflects those higher order norms. Don’t have the 
answers to that question yet, it’s part of my job over the next couple of years.” (Key 
Informant 13)  
Referring to the action plan for climate migration (MFAT, 2018), this informant suggests that 
New Zealand is approaching this in a way that is trying to include self-determination and 
culture, rather than only basic human rights. Thus, while justice is not possible, it may be 
possible to minimise the injustices that do occur.  
 
There were also some who considered how justice might be achieved, mainly through New 
Zealand taking action and fulfilling global obligations:  
“A just outcome could be perhaps that we do our fair share and that we really put 
some proper money where our mouth is. I think, I mean through no fault of their own, 
Pacific countries are, are the countries globally that are most likely to be impacted by 
something that’s been completely out of their control, out of their influence. […] I 
mean hopefully [New Zealand] can do enough to try and prevent sea level rise being 
too, onerous. But […] I think we only, we pay lip service really.” (Key Informant 10) 
This returns to the ideas of Chapter Six where it was suggested that New Zealand took actions 
based not only on a sense of obligation and responsibility to the Pacific region, but also due to 
geopolitical factors in the area. Another felt that injustice went across a long time-scale and 
that worldviews should be adjusted to account for this:  
“to me all of this is about redressing an injustice, redressing a whole series of human 
rights violations, real and pending […] maybe if we […] adopt a different worldview, 
and think along a much longer horizon over centuries, maybe that’s where we can 
start imagining what a just resolution might look like. […] the injustice has already 
 
4 See the MFAT (2018) Cabinet Paper ‘Pacific climate change-related displacement and migration: a New 
Zealand action plan’ for further details, or the discussion of this paper in Chapter Three and Chapter Six.  
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happened, and so it’s hard to imagine that there’s any outcome here that is proactively 
positive, we’re not improving [anything]” (Key Informant 7)  
Thus, there were many different views on what justice would be, and responsibility was 
interwoven into this. I argue that these views on justice for Kiribati help to further understand 
the issues present with Western discourses of climate migration, as well as to understand what 
climate justice might look like for PICs.  
 
This section has shown that there are various perspectives on the responsibility for climate 
change migration/adaptation and achieving justice in relation to Kiribati. Respondents largely 
saw climate migration as a scenario where a just outcome was not possible. An NGO Key 
Informant summarised what justice might look like clearly:  
“I think Climate Justice to me would be a world in which Pacific Peoples can go about 
their everyday lives and constantly pursue a better standard of living for our own 
people, knowing that Western Countries are taking the responsibility of Climate 
Change off our shoulders. Climate Justice is where we, as Pacific Peoples, can be part 
of the solution but we don’t need to be pushing for/leading the action to solve a 
problem that we didn’t contribute to.” (Key Informant 11) 
This is an interesting perspective given the emphasis shown in other chapters that Kiribati 
should be leading on climate change issues. This suggests that while Kiribati should be making 
decisions around climate change, it is other countries that should be taking the action to address 
climate change. The next section will discuss further what it might look like for PICs and 
Kiribati to lead on climate change migration issues.  
 
7.4 What might it look like for Kiribati to lead on climate change and 
migration issues?  
Throughout this thesis there has been a consistent theme that Kiribati and other PICs should be 
leading issues of climate change migration and adaptation. Indeed, when discussing leadership 
of Kiribati on issues of climate change, it is crucial to recognise that in many respects, PICs 
are already leaders on climate change action. Communities, leaders, and activists in the Pacific 
region have rejected claims of discourses that they are passive victims of a changing climate 
change, instead advocating for international actions (Kirsch, 2020). Leaders such as former 
president of Kiribati Anote Tong and the Prime Minister of Tuvalu Enele Sopoaga have been 
vocal internationally about the need for climate actions and in climate change negotiations, and 
groups such as the Pacific Climate Warriors have also formed to push for climate action 
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(Kirsch, 2020; Ourbak and Magnan, 2018). PICs have been active in international negotiations 
for climate change agreements, being influential particularly considering the small size of these 
nations (Campbell and Barnett, 2010). Through organisations such as the Alliance for Small 
Island States (AOSIS) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
(SPREP), PICs have coordinated to collectively negotiate at COPs and in the UN (Campbell 
and Barnett, 2010; Ourbak and Magnan, 2018; Ryan, 2010). Thus, it was argued by those in 
this study that Kiribati and other PIC communities should be leading on the issue of climate 
change adaptation and migration. In particular, one NGO Informant highlighted the existing 
leadership on issues of climate induced displacement:  
“I think it will be interesting to see, because there’s a lot of ways in which Pacific 
governments are well ahead of New Zealand on an issue that New Zealand is having 
to grapple with too, for all of our coastal communities and different communities 
affected by climate change […] so when you consider that the governments of Fiji 
and Vanuatu already have strategies for climate induced displacement and how 
they’re going to deal with it in their countries, that yeah New Zealand is so far away 
from having anything like that we, because there are so many implications, that - 
political implications, I think that the [New Zealand] Government hasn’t been able to 
grapple with yet.” (Key Informant 7) 
This Key Informant's point reinforces that the Pacific region acts and leads on issues of climate 
change. PIC communities have also been a centre for climate change activities, contributing to 
the development and piloting of climate change strategies and adaptation (Lesa, 2020; Mcleod 
et al., 2019). Leading and sharing adaptation and mitigation strategies globally, PIC 
communities have incorporated local traditional knowledge, values and practices with science 
and technologies to counter the effects of climate change (Hayward et al., 2020; Lesa, 2020; 
Mcleod et al., 2019). This section will explore the potential for Kiribati to lead on issues of 
climate change migration and adaptation in more detail.  
 
Based on the policy and interviews, it appears that to some extent this leadership is already 
occurring in terms of the relationship that New Zealand has with Kiribati. For instance, in 
Chapter Six there was discussion about the Pacific Reset and the focus on working in 
partnership and breaking down traditional donor/aid relationships, and working on the 
priorities of Kiribati in terms of development – including climate change (MFAT, n.d.b; Peters, 
2018). I argue the PICs are also already taking the position of leading climate change related 
mobilities through vocalising the intention to remain in their home countries despite Western 
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NGOs/media constructions of climate refugees and climate migration. In the case of New 
Zealand this is also visible through the pause on the Experimental Humanitarian Visa until at 
least 2024 based on discussion with PIC leaders among other factors (MFAT, 2018). However, 
there remain questions about what it would look like for Kiribati to lead issues around climate 
change migration and adaptation, particularly with the recent changes in the way that leadership 
in Kiribati are approaching climate change.  
 
While Kiribati’s current approach is to adapt and not to focus on migration, before 2016 this 
issue was being approached differently, with former President Tong being focused on 
upskilling his people to migrate with dignity. Some Key Informants pointed out that while there 
are similarities between the approaches of these Presidents, the current approach is not focused 
on climate change migration options:  
“the President [Anote Tong] before was more into migration,  yeah migrating people 
because he believed that worse case scenario it’s going to be extreme and […] the 
land will be uninhabitable […] while this government is more like, like more 
encouraging people to like adapt to the changes that climate change brought in and 
then like try,  tries to connect with other government NGOs to like help with that, to 
adapt and to be resilient, I think that’s the different- kind of like difference. But I think 
the previous government as well was also, was also about adapting to the impacts, but 
it was considering that migration is one of the like, one of the options in case 
something, yeah in case it gets really extreme. While this Government’s not really 
encouraging refugee, like climate refugee, like yeah migrating for, because of climate 
change.” (Key Informant 2) 
The Government of Kiribati‘s current approach to focus on adaptation to climate change is in 
line with New Zealand’s support for the nation being mainly development and climate change 
adaptation projects, with climate change mobilities being investigated in the background (see 
Chapter Six). When thinking of future approaches, Key informants had a range of views and 
no clear way for Kiribati to address the issue emerged. Key Informant 3 noted that there was 
no obvious way to address the issue even with the previous Government of Kiribati’s purchase 
of land:  
“… for instance this place in Fiji. Even if Kiribati buy that place it wouldn’t replace 
Kiribati you know? We wouldn’t change the name and call it Kiribati. You know it’s, 
that’s not it, you know what I mean? […] we can’t replace Kiribati. I don’t know 
what the government could do about it because it’s a natural disaster […] it’s a slow 
process not like went and it’s gone. Yeah. It’s a slow process and I don’t know the 
way how are the government, what they going to do to maybe slow the process? They 
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can do the reducing you know emission and- but if it’s happening already I don’t 
know how to fix it. But maybe they know.” (Key informant 3)  
This informant echoes the perspectives on issues of justice and responsibility and that there is 
no good way to address this issue and no good outcome. Another noted the cultural connections 
of importance to I-Kiribati:  
“Our ancestors they have lived on that island for a long time. We can trace our 
genealogy roots to the spirits, yeah so everyone got, they have a genealogy, you know 
what is it in Māori? Whakapapa? You whakapapa back all the way back to the spirits, 
and then it turn into half-human, that’s how long people have been there. Yeah. And 
they’ve always managed their own issues. No one ever thought that Kiribati would 
disappear. […] If the worlds changed and there’s more damage caused to the 
environment which is affecting Kiribati then there is a problem. And we need to be, 
we can’t be in denial about it because the impact it’s about lots of people, yeah so we 
need to prepare peoples thinking, you know what do they want to do about it.” (Key 
Informant 1) 
The New Zealand Government Informant supported these complicated factors involved in 
migration due to cultural connections and legal differences stating the issues that arise that 
meant migration to New Zealand was not simple :  
“… people say “why don’t you just move?” it’s just not that easy […] we just think 
of private law, private property sort of transaction. Just sell that house and buy another 
one, but there are so many more factors at play that people don’t want to relocate. So 
with all the best intentions when people talk about New Zealand should open you 
know our doors to climate migrants, I think […] we just need to be careful how we 
target that good will, and how we use it. Because it does come from a place of 
goodwill, right? But we just need to make sure we’re thinking about what don’t 
people really want and need” (Key Informant 13) 
These complicated factors related to ancestral connections and the loss homelands will 
influence what climate change approaches look like in future from the Kiribati Government. 
However, even with these complex issues, not all I-Kiribati agreed with the government 
approach to focus on only adaptation. 
 
Though the current Government of Kiribati is not focused on climate change migration as a 
future option, there were a variety of opinions on this with several of the I-Kiribati Key 
Informants noting they thought migration still needs to be available:  
 154 
“And I’m so mad at it. Because adaptation it’s ok, but adaptation there is a point 
where you can’t adapt anymore. […] they can’t hold the young ones because their 
future there is nothing, they [older I-Kiribati] have their future, Kiribati will still be 
there within their lifetime and not in the worst situation. […] I prefer the migration 
with dignity because I think that one gives more like, it gives me the right to decide 
for myself if I should go or not. And the right for me to prepare for myself in terms 
of maybe getting a good education before migrating […] But if it’s just like adapt that 
means the door closed, you stay here and you die here, you know what I mean? I hate 
it, I hate it so much.” (Key Informant 3)  
This Key Informant who had migrated to New Zealand felt that taking away the option of 
migration with dignity for those still in Kiribati was problematic. Additionally, there remains 
uncertainty and debate over whether migration will be necessary for I-Kiribati in the future 
(Barnett, 2017, 2001; Donner and Webber, 2014). Key Informant Four suggests that both 
adaptation in Kiribati and migration are potentially necessary approaches to climate change:  
“I reckon [climate change migration or adaptation are] both good anyways, because 
some people want to want to start a new beginning and move for a better life you 
know, and then some people want to stay here, yeah, home is home. They don’t want 
to leave their home (Key Informant 4) 
This suggests that there is not one correct or ‘best’ approach to the issue but that there are 
different ways that would be dependent on what people want and need. So, this shows that 
there are two schools of thought and it might not be a matter of permanently migrating or 
remaining in Kiribati. The decision to migrate is complex and based on a number of factors 
such as economic, cultural, social and political reasons along with climate change impacts 
(Kelman et al., 2015; McNamara et al., 2018). It also appears that Kiribati is navigating climate 
change approaches based on the geopolitics in the region. Global governance of climate change 
in terms of aid and finance may influence what approaches are taken due to the dominance of 
Western views in climate change. These factors add to the uncertainty about future migration 
but is something that will have to be grappled with as this issue develops over time.  
 
A final area worth consideration is whether Kiribati should need to lead on this issue. As Key 
Informant 11 stated in the previous section, climate justice in this situation could be that the 
Pacific region did not need to be “pushing for/leading action to solve the problem that we didn’t 
contribute to”. Along with this, there is an emphasis on the need for industrialised nations to 
take responsibility for contributions to climate change through taking action to minimise 
impacts from climate change globally (Klepp and Herbeck, 2016; Mearns and Norton, 2010). 
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From this perspective, it is the place of developed countries to be supporting and leading action 
on climate change. However, this action and support need to account for the abilities and 
approaches that PICs want to take towards climate change. For example, I-Kiribati Informant 
1 advocated for the capabilities of Kiribati:  
“And I still think there is a lot of capability in Kiribati itself. People are 
knowledgeable about their situation and when I go there, last time I saw so many so 
called experts, expatriates. […] They are considered experts in their field so they I 
mean they lead work they’re like consultants and they yeah they work with people 
there but it’s still not how I would want it to happen […] I think that people in Kiribati 
need to be really acknowledged for what their capabilities are and then if they need 
help from outside then I think they determine how that should be.” (Key Informant 
1)  
This returns to the issues with local context and knowledge being less focused on and outside 
development experts leading climate change approaches. Thus, a balance needs to be reached 
where responsibility is taken for past and current contributions to climate change, but in a way 
that Kiribati is making choices. Returning to the idea of geographic imaginaries of PICs such 
as Kiribati, this section suggests the leadership helps to counter representations of these nations 
populations as passive and victims originating from Global North countries. One Key 
Informant noted that the work MFAT was doing on climate change related displacement issues 
offered a chance to improve these relationships:  
“My hope is that there’s actually a huge opportunity, to break down those traditional, 
kind of you know, neo-colonial relationships because New Zealand really should be 
trying to learn from what Pacific islands are putting forward.” (Key Informant 7) 
This is a useful consideration for the way that these discourses of climate migration might offer 
an opportunity for building relationships and connections, and for New Zealand to learn from 
Kiribati.  
 
7.5 Conclusion  
Knowledge and worldviews are central to the way that Kiribati is represented in relation to 
climate change as well as Kiribati’s responses to climate change. In this chapter I have argued 
that while Western knowledge of climate change has often dominated in these climate change 
migration conversations, there is also nuance to this discussion as approaches to the issue shift 
over time. Local and indigenous knowledge are being included in some cases and may continue 
to be included more in future as countries such as New Zealand focus on supporting Pacific 
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leadership and priorities. There are differences and similarities between Key Informants views 
of justice and responsibility to climate migration. Some Kiribati Informants view responsibility 
for climate change migration/adaptation as being a global issue for everyone which contrasted 
with New Zealand NGOs responses that focused mainly on the responsibility of New Zealand. 
However, most participants felt that no just outcome was possible if migration from Kiribati 
had to occur in the future. Finally, when thinking about what it could mean for Kiribati to lead 
on these issues I have argued that there are many questions that remain around whether Kiribati 
will be able to lead (even with policies like the Pacific Reset from New Zealand that focus on 
partnership) as Kiribati may still be conforming to discourses of vulnerability and Western 
approaches to climate change to receive aid and funding. It is therefore important that 
industrialised nations such as New Zealand support PICs such as Kiribati to lead on issues of 
climate change through contextually appropriate approaches to knowledge. This chapter, along 
with Chapters Five and Six, has established the findings of this research. The following final 










Kiribati and Climate Migration: Conclusions and 
Future Considerations  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has shown that climate migration is a complex and contested idea, that highlights 
broader issues of knowledge, discourse, and power relations between Western nations and 
those of the Global south. In this research, I have aimed to explore the ongoing debates over 
“climate refugees” and climate change induced migration in the Pacific region, climate change 
adaptation approaches, and New Zealand’s role in these issues. In doing so, I have examined 
representations of climate change regarding Kiribati, and the implications or consequences of 
these representations for the responses of both Kiribati and New Zealand to climate change. 
This project had four key questions:   
1. How has climate change in the Pacific region been represented by mainstream media 
groups? The specific focus has been in terms of migration and adaptation, specifically 
in relation to Kiribati and in representations by New Zealand.  
2. How do popular representations of climate migration reflect how the issue is 
understood and approached by New Zealand government, NGOs and policy makers 
who are involved in the issue?  
3. What are the different perspectives of the New Zealand Government, NGOs and New 
Zealand based I-Kiribati on climate migration, adaptation and approaches taken to 
Kiribati? How have these shifted over time?  
4. How do notions of climate justice and responsibility affect issues of climate change 
migration and adaptation, particularly with regards to New Zealand’s approaches in 
the Pacific? 
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To address these research questions I have used a post-structural approach to complete a 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis of news articles, and semi-structured interviews with Key 
Informants from the New Zealand Government and NGOs involved in development and 
climate change in Kiribati and the Pacific region, as well as New Zealand based I-Kiribati. The 
findings of this study reveal that the mainstream representations of Kiribati construct this 
nation as peopled by those who will inevitably having to migrate in future as victims of climate 
change, without agency. In contrast to these representations found in the media analysis, my 
results taken from researching the actual situation in the country assert that these popular 
perceptions of Kiribati do not align with the actual approaches being taken by New Zealand’s 
approaches in the region, where the focus is on adaptation and development to remain in-
country for the long-term.  
 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarise the research and synthesise the main findings from 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven to answer my research aim and questions. I will then outline the 
limitations of the project and suggest future research directions. The chapter will close with a 
final concluding statement of the research. 
 
8.2 Research Summary and Key findings  
In the first four chapters of this thesis I established the foundations of the research. Chapter 
Two analysed and outlined the relevant areas of literature that inform the research project. This 
focused on climate change, development, and climate migration debates over time, and 
responsibility and justice. I illustrated the dominance of Western knowledge and approaches 
to climate change issues, and the importance of post-structural ideas of knowledge, power and 
discourse to understand climate change migration. This chapter showed that while there have 
been numerous studies of climate migration in relation to the Pacific region and Kiribati, fewer 
studies have taken a post-structural approach, and minimal studies have examined the issue 
from the perspective of what role New Zealand actors have in the issue. For this reason, I chose 
to focus on what New Zealand’s role in climate migration issues are, and how these compare 
to mainstream representations of climate change migration and adaptation in relation to 
Kiribati.  
 
Chapter Three established the context of the two countries this thesis focuses on, Kiribati and 
New Zealand. To do this, the main events, actors, approaches and policies in the climate 
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change, development and governance spaces were outlined and analysed. I highlighted the 
existing geopolitical relations between Kiribati and New Zealand and how these contribute to 
the way climate migration and adaptation are currently approached and understood. I argued 
that these two nations are connected by issues of climate migration such as the climate refugee 
claim by I-Kiribati man Teitiota, and the 2017 Green Party suggestion of an Experimental 
Humanitarian Visa for Pacific people displaced by climate change. This chapter established a 
need to further investigate what role and responsibility New Zealand Government and NGOs 
have in these issues, and what current approaches and perspectives are. 
 
In Chapter Four I explained and justified the methodological approach and methods used in 
this thesis. I choose to take a post-structural approach. This was due to the relatively smaller 
number of studies that use this approach, but also because this methodology allows for in depth 
understandings of the perspectives, knowledges, discourses, and power relations involved in 
climate migration issues. This methodology was particularly well-suited to my method of a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis of news articles on climate migration and adaptation in relation 
to Kiribati and New Zealand. It was also helpful for the analysis of the different perspectives 
that arose from the semi-structured interviews with New Zealand NGOs, Government and New 
Zealand-based I-Kiribati. Finally, in this chapter I also considered my position as a Western 
researcher and the ethical implications of the research. I am very aware of my place as a 
Western researcher and how this impacts the knowledge that is produced by this research. I 
chose to focus on New Zealand organisations and New Zealand based I-Kiribati to reduce these 
power relations and ethical issues that arise from an outside researcher such as myself entering 
a Global South community such as Kiribati. 
 
In Chapter Five I analysed and discussed the results of the media analysis to answer the first 
research question: How has climate change in the Pacific region been represented by 
mainstream media groups? The specific focus has been in terms of migration and adaptation, 
specifically in relation to Kiribati and in representations by New Zealand. Through this 
analysis I explored the mainstream media representations of Kiribati, New Zealand, and 
climate change migration or adaptation. The findings show four key themes: i) the uncertainty 
and differing perspectives in relation to the need for climate migration from Kiribati; ii) the 
need for international responsibility on climate change issues; iii) development challenges as 
complicating climate change in Kiribati; iv) and science or development expertise dominating 
representations of climate change migration. While this Chapter showed there was some 
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nuance to the perspectives in the media, these articles were still largely dominated by Western 
ideas of Kiribati communities. Rather than the focus of the articles being on the agency, 
abilities and local knowledge of I-Kiribati, the discourses emphasise the danger Kiribati 
communities are in, vulnerability and victimhood. Interestingly, there was not much difference 
in the perspectives pushed by adaptation or migration focused articles.  
 
Representations of Kiribati in this media analysis showed simplistic views of migration, with 
only a small amount of articles touching on the complexity of migration decisions that were 
argued for in previous studies (e.g. Black et al., 2011; Morrissey, 2012). I have demonstrated 
the dominance of Western voices in the mainstream news coverage and suggest that there is a 
need for greater representation of Pacific communities in these mainstream news sources to 
counter “regimes of truth” (Foucault, 1980) that present Kiribati in this manner. Chapter Five 
also asserts that analysis of Kiribati such as this media analysis is needed to consider how 
representations of climate migration affect power relations between the Global North and 
Global South. I argue that mainstream media representations continue to support simplistic 
geographic imaginations of the Global South by those within the Global North, influencing 
public perceptions of PICs as ‘other’ and lacking agency. Finally, while the media analysis 
dominantly represents Kiribati in one way, I contend in chapter Six that this is not necessarily 
reflective of the approaches to this issue by the Government of Kiribati or other organisations.  
 
Research question two was addressed in Chapter Six, asking: How do popular representations 
of climate migration reflect how the issue is understood and approached by New Zealand 
government, NGOs and policy makers who are involved in the issue? Here I explored 
interviews with Key Informants from New Zealand NGOs and the Government to understand 
New Zealand’s role in issues of climate change migration in relation Kiribati. The findings 
reveal that issues of climate migration are embedded in much broader issues of climate change 
adaptation and governance, development aid, and the geopolitics of the Pacific region. The 
interviews also show that rather than focusing on climate migration, New Zealand and Kiribati 
development approaches are focused on maintaining the habitability of Kiribati so that the 
population can remain in-country in future. Though discussion of the potential for migration is 
popular in mainstream representations and has received a certain extent of consideration in 
government policies (e.g. New Zealand government Cabinet papers) this is not the focus of 
New Zealand’s aid in Kiribati. In assessing the focus and direction of this aid programme, I 
argue that the issue of climate change migration is more nuanced than discourses in the 
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mainstream media have suggested. This apparent disconnect between representations of 
Kiribati and the actual approaches of New Zealand’s development aid in Kiribati further 
advanced the argument of the previous chapters that climate migration is a developing issue 
surrounded by uncertainty.  
 
Additionally, Chapter Six highlighted that New Zealand’s role in Kiribati is embedded in the 
principles of partnership furthered by the Pacific Reset policy. As such, the focus is not on 
climate migration, as signalled by the dismissal of the 2017 Experimental Humanitarian Visa 
suggestion. Attention is instead on adaptation and development issues in line with the policies 
of the Government of Kiribati. However, the New Zealand Government does appear to be 
working on this issue in the background, through policy and research. The interviews with Key 
Informants suggested that the New Zealand government is keeping a range of potential options 
on the table from measures such as extensions to existing visas, all the way to open borders. 
Likewise, Key Informants felt that as a neighbouring and industrialised nation, New Zealand 
has a role and responsibility to assist Kiribati with issues of climate change, whatever form 
these responses might take. Clearly then, climate migration pathways are still being 
investigated in the background and there is a need for flexibility on these issues in case of 
future migration becoming necessary.  
 
The final findings chapter, Chapter Seven, aimed to address research questions three and four. 
Research question three asked: What are the different perspectives of the New Zealand 
Government, NGOs and New Zealand based I-Kiribati on climate migration, adaptation and 
approaches taken to Kiribati? Have these shifted over time? Climate migration clearly involves 
issues based around different knowledges, worldviews, and power relations. The findings of 
this chapter show that while climate migration is discursively constructed by Western 
knowledge, Kiribati has local and traditional knowledges and capabilities that should have a 
part in approaches to climate change issues. However, I-Kiribati informants highlighted the 
need for awareness and education about climate change impacts within Kiribati communities 
through contextually appropriate approaches. Locally effective communication mediums and 
trusted institutions could be used to increase access to information, education and awareness 
as well as support for local I-Kiribati perspectives in media. The media, Government and 
locally trusted institutions such as the Church all play a role in this. The need for Kiribati 
communities and actors to be leading climate change approaches was emphasised as a way to 
address uneven power and representations. This chapter reinforced the theme asserted 
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throughout this thesis, that it is crucial for Pacific perspectives to be included more in 
mainstream discussions of climate change issues.  
 
The final research question was addressed in the latter part of Chapter Seven: How do notions 
of climate justice and responsibility affect issues of climate change migration and adaptation, 
particularly with regards to New Zealand’s approaches in the Pacific? As Chapters Five and 
Six began to discuss, the Key Informants were clear that New Zealand has a responsibility to 
Kiribati (and the wider Pacific region) on issues of climate change due to contributions to 
climate change and close ties to the region. Whether this responsibility extended to migration 
depended on what approaches the people of Kiribati choose to pursue in future. The I-Kiribati 
informants in particular stressed that climate change is a global issue that entails a collective 
responsibility to take action. These different visions for responsibility and climate justice are 
useful for envisioning what Kiribati’s transition to a future in climate change might look like. 
However, the majority of participants felt that there can be no just outcome for the people of 
Kiribati in scenarios where climate migration must occur, something most felt was likely to 
occur in the future. Therefore, taking action to minimise the impacts of climate change is 
crucial. Based on both the findings of Chapter Six and Seven, I argue that industrialised nations 
such as New Zealand have a role to play in taking climate change action, as well as supporting 
PICs such as Kiribati through following the wishes of these nations. To a certain extent the 
Pacific Reset may signal this beginning to occur, with the focus on partnership and attempts to 
break down traditional donor/beneficiary relationships. Further questions around the ability to 
achieve this leadership can be raised given the evidence in these findings and past studies that 
suggests Kiribati may have to conform to global governance of climate change (e.g. enacting 
vulnerability) in order to gain donor aid for climate change (e.g. Webber, 2013).   
 
Overall, the findings of this thesis have demonstrated that climate migration remains a complex 
issue, that is more nuanced than mainstream representations may portray. In particular while 
these discursive constructions portray Kiribati communities as ‘helpless’, passive victims of 
climate change without agency, Kiribati populations have a range of knowledge and 
capabilities. As such, it appears that popular representations are not reflective of, or 
influencing, the approaches of Kiribati and New Zealand to climate change. The results suggest 
it is the role of nations such as New Zealand to support climate change action in Kiribati, 
whether that be migration or adaptation, while also taking global action to mitigate climate 
change. I argue that climate migration from Kiribati is still a developing issue with uncertainty 
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in terms of what the most appropriate future approaches are, and significant questions about if 
this will include international migration pathways. Understanding the way that popular 
representations portray Kiribati is useful for gaining insight into the way that discourse and 
Western knowledge can have a role in wider development approaches and aid in the Pacific 
region. I suggest that climate migration signals an iteration of geographical imaginations that 
maintain the idea of difference between the Global North and South. However, approaches of 
partnership and the focus on adaptation as well as attention to inclusion of local knowledge 
and approaches may help to break down these discursive constructions of climate migration 
from Kiribati.   
 
In this thesis I have examined climate migration through a post-structural lens that has focussed 
on the problematic nature of Western knowledge and the use of expertise dominating in issues 
of climate change and development (see Chapter Two). I intended to uncover the different 
ways climate migration in Kiribati is represented and understood through discussions with Key 
informants and a media analysis. I have been clear throughout this thesis that it is not my 
intention to speak for the people of Kiribati, nor is it to determine whether some form of climate 
migration might be a solution to the challenges of climate change. Therefore, it is not the nature 
of this thesis to provide policy recommendations for the New Zealand or Kiribati Governments, 
or stakeholders, on what should be done moving forward. I feel any such recommendations 
would undermine the purpose of this research, and contribute further to issues of Western 
research or experts knowledge being privileged over that of local knowledge. What is clear 
from a policy perspective is that there is a sense of partnership between leaders in Kiribati and 
New Zealand. This can be seen in the accounts of Kiribati and New Zealand governments 
focusing on climate change adaptation and development that is in line with the current policies 
and approaches chosen by the Government of Kiribati. Climate migration however, remains a 
background issue that is currently is not being pursued by Kiribati leaders. 
  
8.3 Limitations  
This study has a number of limitations. These are due mainly to the scope of the research and 
my positionality. First, as this is a Master’s thesis, there were geographic, financial and time 
limitations which ultimately resulted in travel to Kiribati for any length of time being 
unfeasible. This limited the scope of who could be spoken to, and I am aware that this omitted 
a large group of stakeholders in the form of government and NGO employees on the ground in 
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Kiribati itself, and I-Kiribati communities who might hold vastly different views to those I-
Kiribati living in New Zealand.  
 
Connected to this, the second limitation of this research comes from my positionality. From 
the beginning of this project I have attempted to remain reflexive and aware of my position in 
the research, and the ethical implications this has. I am conscious of my position as a Western 
researcher and the ethical implications of outside researchers entering communities such as I-
Kiribati that are often researched without the interests of these communities being considered. 
This ‘researcher’ and ‘researched’ relationship troubles me and is difficult to address. These 
challenges, and the above mentioned financial and time limitations, motivated me to explore 
this issue from New Zealand NGOs, Government and New Zealand based I-Kiribati 
perspectives, particularly given the current gap in research that looks at what role New Zealand 
actors plays in climate migration. I felt that taking this approach was more appropriate as it 
reduced the uneven power relations that arise from outside researchers entering a community 
for the purposes of research. However, taking this approach has limited the number of 
perspectives and voices that could be included and represented in this project. Though this 
approach has limitations, I hope through investigating and critiquing New Zealand approaches 
I have presented a nuanced understanding of the situation that sheds light on the issues with 
popular representations of climate migration, in a way that does not bring harm to the Kiribati 
community.  
 
The final limitation in this project is the media analysis. There are limitations due to the large 
number and the type of articles included in the analysis. A larger dataset was intentionally 
chosen because to my knowledge, few studies have conducted a large discourse analysis in 
relation to this issue. Instead most have instead focused on a specific newspaper or set of reports 
and analysed these in great detail (See for example: Farbotko, 2005; Bettini, 2013). The 
purpose of the Foucauldian media analysis with this large dataset was to provide an overarching 
understanding and comparison of the dominant representations of climate migration and 
adaptation. This would then allow me to compare how these discourses might differ from on 
the ground approaches to climate change. Finally, I limited this media analysis to articles 
written in English and accessible through the Factiva database. This reduced the scope of the 
analysis in terms of including local Pacific representations of climate change issues that might 
not be in English, or might other mediums such as social media, video or radio sources that 
may be popular in Kiribati and other PICs. However, the intention of this analysis was to 
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understand the dominant discourse of climate migration through popular representations of the 
issue in mainstream international media. I am confident that this analysis did provide a good 
overview of Western perspectives on the issue of climate migration.  
 
8.4 Recommendations for future research  
This study has raised a number of questions that were beyond the scope of the research but that 
future research could investigate further. Some suggestions for future research are now listed:  
1. In this research I have shown the role that New Zealand NGOs and Government in 
issues of climate change migration, from the perspective of both these organisations 
and New Zealand based I-Kiribati. It would be beneficial for a longer and more 
extensive study within Kiribati to explore the impacts of development and adaptation 
by these organisation and to establish what approaches are being taken in a range of 
communities. This could also investigate the perspectives and involvement of local 
organisations such as Churches, NGOs or community groups within Kiribati. This 
research being led by Pacific researchers using participatory methods could also expand 
the scope and overcome some of the barriers and ethical issues that arise with outside 
researchers entering a community.  
2. The Pacific Reset and its focus on partnership emerged as an important factor for the 
way the New Zealand Government and NGOs approached climate change in Kiribati. 
This is an area that would benefit from further research to expand on these findings 
through asking what role the Pacific Reset is having in Pacific Island Countries, and to 
what extent this will facilitate true partnerships? This could also further interrogate the 
idea of ‘performative vulnerability’ (Webber, 2013) to ask how partnerships are 
affected by PICs potentially needing to conform to the global governance of climate 
change to receive funding and investment in adaptation projects.  
3. In Chapter Six the Key Informants briefly discussed the role that Maori can have in 
climate migration discussions. Future research could engage with tāngata whenua to 
ask what role, approaches, and Te Tiriti o Waitangi issues could be involved in climate 
migration pathways for Kiribati and other PICs should migration eventuate.  
4. Future research could expand on the media analysis conducted in this thesis to focus on 
Pacific media sources. This could include sources from Kiribati papers or local 
organisations and include languages beyond English to gain greater understanding of 
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Pacific representations of the issue. In doing this, the challenges of local media access 
and awareness in relation to climate change could also be expanded on.  
5. Key Informants highlighted the importance of responsibility and justice for motivating 
climate change actions in Kiribati and the wider Pacific region. The findings showed 
understanding of responsibility that ranged from individual to collective responsibility. 
Future research could investigate in more depth how Young’s (2011) social connection 
model of responsibility could be applied to issues of climate migration from PICs such 
as Kiribati, should migration need to occur.  
8.5 Concluding statement  
This research aimed to explore the complex issues of “climate refugees” and climate change 
induced migration, climate adaptation approaches and New Zealand’s role in these issues. I 
have specifically examined representations of climate change in relation to Kiribati and the 
implications or consequences these have for the responses of both Kiribati and New Zealand 
actors to climate change. In doing this, I have shown that mainstream representations of climate 
migration and adaptation generally discursively construct Kiribati communities as victims of 
climate change that lack agency to make changes and adapt. However, even within this analysis 
there were signs of counternarratives that see the abilities, capacity and knowledge of I-
Kiribati. The Key Informants further supported these counternarratives with their more 
nuanced accounts of climate change migration and adaptation responses in Kiribati. There is 
no doubt that climate change has impacted upon Kiribati and will do so to an even greater 
extent in the future, creating serious challenges. However, migration is not inevitable nor is it 
the focus of this nation’s approaches to climate change. Indeed, in this thesis I argue that the 
approaches of New Zealand and Kiribati differ from these mainstream representations of 
climate migration. These approaches are more nuanced and focused on a variety of 
development and adaptation approaches, with migration only being a background 
consideration for if Kiribati Government and communities choose to take this route.  
 
To my knowledge, few studies have explored the role of New Zealand Government and NGOs 
in issues of climate migration in relation to Kiribati. The findings of this research are therefore 
important in highlighting the disconnect that is evident between popular representations of 
climate migration in Kiribati and what approaches organisations are actually taking in-country. 
Indeed, the representation that Kiribati will be inevitably be uninhabitable in the future and that 
climate migration will occur does not match current approaches being taken by the Government 
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of Kiribati and New Zealand aid organisations. Using a post-structural approach to conduct a 
media analysis and to analyse the different perspectives of Key Informants has allowed for a 
variety of differing perspectives on issues of climate migration in relation to Kiribati and the 
role of New Zealand to be explored. These interviews demonstrated the need for inclusion of 
local perspectives of I-Kiribati to better represent climate migration issues, as well as the clear 
need for PICs to be leading on climate change issues. The role of New Zealand (and other 
industrialised nations) is therefore to support climate action in Kiribati, but also to take global 
action to mitigate anthropogenic climate change. I argue taking actions to mitigate the extent 
of future climate change impacts is crucial as participants made it clear that there will be no 
just outcome in a future where Pacific populations are forced to migrate due to climate change. 
Understanding these discourses and perspectives of climate migration in relation to Kiribati is 
useful for understanding the way that discourse and Western knowledge had a role in the bigger 
picture development approaches and aid in the Pacific Region.  
 
More broadly, interrogating issues of climate migration helps to understand how Western based 
geographical imaginations contribute to the broader power relations between Global South and 
Global North nations. I contend that discourses of climate migration represent an iteration of 
Western-based imaginaries that frame the Global South as ‘other’ or in need of western 
assistance, creating differential power relations between the Global North and South. 
Importantly, I show in this research that these geographical imaginations do not necessarily 
represent the actual approaches to climate change in Kiribati where New Zealand Government 
and NGOs appear to be focusing on adaptation and development through principles of 
partnership. Overall, this research has shown that the issue of climate migration is developing 
and uncertain and it is important to question whose knowledge, discourses and discursive 
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Appendix B: NGO/Government Interview Schedule 
Interview questions for NGOs  
Introductory questions:  
• What organisation/group are you involved in? What is your role?  
• What area of development/aid does your organisation work in? What part of the Pacific 
region?  
• How is your organisation/group involved in discussion/work related to climate change?  
 
Kiribati Climate Change Representations  
• Roughly how long have you been working with stakeholders in Kiribati? What sort of 
work/projects?  
• How do these projects aim to address issues of climate change?  
• Do you have any partnerships/groups/funds you are working with in the Pacific 
region/Kiribati (e.g. MFAT, global funds, international groups, other countries)  
• Does your organisations climate adaptation work with the community (i.e. bottom-up 
approaches) or at a national/government level (i.e. top-down approaches) or a mixture 
of both? Why?  
• How are these projects helping to build community resilience (if relevant)?  
• What is your perspective on the climate change migration/ “climate refugee” narrative 
in NZ/international media? 
• From your experience working in international development, do you think that 
international migration is a potential adaptation approach to climate change in Pacific 
Island countries? Why/why not?  
• What are your thoughts on the way that Kiribati specifically has been portrayed in the 
media (internationally and in NZ)?  
• Does your organisation support migration as an option to adapt to climate change? 
Why/why not?  
• Politically, has the climate and sort of work that your organisation focuses on in Kiribati 
changed with the change of President in the region and the shift from ‘migration with 
dignity’ (e.g. Anote Tong) to staying and adapting (current president)?  
 
New Zealand’s approach to Pacific climate change  
• It is often the least contributing to climate change that face the most severe 
consequences, do you think that the NZ government and other organisations from the 
West are doing enough to assist/counter the effects of climate change in the 
Pacific/Kiribati – why/why not?  
• What are your thoughts on the Humanitarian Visa that was proposed by the government 
in 2017, and later abandoned (at least for the time being)?  
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• What are your thoughts on the Pacific reset? Is this a positive/negative move by New 
Zealand? Does the reset influence aid in Kiribati and the way that migration/adaptation 
is approached by organisations such as yours?   
• What do you think about the proposals that are being suggested by MFAT for addressing 
these issues, for example projections for future involvement of immigration NZ and the 
defence force in the issue of climate change/migration?  
• Do you see any influence of justice and responsibility in the way that New Zealand NGOs 
approach aid and development particularly in relation to climate change adaptation in 
the region? 
• Could New Zealand’s approach to the Pacific/Kiribati improve? If yes how? What needs 
to be done?  
• What responsibility do you feel New Zealand holds towards Kiribati in terms of climate 
change and if migration did need to occur, given that we are a major emitter in the 
Pacific region?  
• How are/should NGOs work with Pacific nations to navigate issues of climate change 
displacement and adaptation in a way that doesn’t disempower or victimise these 
nations, and instead highlights a Pacific voice in the (often) western dominated area of 
international development? 
• Do you have any final thoughts, comments or other topics you would like to discuss? Or 







Appendix C: I-Kiribati Interview Schedule 
Interview Questions for I-Kiribati  
Introductory questions 
• What is your name? how are you involved in the Kiribati community? 
• (if relevant) How long have you lived in New Zealand? 
Kiribati related questions 
• As someone who has come from Kiribati, what are your perceptions of climate change 
here and how it is impacting the nation? 
• Kiribati has been framed by western media in particular as a nation that is vulnerable to 
climate change and that may eventually be uninhabitable. What are your thoughts on this 
portrayal? 
• Why do you think the media has portrayed Kiribati (and other low-lying islands in this 
way? 
• Are there benefits or negatives to the way Kiribati has been represented? 
• What impact (if any) do these representations have on the Kiribati community? 
• What are your perceptions of climate change in Kiribati living in NZ? Is this something the 
NZ Kiribati community discusses? Prompt: or are there other broader issues/priorities? 
• Have you met/heard about any I-Kiribati leaving Kiribati solely because of the impacts of 
climate change? Or has this been for other reasons (social, political, economic etc.)? 
• What do you think the New Zealand government should be doing in Kiribati in relation to 
climate change? Should it be doing less/more? What should its focus be? 
• What are your thoughts on the Humanitarian visa that was proposed by the Green Party 
in 2017? 
• What about the media? Do you think it is approaching issues of climate change in relation 
to Kiribati appropriately? Why/why not? 
• What impact has the international communities representation of Kiribati had on your life 
in New Zealand (if any)? Your identity and culture? 
• What (if any) action should NZ government, organisations, and media be taking to 
improve the way climate change is approached in Kiribati? 
• In what way do you think responsibility and justice are involved in the issue? Who (if 
anyone) should be responsible for assisting in adaptation and/or migration? 
• And if this is NZ/western countries how can these issues be approached in a way that 
centres on local knowledge and information rather than Western understandings? 
• How would you like to see the issue of climate change and potential migration addressed 
by the Kiribati and NZ government in future? 
• How do you understand the risks of climate change to Kiribati and do you have any opinion 
on what should be being done or a way to approach the issues of climate change? 
• Do you have any final thoughts, comments or other topics you would like to discuss? Or 
anything you think we should cover in more detail? 
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Appendix D: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Climate Change Migration, Adaptation and New Zealand’s role in the Pacific 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
Thank you for showing interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before 
agreeing to participate in this study. If you decide to participate we thank you. If you decide not to 
participate there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request. 
 
What is the aim of the project?  
The aim of this project is to explore the ongoing debate over “climate refugees” and climate change 
induced migration in the Pacific region, along with climate change adaptation approaches and New 
Zealand’s role in this issue. Specifically, we will examine representations of climate change in the 
Pacific and Kiribati, and the implications or consequences of these representations for Kiribati and New 
Zealand’s responses and approaches to climate change. This project is being undertaken as part of the 
requirements of a Master of Arts at the University of Otago in New Zealand.  
 
What type of participants are being sought?  
We are seeking participants in New Zealand, who work in the development sector, policy makers, Non-
government Organisations, community leaders, or other areas relevant to issues of climate change in 
the Pacific. We are also seeking members of the I-Kiribati community living in New Zealand to 
participate.  
 
What will participants be asked to do?  
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to attend a 30-60 minute interview, this 
will be an informal discussion at a location that suits you. With your permission the interview will be 
audio recorded. This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning 
includes your experiences, understandings and perspectives of the challenges of climate change in 
Kiribati and/or the Pacific region, the impacts of representations of climate migration in media, climate 
change adaptation approaches in the Pacific, Kiribati and New Zealand’s approaches to climate change 
adaptation and development aid. The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been 
determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops. Consequently, 
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although the School of Geography is aware of the general areas to be explored in the interview, the 
Committee has not been able to review the precise questions to be used. In the event that the line of 
questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or uncomfortable you can ask the 
researcher to stop the interview without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What Data or Information will be Collected and what use will be made of it?  
With your permission the interview will be audio recorded to ensure an accurate transcription of 
the dialogue. You may request a transcribed copy of your interview to read and verify. Audio 
recordings of interviews will only be available to the student researcher and supervisor named 
below. Audio recordings will be destroyed at completion of the project.  
 
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only those mentioned below will be 
able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be kept for at least 5 years 
in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants (such as contact details and 
audio recordings) may be destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived 
from the research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
 
The results of the project may be published. The results will be available in the University of Otago 
Library (Dunedin, New Zealand). Every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. A report 
summarising the results of this project will be available. If you would like a copy of the report 
please select yes on the consent form and write your email address. 
 
Can Participants change their mind and withdraw from the project?  
You have the right to withdraw from the project at any time from the time of the interview until 
January 30th, 2020 without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. You have the right to access 
and correct any personal information until this date.  
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either: 
Olivia Eyles    and   Associate Professor Douglas Hill  
School of Geography     School of Geography  
Email Address:   University Telephone Number: 64 3 479 8775 
eylol270@student.otago.ac.nz  Email Address: dph@geography.otago.ac.nz  
 
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any concerns about the 
ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee through 
the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any 
issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome. 
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Climate Change Migration, Adaptation and New Zealand’s role in the Pacific 
CONSENT  FORM  FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All 
my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request 
further information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time until January 30th, 2020 without any 
disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information (contact details and audio recordings) may be destroyed 
at the conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend 
will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; Participants are only speaking in 
a professional capacity and all details will be anonymised in the final thesis. 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning 
includes questions about The general line of questioning includes your experiences, 
understandings and perspectives of the challenges of climate change in Kiribati/the Pacific 
region, the impacts of representations of climate migration in media, climate change 
adaptation approaches in the Pacific, Kiribati and New Zealand’s approaches to climate 
change adaptation and development aid. The precise nature of the questions which will be 
asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the 
interview develops and that in the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way 
that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) 
and/or may withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any kind. 
 
5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago 
Library (Dunedin, New Zealand), but every attempt will be made to preserve my 
anonymity.  
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 









Name of person taking consent 
 
 
I wish to receive a copy of a final report:      Yes / No 
 
If yes, please provide an email address: ___________________________________ 
 
 
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any concerns 
about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you 
will be informed of the outcome. 
  
 
